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SUMMARY
This dissertation consists of three essays on socially responsible operations. The unify-
ing theme is the focus on nonprofits and healthcare supply chains. In particular, the first two
essays (Chapters 2 and 3) study perishable inventory management problems motivated by
blood supply chain management in a local hospital network, while the third essay (Chapter
4) studies a resource allocation problem faced by nonprofit humanitarian organizations that
collect and deliver unused or reusable medical surplus products to underserved healthcare
facilities in developing countries. The overarching objectives are to 1) develop (near) op-
timal and implementable policies that can help improve the effectiveness and efficiency of
daily operations in health and humanitarian organizations; and 2) derive insights to shed




In the past few years, there has been an increasing interest in studying operations man-
agement problems that have a societal perspective or aim to address social issues. Typical
examples include many activities undertaken by nonprofit organizations with the objective
to better serve the underserved. Problems in these contexts face unique challenges that sig-
nificantly differ from those in traditional for-profit settings. For example, the objective of
these problems is to improve social welfare or service levels to beneficiaries instead of max-
imizing profit, and monetary transfer is usually not used for matching supply with demand
(e.g., beneficiaries may not pay for the products or services). Also, nonprofit organizations
typically face tight operational and cash constraints, which requires innovative solution
methods to allocate the scarce resource in an effective and efficient manner. Finally, imple-
mentation in these contexts is challenging due to the possible lack of operational expertise
therein, which hence requires not only competitive performance but also simplicity of the
proposed solution approaches to facilitate real-world implementation.
This dissertation studies three important problems faced by nonprofits and healthcare
supply chains, and our contributions are mainly the following two folds: First, we develop
provably good and easy-to-implement policies to support daily decision making in the
health and humanitarian contexts, and work closely with our industry collaborators to im-
plement our proposed solutions. For example, we have been working with the Emory Uni-
versity Hospital to implement our proposed inventory ordering and sharing policies for their
management of platelet inventory, and working with MedShare, a top-ranked Southern-US
based medical surplus recovery organization, to implement our proposed scoring mech-
anism to support their recipient selection and biomedical equipment allocation decisions.
Second, we derive insights to shed light into the key trade-offs in complex managerial deci-
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sions in these settings. For example, by studying inventory sharing in a blood supply chain,
we identify managerial insights that are significantly different from common wisdom de-
rived from studies on traditional nonperishable inventory sharing.
In particular, motivated by a platelet inventory management problem in a local hospital,
Chapter 2 of the dissertation considers a periodic-review, fixed-lifetime perishable inven-
tory management problem where demand is a general stochastic process. Determining an
optimal solution for this problem is intractable due to the ”curse of dimensionality”. In
this paper, we first present a computationally efficient algorithm that we call the marginal-
cost dual-balancing policy for the perishable inventory management problem. We then
prove that a myopic policy under the so-called marginal-cost accounting scheme provides
a lower bound on the optimal ordering quantity. By combining the specific lower bound we
derive and any upper bound on the optimal ordering quantity with the marginal-cost dual-
balancing policy, we present a new algorithm that we call the truncated-balancing policy.
We prove that when first-in-first-out (FIFO) is an optimal issuing policy, the expected total
cost of our policies is at most twice that of an optimal ordering policy. Finally, we conduct
numerical analyses based on real data and show that both of our algorithms perform much
better than the worst-case performance bound, and the truncated-balancing policy has a
significant performance improvement over the balancing policy.
Chapter 3 considers inventory sharing in a two-location perishable inventory system,
specifically in the context of platelet inventory sharing in a two-location hospital network.
While the existing studies on inventory sharing have primarily focused on nonperishable
products, motivated by the platelet inventory management problem, we present one of the
first analyses of perishable inventory sharing in a two-location system. We assume that
each location faces stochastic demand and replenishes its inventory using a base-stock pol-
icy. Under given base-stock levels, we determine the direction of transshipment and derive
bounds on the optimal transshipment quantities, which enable us to develop an intuitive
transshipment policy and derive approximations of the expected cost functions. Using
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extensive numerical analyses, we show that our proposed policy performs near-optimally.
Comparing our results with those from the multi-location nonperishable and single-location
perishable inventory literature, we further establish the following findings: i) Transship-
ments should occur more often (or with a larger quantity) when products are perishable;
ii) unlike the well-established result in the single-location setting, in a two-location setting
where inventory sharing is possible, it may be optimal to order strictly more in the perish-
able case than in the nonperishable case; and iii) contrary to the established finding in the
nonperishable case, the value of inventory sharing for the perishable case can be substantial
even when demand at one location is deterministic.
Chapter 4 considers a resource allocation problem faced by Medical Surplus Recov-
ery Organizations (MSROs) that recover medical surplus products to fulfill the needs of
under-served healthcare facilities in developing countries. Due to the uncertain, uncontrol-
lable supply and limited information about recipient needs, delivering the right product to
the right recipient in MSRO supply chains is particularly challenging. The objective is to
identify strategies to improve the value provision capability of the MSROs. In particular,
we propose a mechanism design approach to determine which recipient to serve at each
shipping opportunity based on the recipients reported rankings of products. We find that
when MSRO inventory information is shared with recipients, the only truthful mechanism
is random selection among the recipients. We then show that eliminating the inventory
information provision and withholding information regarding other recipients both enlarge
the set of truthful mechanisms, thereby increasing the total value provision. Further, we
show that under a wide class of implementable mechanisms, eliciting valuations has no
value-added beyond eliciting rankings. Finally, we present a calibrated numerical study
based on historical data from a partner MSRO, and show that a strategy consisting of a
ranking-based mechanism in conjunction with eliminating inventory and competitor infor-
mation can significantly improve the value provision for the MSROs.
3
CHAPTER 2
2-APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS FOR PERISHABLE INVENTORY
MANAGEMENT WHEN FIFO IS AN OPTIMAL ISSUING POLICY
2.1 Introduction.
Typical examples of perishable products include medical products such as blood and cer-
tain pharmaceuticals, and food products such as refrigerated meat and many dairy prod-
ucts. Unlike nonperishable products that can wait in inventory indefinitely until they are
used to satisfy demand, perishable products must be used within a short period of time
and will become outdated otherwise. Outdating can result in a significant amount of waste
and financial loss. For example, the number of platelets outdated in 2011 in the U.S. was
approximately 321,000 units, which accounted for 12.8% of all processed units ([1]). Sim-
ilarly, the total annual unsaleable costs in the food, beverage, health and beauty industries
in the U.S. were estimated as $15 billion, and about 17% of these costs (over 2.5 billion
dollars) were caused by outdating ([2]). These facts underline the critical need for efficient
inventory management policies for perishable products.
Our study is specifically motivated by a platelet inventory management problem faced
by a local acute-care hospital, Emory University Hospital Midtown. In Emory Midtown,
the demand for platelets mainly comes from cardiac surgeries, which account for more
than 85% of its platelet transfusion. In this case, the uncertainty of demand stems from
two sources: i) the number of surgeries performed per day, and ii) the amount of platelets
needed per surgery. Such a structure of demand is common for many blood products. As
such, the compound Poisson distribution, where a random (Poisson) amount of patients
arrive at every time period (e.g., day) and each patient consumes a random amount of
blood products, has been widely assumed for modeling demand in the blood supply chain
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literature (e.g., [3, 4, 5]). However, while simply assuming random arrivals of patients
is reasonable for some cases such as trauma patients, more detailed forecast information
on the number of arrivals is often available for many other cases, especially for scheduled
operations such as cardiac surgeries. Most of those surgeries are scheduled days or even
weeks in advance, and hence the number of surgeries that will be performed each day
is gradually revealed as time approaches. Although the compound structure of demand
is widely considered in the blood inventory literature, to our knowledge, the gradually
revealed forecast information on the number of arrivals has not been formally captured.
Motivated by the platelet inventory management problem at Emory Midtown, in this
paper, we study a periodic-review, fixed-lifetime perishable inventory problem under a
general demand process, which can be nonstationary, correlated, and dynamically evolving
over time. Similar to many other perishable inventory studies, we consider the first-in-first-
out (FIFO) issuing policy, i.e., older products are issued first to meet demand, which is
shown to perform very well in many perishable inventory systems (e.g., [6, 7]).
Our contributions in this paper are as follows:
i) We present an approximation algorithm that we call the marginal-cost dual-balancing
policy (or the balancing policy for short) for the perishable inventory problem. We prove
that when FIFO is an optimal issuing policy, our algorithm has a worst-case performance
guarantee of two, i.e., the expected total cost of our policy is at most twice that of an optimal
policy.
ii) While it is intuitive that FIFO helps reduce the amount of outdate by removing the
oldest products from inventory, it is not obvious when it is guaranteed to be an optimal
issuing policy. In this regard, we extend existing results in the literature on the optimality
of FIFO and provide a necessary and sufficient condition and an easy-to-check sufficient
condition for FIFO to be optimal.
iii) We present a tight example to show that the worst-case performance bound of two
for the balancing policy can be achieved asymptotically when the unit shortage penalty
5
goes to infinity, in which case the balancing policy tends to under-order. We also present a
counterexample to show that when FIFO is not optimal, the worst-case performance bound
can be strictly greater than 2.
iv) We derive a lower bound on the optimal ordering quantity by minimizing the one-
period cost under the so-called marginal-cost accounting scheme. Then, by “truncating”
the balancing quantity using this (or any looser) lower bound and any upper bound on the
optimal ordering quantity, we present a new algorithm that we call the truncated-balancing
policy. We prove that the truncated-balancing policy also admits a worst-case performance
guarantee of two when FIO is optimal.
v) Lastly, we conduct extensive numerical analyses using both hypothetical and real
data to show that a) our proposed algorithms perform significantly better than the worst-
case performance bound of two; and b) the truncated-balancing policy performs signif-
icantly better than the balancing policy and existing policies in the literature, especially
when the unit shortage penalty is large.
In the literature, many papers have studied the periodic-review, fixed-lifetime perish-
able inventory management problem (see reviews by [8, 9] and [10]). The general multi-
period lifetime perishable inventory problem was first studied independently by [11] and
[12], who both formulated the problem as a dynamic program (DP) with a state space com-
prised of inventory levels of different ages. However, the structure of an optimal policy is
complicated and finding an optimal policy using standard dynamic programming is com-
putationally intractable due to the well-known “curse of dimensionality”. Therefore, later
efforts are mainly focused on heuristic policies. Among the developed heuristic policies,
the base-stock policy, under which the total inventory is replenished up to the same level
(i.e., base-stock level) at each period, is particularly popular due to its simplicity and near-
optimal numerical performance (e.g., [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]). Other heuristic
policies such as the modified base-stock policy (e.g., [21]), the constant order policy (e.g.,
[22, 23]), and a higher-order approximation ([24]) are also proposed and studied. However,
6
due to the complexity of the perishable inventory management problem, most of these stud-
ies assume that demand over time is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.), and
none of the proposed heuristic policies has a theoretical performance guarantee.
More recently, there is a stream of work focusing on approximation algorithms for
stochastic inventory systems under general demand processes. The pioneering work by
[25] studies a stochastic inventory management problem for nonperishable products. They
show that the proposed dual-balancing policy, which balances the costs of under-ordering
and over-ordering under a marginal-cost accounting scheme, has a worst-case performance
guarantee of two. This idea has been later extended to many other settings to consider lost
sales ([26]), setup costs and capacity constraints ([27, 28, 29]), remanufacturing ([30]), and
perishable products ([31, 32, 33]).
Among these papers that study approximation algorithms in inventory management,
[32], which also considers a perishable inventory control problem with zero lead time and
no set-up cost, is the most relevant to ours. In particular, [32] present a proportional-
balancing policy and a dual-balancing policy for perishable inventory systems that follow
FIFO issuing policy, and they prove that 1) the proportional-balancing policy has a per-
formance guarantee between two and three for the general case, and 2) the dual-balancing
policy has a performance guarantee of two when demand is independent and stochastically
non-decreasing over time.
While both our study and [32] focus on developing approximation algorithms for per-
ishable inventory systems, our analysis and results are different from theirs in the follow-
ing aspects (see also Table 2.1): i) We present algorithms that are different from the ones
presented in [32]. ii) We tighten the worst-case performance guarantee for perishable in-
ventor systems to exactly two for cases where FIFO is an optimal issuing policy, and show
that the condition presented in [32] to ensure a performance guarantee of two (i.e., de-
mand is independent and stochastically non-decreasing) is a special case of ours. iii) We
further consider truncating our balancing policy using a specific lower bound we derive
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on the optimal ordering quantity, and establish worst-case performance guarantee for the
truncated-balancing policy. This is an important contribution because, unlike the exist-
ing results in the nonperishable inventory literature, truncation in the perishable inventory
case imposes several new methodological challenges. Further, as we show in §4.7, the
truncated-balancing policy performs much better than the existing policies in the litera-
ture. iv) Methodologically, while [32] build their analysis based on algebraic arguments,
our analysis is based on two new ideas that we call the imaginary operation policy and
the dynamic unit-matching scheme, respectively (see discussion also in the following para-
graphs).
Table 2.1: A summary of the major differences of our work from [32]
Policies Proportional-balancing Dual-balancing Marginal-cost dual-
([32]) ([32]) balancing (our work)
Common assumptions FIFO issuing policy, no setup cost, zero lead time, backlogging/lost sales
Specific settings A: General B: Demand is indepen- C: FIFO is an optimal
dent and stochastically issuing policy
non-decreasing
Relationship Setting B ⊂ Setting C ⊂ Setting A
Performance guarantee Between 2 and 3 2 2
Truncation of policies No Yes
Methodology Algebraic arguments Imaginary operation policy
& Dynamic unit matching
Finally, we remark that the main challenge for the worst-case analysis for perishable
inventory systems stems from the outdating process of perishable products. More specif-
ically, the existing worst-case analysis for nonperishable inventory systems is based on a
(static) one-to-one matching between units under the balancing policy and the optimal pol-
icy, which relies on the fact that all products will be used to satisfy demand (or remain in
inventory at the end of the horizon). This is in contrast to the perishable inventory case
where units can simply outdate without satisfying any demand. As [32] also point out, “the
perishability of products destroys this matching mechanism, thus the existing techniques
developed for non-perishable inventory systems are no longer applicable.” In this paper, we
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introduce two new ideas: 1) an imaginary operation policy, under which old products can be
replaced with new ones without cost so that the (otherwise partially ordered) inventory vec-
tors under two different policies can be easily compared, and 2) a dynamic unit-matching
scheme, under which units can be dynamically matched over time after we observe the re-
alizations of outdates. These two ideas together allow us to address the challenges imposed
by not only perishability but also truncation of balancing policies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In §2.2, we present a model for-
mulation of the problem. In §2.3, we present a marginal-cost dual-balancing policy for the
perishable inventory control problem. In §2.4, we prove that when FIFO is an optimal issu-
ing policy, our algorithm has a worst-case performance guarantee of two, i.e., the expected
total cost of our policy is at most twice that of an optimal ordering policy. We further com-
pare our policy with base-stock policies and show that the expected total cost of our policy
is always at most twice that of an optimal base-stock policy. In §2.5, we first show that a
myopic policy under the marginal-cost accounting scheme provides a lower bound on the
optimal ordering quantity; we then present a truncated-balancing policy that also admits a
worst-case performance guarantee of two when FIFO is an optimal issuing policy. In §2.6,
we present a necessary and sufficient condition and several easy-to-check sufficient condi-
tions that ensure the optimality of FIFO issuing policy. Finally, we present computational
results based on a platelet inventory control problem in §4.7, and draw conclusions in §4.8.
2.2 Model Formulation.
We study a periodic-review, fixed-lifetime perishable inventory management problem un-
der a general stochastic demand process.
Notation. We consider a product lifetime of K > 1 periods and a planning horizon of
T periods. Demands over the planning horizon are denoted asD1, ..., DT , which are exoge-
nous random variables with finite means and can be nonstationary, correlated and dynami-
cally evolving. As a convention, we generally use capital letters to denote random variables,
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and lowercase letters to denote their realizations (product lifetime K and planning horizon
T are exceptions). At the beginning of each period t, there is an information set denoted as
ft, which contains the realization of demands (d1, ..., dt−1) and possibly some other fore-
cast information available at period t, denoted as (u1, ..., ut). That is, the information set ft
is a specific realization of the random vector Ft = (D1, ..., Dt−1, U1, ..., Ut). Let Ft be the
set of all possible ft. Further, we assume that the conditional joint distribution of future de-
mands (Dt, ..., DT ) is known for given ft. Additional notation that describes system states
and decision variables is defined as follows:
Xk,t: the inventory level of age k at the beginning of period t, k = 1, ..., K − 1; t =
1, ..., T .
Xt: the inventory vector at the beginning of period t, i.e., Xt = (X1,t, ..., XK−1,t),
t = 1, ..., T .
Qt: the ordering quantity at period t, t = 1, ..., T .




Xk,t +Qt, t = 1, ..., T .
System Dynamics. We define the sequence of events as follows: 1) At the beginning of
each period t = 1, ..., T , theK−1 dimensional inventory vector Xt and the information set
Ft are observed, based on which Qt products of age zero are ordered; 2) products ordered
arrive instantly with a zero lead time; 3) random demand Dt then occurs during the period,
inventory is issued to satisfy demand based on the FIFO rule, and unmet demand is lost;1
and 4) at the end of each period, all products in inventory age by 1, and products reaching
age K are disposed from the inventory. Let X0,t = Qt. Then, the inventory vector is
1We note that since we assume zero lead time, our results hold equally well for the backlogging case. This
is because with zero lead time, all backlogged demand can be satisfied at the beginning of the next period.
Then, a backlogging model with cost parameters ĉ, p̂, ĥ and ŵ is equivalent to a lost sales model with cost












, k = 1, ..., K − 1; t = 0, ..., T − 1.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the system starts from empty (i.e., zero initial
inventory); however, all of our results can be extended to consider arbitrary initial inventory
levels.
Cost Structure. At each period, we consider an ordering cost ĉ for each unit of product
ordered at that period, a shortage penalty p̂ for each unit of stock-out, a holding cost ĥ for
each unit of excess inventory after demand realization, and an outdating cost ŵ for each
unit of product that is outdated at the end of that period. To eliminate trivial situations,
we assume p̂ − ĉ ≥ 0. We allow negative outdating cost (i.e., salvage value) as long as
ŵ+βĉ ≥ 0, where β denotes the discount factor. We also consider a salvage value for each
unit of product left in inventory at the end of the planning horizon, and for simplicity we
assume it is equal to the ordering cost ĉ (our results can be easily extended to consider any
salvage value v̂ as long as ŵ + βv̂ ≥ 0 and ĥ+ ĉ− βv̂ ≥ 0).
Optimality Criterion. At each period t, given the inventory vector xt and the infor-
mation set ft, an ordering decision rule is a function that maps from the set of all possible
(xt, ft) to the set of possible qt; and an ordering policy is a collection of ordering decision
rules at all periods. Let π denote any given ordering policy. Then, the total discounted cost












where Xπt and Qπt denote the inventory vector and ordering quantity at period t under pol-
icy π, respectively. Then, an optimal ordering policy OPT can be obtained by OPT ∈
arg minπ E[Ĉ (π)]. We call the decision rules that constitute an optimal policy the optimal
decision rules.
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2.3 Marginal-Cost Dual-Balancing Policy.
In this section, we first introduce a cost transformation to eliminate ordering cost in §2.3.1.
We then present a marginal-cost accounting scheme for the perishable inventory setting in
§2.3.2. Finally, we present our algorithm in §2.3.3. Unless presented in the main text, the
proofs of all analytical results are included in the appendix.
2.3.1 Cost Transformation.
To apply the marginal-cost accounting scheme which we present in §2.3.2, we first need to
construct an equivalent problem with zero ordering cost.
Define the cost parameters for the transformed problem as: c = 0, p = p̂ − ĉ, h =
ĥ + (1 − β)ĉ, and w = ŵ + βĉ. Since we assume p̂ − ĉ ≥ 0 and ŵ + βĉ ≥ 0, all of the
transformed costs are nonnegative. Then, for a given policy π, the total discounted cost of






p(Dt − Y πt )+ + h(Y πt −Dt)+ + w(XπK−1,t −Dt)+
)
.
In the following lemma, we show that the difference between the total discounted costs
of the original and transformed problems is independent of policy π, which implies that the
two problems are equivalent in the sense that they have the same set of optimal ordering
policies.
Lemma 1 For any policy π, Ĉ (π)− C (π) =
T∑
t=1
βt−1ĉDt, with probability one.
2.3.2 Marginal-Cost Accounting Scheme.
Unlike traditional methods which assign each period all costs that occur at this period, the
marginal-cost accounting scheme, first introduced by [25], assigns each period all costs
that are “caused” by the decision made at this period. For example, a unit ordered at period
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t may stay in the system for multiple periods, thus holding costs may be charged for this
unit for multiple periods; under the marginal-cost accounting scheme, all of these holding
costs are assigned to period t. Following a similar logic, we next present the marginal-cost
accounting scheme for the perishable inventory setting.
Marginal Shortage Penalty. Since inventory can be replenished with a zero lead time,
any mistake of under-ordering at a given period can be fixed by ordering more in the next
period. Hence, the marginal shortage penalty at each period is simply defined as the short-
age penalty that occurs at this period. For t = 1, ..., T , given xt, ft and qt, let Pt(xt, ft, qt)
denote the expected marginal shortage penalty at period t. Then, we have:
Pt(xt, ft, qt) := βt−1pE[(Dt − yt)+|ft].
Marginal Holding Cost. For t = 1, ..., T , given xt, ft and qt, let Ht(xt, ft, qt) denote
the expected marginal holding cost at period t, which is defined as the sum of all expected
holding costs charged for units ordered at period t. In the perishable inventory setting,
since units in inventory may become outdated without satisfying any demand, the future
holding costs charged for qt depend on the entire inventory vector xt. Thus, similar to
[12], we let A0,t = 0, and for k = 1, ..., K − 1, let Ak,t be the total demand over periods
t, ..., t + k − 1 that cannot be satisfied by the inventory of (xK−k,t, ..., xK−1,t), i.e., the
inventory that would have been outdated by the end of period t+ k − 1. Then:
Ak,t = (Ak−1,t +Dt+k−1 − xK−k,t)+, k = 1, ..., K − 1.




+ represents the total demand over




+)+ represents the amount of qt left in inventory at the end of period t + k.
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Then, we have:











where the sum over k is defined up to T − t when t+K − 1 ≥ T .
Marginal Outdating Cost. For t = 1, ..., T , given xt, ft and qt, let Wt(xt, ft, qt)
denote the expected marginal outdating cost at period t, which is defined as the sum of all
expected outdating costs charged for units ordered at period t, i.e., the expected outdating
costs that occur at period t + K − 1. Since units ordered at periods T −K + 2, ..., T will
not outdate within the planning horizon, we have Wt(xt, ft, qt) = 0 for t ≥ T −K+ 2. For
t ≤ T −K + 1, (qt−AK−1,t−Dt+K−1)+ represents the amount of qt that will be outdated
at the end of period t+K − 1. Then, we have:
Wt(xt, ft, qt) := βt+K−1wE[(qt − AK−1,t −Dt+K−1)+|ft].




t denote the corresponding marginal shortage
penalty, holding and outdating costs at period t, respectively. Under a given policy π, xπt and
qπt are both known for given ft. Then, E[P
π
t |ft] = Pt(xπt , ft, qπt ), E[Hπt |ft] = Ht(xπt , ft, qπt ),










Now we present our first algorithm based on the marginal-cost accounting scheme pre-
sented above. Clearly, the expected marginal shortage penalty Pt(xt, ft, qt) occurs due to
under-ordering, while the expected marginal holding and outdating costs Ht(xt, ft, qt) and
Wt(xt, ft, qt) occur due to over-ordering. Therefore, we define the marginal-cost dual-
balancing policy (denoted as B) as to balance the expected marginal shortage penalty
against the sum of the expected marginal holding and outdating costs. More specifically,
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at each period t, given xt and ft, the marginal-cost dual-balancing ordering quantity qBt
(for simplicity, we also call it the balancing quantity in the following text) is defined as the
solution to the following equation:
Pt(xt, ft, qBt ) = Ht(xt, ft, q
B
t ) +Wt(xt, ft, q
B
t ). (2.1)
Note that the existence of the balancing ordering quantity qBt is guaranteed, because at
any period t, given xt and ft, Pt(xt, ft, qt) is non-increasing in qt; when qt = 0, Pt(xt, ft, qt)
is nonnegative, and when qt goes to infinity, Pt(xt, ft, qt) goes to zero. In contrast,Ht(xt, ft, qt)
and Wt(xt, ft, qt) are non-decreasing in qt; when qt = 0, Ht(xt, ft, qt) = Wt(xt, ft, qt) = 0,
and when qt goes to infinity, both Ht(xt, ft, qt) and Wt(xt, ft, qt) go to infinity. Therefore,
when we allow fractional ordering quantities, qBt is guaranteed to exist. The algorithm can
be easily extended to consider discrete ordering quantities following a similar argument as
in [25].
We also remark that our marginal-cost dual-balancing policy is different from both the
proportional-balancing policy and the dual-balancing policy defined in [32]. First, while
our policy uses a balancing ratio of 1:1 (i.e., set the marginal shortage penalty to be equal
to the sum of the marginal holding and outdating costs), the proportional-balancing policy
in [32] uses a balancing ratio of 1 : Kh+w
2(K−1)h+w . Second, while our policy balances the
marginal shortage penalty against the sum of the marginal holding and outdating costs, the
dual-balancing policy in [32] balances the marginal shortage penalty against the marginal
outdating cost plus the holding cost that occurs at period t, i.e., the marginal holding cost




In this section, we first build a bridging policy in §2.4.1. Then, in §2.4.2, we construct a
new unit-matching scheme that (dynamically) matches units under two different policies on
a one-to-one correspondence. Based on these results, we prove the worst-case performance
guarantee of our algorithm in §2.4.3 under the assumption that FIFO is an optimal issuing
policy. Finally, in §2.4.4 and §2.4.5, we present a tight example and a counterexample,
respectively, to show that our worst-case performance guarantee of two is tight, and that the
worst-case performance bound can be strictly greater than two when FIFO is not optimal.
2.4.1 A Bridging Policy: Imaginary Operation Policy.
By Lemma 1, we know that Ĉ (π) − C (π) is nonnegative and independent of policy π.
Therefore, to show that the expected total cost of the marginal-cost dual-balancing policy
is at most twice that of an optimal ordering policy (i.e., E[Ĉ (B)] ≤ 2E[Ĉ (OPT )]), it is
sufficient to show that E[C (B)] ≤ 2E[C (OPT )].
However, due to the partially ordered nature of multi-dimensional inventory vectors in
the perishable case, it is difficult to directly compare the costs under policies B and OPT .
Therefore, we next propose a bridging policy that we call the imaginary operation policy
(denoted as IM ), which allows us to properly modify the inventory vectors so that the in-
ventory vectors under two different policies become completely ordered, and the respective
costs can be easily compared. We then show E[C (IM)] ≤ E[C (OPT )] (Lemma 4) and
E[C (B)] ≤ 2E[C (IM)] (Lemma 6), respectively, which together lead to our main result
E[C (B)] ≤ 2E[C (OPT )] (Theorem 1).
We start with defining the ordering rule under policy IM . At each period t, given the
system state xt and ft, let the system under policy IM follow an optimal ordering decision
rule (note that this is different from copying the ordering quantity from the system under
policy OPT ). What differentiates policies IM and OPT is that under policy IM , at each
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period after ordering and before demand realization, products in the inventory vector can be
“moved” from older positions to the position of age zero, i.e., old products can be replaced
with new ones for free.
We now define how units are moved under policy IM along a given sample path fT+1.
First, at period 1, let yB1 and y
IM
1 be the total inventory levels after ordering under policies
B and IM , respectively. Suppose yB1 ≥ yIM1 . Then no units are moved at this period.
Suppose yB1 < y
IM
1 . Then we move all units in the inventory vector under policy IM to
the position of age zero.
At period 2, let yB2 and y
IM
2 be the total inventory levels after ordering under policies B
and IM , respectively. Suppose yB2 ≥ yIM2 . Then no units are moved at this period. Suppose
yB2 < y
IM
2 . Consider the following two subcases: i) if y
B
1 ≥ yIM1 , i.e., no units were moved
at period 1, then we move all units under policy IM to age zero; ii) if yB1 < y
IM
1 , i.e., all
units under IM were moved to age zero at period 1, then the rule of movements for period
2 is defined as follows.
Since all units were moved to age zero at period 1, the inventory under policy IM is
consumed (used to satisfy demand or outdated) no faster than that under policy B. Also,
we have yIM1 > y
B
1 . Then at period 2, the total inventory of age greater than or equal to one






xBk,2. Then, at the








Similarly, at any period t, let yBt and y
IM
t be the total inventory levels after ordering
under policies B and IM , respectively (both are well defined after the rules of movements
in periods 1, ..., t − 1 are defined). Then, we assign period t into one of the following
subsets of {1,...,T}:
TP := {t : yBt ≥ yIMt },TH := {t : yBt < yIMt }.2
2Note that to define the rule of movements in period t under policy IM , we do not need to know the
full partition of the decision epochs {1, ..., T}; instead, we only need to know whether each period 1, ..., t
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Suppose t ∈ TP , i.e., yBt ≥ yIMt . Then no units are moved at period t. Suppose t ∈ TH ,
i.e., yBt < y
IM
t . Let TH = {τ1, ..., τn}, where τ1 < ... < τn. Then, if t = τ1, we move all
units under policy IM to age zero. If t = τi for some i ≥ 2, we first move all units of age
strictly less than τi − τi−1 under policy IM to age zero, and then for each j = 1, ..., i− 1,
move some units of age equal to τi − τj (i.e., ordered in period τj) under policy IM to age
zero such that after all the movements, we have:
(i) There is only positive inventory of age 0, τi − τi−1, ..., τi − τ1 under policy IM .
(ii) For j = 1, ..., i − 1, the total inventory of age greater than or equal to age τi − τj






xBk,τi , j = 1, ..., i− 1. (2.2)
By construction, we are ensured to have that: ∀τi ∈ TH , after the movements of units
at τi, the inventory vector under policy IM is “younger” than that under policy B, i.e., for
k = 1, ..., K − 1, policy IM has no more inventory of age greater than or equal to k.






xBm,τi , k = 1, ..., K − 1. (2.3)
An illustrative example describing the rules of movements is presented in Figure 2.1. In
this example, we have product lifetime of K = 3 periods, and planning horizon of T = 4
periods. Consider a given sample path where d1 = d2 = d3 = 0 and d4 = 2. At the
beginning of period t = 1, assume qB1 = 2 and q
IM
1 = 1. Then, y
B
1 = 2 > 1 = y
IM
1 , thus
t = 1 ∈ TP and no movements are performed at this period. At the beginning of period
t = 2, assume qB2 = 1 and q
IM
2 = 3. Then, y
B
2 = 3 < 4 = y
IM
2 , thus t = 2 = τ1 ∈ TH ,
and we move all units under policy IM to age 0. At the beginning of period t = 3, assume
qB3 = q
IM
3 = 2. Then, y
B
3 = 5 < 6 = y
IM
3 , thus t = 3 = τ2 ∈ TH . The unit ordered at τ1







t = 1 ∈ TP
(d1 = 0)
t = 2 = τ1 ∈ TH
(d2 = 0)
t = 3 = τ2 ∈ TH
(d3 = 0)
t = 4 ∈ TP
(d4 = 2)
units of age 0 units of age 1
units of age 2
Figure 2.1: An illustrative example to show the imaginary operation policy (IM )
under policy B is now of age τ2−τ1 = 1, therefore we move one unit of age 1 under policy
IM to age 0 such that the amount of units of age greater than or equal to 1 under policiesB
and IM are equal. At the beginning of period t = 4, assume qB4 = 3 and q
IM
4 = 0. Then,
yB4 = 6 = y
IM
4 , thus t = 4 ∈ TP and no movements are performed at this period.
2.4.2 A Dynamic Unit-Matching Scheme.
Based on the imaginary operation policy (IM) we constructed above, we now introduce a
new unit-matching scheme that matches inventory units under policies B and IM , which
plays a key role in the comparison of C (B) and C (IM). In particular, our objective is to
match the units ordered at each period t ∈ TH under policy B to units under policy IM on
a one-to-one correspondence, such that a matched unit under policy B stays in inventory
no longer than the corresponding unit under policy IM . This way, the total holding and
outdating costs charged for the units ordered at t ∈ TH under policy B are bounded by the
total holding and outdating costs under policy IM .
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The idea of examining inventory and demand at a unit level is first proposed by [34],
and is first applied to prove worst-case performance guarantee by [25], where units under
two policies are matched on a one-to-one correspondence. Similar arguments are also
used in all the subsequent studies on approximation algorithms for nonperishable inventory
systems ([26, 27, 28, 29, 30]). However, in these studies, the matching of inventory units
is static in the sense that once a pair of units under two policies are matched at some
period, the matching is permanent. This approach relies on the assumption that all units
ordered will be eventually used to satisfy demand (or remain in inventory at the end of the
horizon), and a pair of units, once matched, will be used to satisfy the same unit of demand.
However, this is in contrast to the perishable inventory setting where units in inventory may
simply outdate without satisfying any demand. To address this complication, we introduce
a new matching scheme that we call the dynamic unit-matching scheme, under which, a unit
ordered at t ∈ TH under policy B can be matched and then re-matched to a new unit under
policy IM . The rules of matchings are defined as follows, and an illustrative example is
provided at the end of this subsection.
Recall that TH = {τ1, ..., τn}, where τ1 < ... < τn. At the beginning of period τ1,
after the movements of units under policy IM (based on the rules described in §2.4.1), we




units under policy IM ,3 where yBτ1 < y
IM
τ1
. Older units are assigned smaller indices, and
units of the same age are assigned indices in an arbitrary sequence. Then, we temporarily
match each unit ordered at τ1 under policy B to the unit with the same index under policy
IM . Clearly, each pair of temporarily matched units have the same age (of age 0). At the
beginning of period τ2, consider the following three cases.
Case 1: If a temporarily matched unit under policy B has been used to satisfy demand,
there must exist a unit under policy IM that is also used to satisfy the same unit of demand.
This is true because yBτ1 < y
IM
τ1
and the inventory under policy IM is consumed no faster




than that under policy B (due to Inequality (2.3)). Therefore, for a temporarily matched
unit under policy B that has been used to satisfy demand, we re-match it to the unit under
policy IM that is used to satisfy the same unit of demand, and we set this matching to be
permanent.
Case 2: If a temporarily matched unit under policy B has been outdated, its last tem-
porarily matched unit under policy IM must also have been outdated (because they have
the same age). We set this matching also to be permanent.
Case 3: If a temporarily matched unit under policy B is still in inventory, we re-define
the index and re-match it to a (potentially) new unit under policy IM . In particular, we




units under policy IM (after the movements of units). Then, we re-match (still temporarily)
all previously temporarily matched units (now of age τ2 − τ1) and all units ordered at τ2
(now of age 0) under policy B to units with the same indices under policy IM . Since there
is only positive inventory of age 0 and τ2 − τ1 under policy IM and Equation (2.2) holds
after the movements of units in period τ2, each pair of temporarily matched units must have
the same age (either 0 or τ2 − τ1).
Continuing in this manner, all units ordered in periods t ∈ TH under policy B are
ultimately permanently matched to certain units under policy IM if they are used to satisfy
demand or outdated. For units that are ordered in t ∈ TH and are still in inventory at
the end of the planning horizon, their last temporarily matched units under policy IM must
also be in inventory. This is because after the movements in τn ∈ TH (i.e., the last period in
TH), Inequality (2.3) holds, which ensures that the inventory under policy IM is consumed
no faster than that under policy B. We then set these matchings also to be permanent. Note
that by construction, there are no overlaps in the permanent matchings. Further, as we will
show in Lemma 5, any matched unit under policy B stays in inventory no longer than its
permanently matched unit under policy IM .







t = 1 ∈ TP
(d1 = 0)































units of age 0 units of age 1
units of age 2 matched units under policy B
Figure 2.2: An illustrative example to show the dynamic unit-matching scheme
ample presented in §2.4.1. At the beginning of period t = 1 ∈ TP , no matching is defined.
At the beginning of period t = 2 = τ1, after the movements under policy IM , units under
policy B are assigned with indices from 1 to 3, units under policy IM are assigned with
indices from 1 to 4, and unit 3 under policyB (ordered at τ1) is temporarily matched to unit
3 under policy IM ; units 1-2 are not matched since they are not ordered at periods in TH .
At the beginning of period t = 3 = τ2, no permanent matching is defined since unit 3 under
policy B is still in inventory. After the movements under policy IM , units under policy B
are assigned with indices from 1 to 5, units under policy IM are assigned with indices from
1 to 6, and units 3-5 under policy B (ordered at either τ1 or τ2) are temporarily matched
to units 3-5 under policy IM , respectively. At the beginning of period t = 4 ∈ TP , no
new temporary matching is defined; also, since units 3-5 are all in inventory, no permanent
matching is defined. At the end of the horizon (i.e., end of period 4), units 3-4 under policy
B is permanently matched to units 1-2 under policy IM since they are used to satisfy the
same units of demand. Unit 5 under policy B is still in inventory at the end of the horizon,
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therefore it is permanently matched to its last temporarily matched unit, i.e., unit 5 under
policy IM .
2.4.3 Worst-Case Performance Guarantee.
We now prove the worst-case performance guarantee for policy B. As discussed before,
we use policy IM as a bridging policy, and show that the expected total cost of policy IM
is no more that that of policy OPT , and the expected total cost of policy B is at most twice
that of policy IM , respectively.
Comparison of Policies IM and OPT . Recall that under Policy IM , an optimal or-
dering decision rule is implemented in each period while old products can be replaced with
new ones for free. While is intuitive that replacing old products with new ones does not
increase the expected total cost, it is not obvious when this is guaranteed to be true. In that
regard, we find that FIFO being an optimal issuing policy is sufficient: FIFO being an op-
timal issuing policy implies that younger products are more preferred to have in inventory
than older ones, thus replacing old products with new ones will not increase the expected
total cost. We next formally describe the optimality of an issuing policy, followed by the
statement of our assumption.
At each period t, given the inventory vector xt, the information set ft and the ordering
quantity qt, let vk,t be the amount of products of age k that are used to meet demand at
period t, k = 0, ..., K − 1. Then, vk,t ≤ xk,t, k = 0, ..., K − 1, and
K−1∑
k=0
vk,t = min{yt, dt}.
An issuing decision rule is a function from the set of all possible (xt, ft, qt, dt) to the set of
all possible vt = (v0,t, ..., vK−1,t); and an issuing policy is a collection of issuing decision





+}, k = 0, ..., K − 1. Given an initial inventory level and an
ordering policy, an issuing policy is said to be optimal if it minimizes the expected total cost
among all issuing policies. Let Φt be the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of Dt for
given ft, and let the inverse c.d.f. of Dt be Φ−1t (z) := inf{x : Φt(x) ≥ z}. Given ft, define
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the critical fractile at period t as ỹt(ft) := Φ−1t (
p
p+h





Then, as we show in the proof of Lemma 3, the total inventory level after ordering at period
t under an optimal policy is at most ȳt. To compare policies IM and OPT , we state our
assumption as follows:
Assumption 1 (FIFO is Optimal) At any period t, if yt ≤ ȳt and an optimal ordering
decision rule (defined in §2.2 when the issuing policy is fixed as FIFO) is implemented at
t+ 1, ..., T , then for any demand realization dt ≥ 0 and future demand distribution defined
by any ft+1 ∈ Ft+1, FIFO minimizes the expected total discounted cost in periods t, ..., T
among all issuing policies.
Remark 1 We note that we only assume FIFO to be optimal for relatively small initial
inventory levels (i.e., yt ≤ ȳt), which is a weaker assumption than assuming FIFO to be
optimal under any initial inventory levels ([7]). This is because when the initial inventory
level is high, FIFO may result in a higher holding cost without reducing much shortages
or outdates compared with other issuing policies, in which case FIFO is less likely to be
optimal.
To date, FIFO has been shown to be optimal under i.i.d. demand ([6]) or zero holding
cost ([7]). In §2.6, we further extend these existing findings and present a necessary and
sufficient condition and a easy-to-check sufficient condition to ensure the optimality of
the FIFO issuing policy. We also provide conditions and commonly seen examples under
which FIFO is optimal and our performance guarantee is strictly tighter than the existing
one.
With Assumption 1, we now present a structural property on the optimal cost-to-go
function, which is a key result for comparing policies IM and OPT . At each period t,
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given xt and ft, let Ct(xt, ft) be the optimal cost-to-go function. Then, we have:
Ct(xt, ft) = min
qt≥0
{




For k = 1, ..., K − 1, for the continuous case, let C(k)t (xt, ft) denote the right partial
derivative of Ct(xt, ft) with respect to to xk,t (i.e., ∂Ct(xt, ft)/∂xk,t; the differentiability
can be easily established following similar arguments as in [6]); for the discrete case, let
C
(k)
t (xt, ft) denote the incremental of Ct(xt, ft) caused by a unit increase of xk,t. Then, we
have the following result.
Lemma 3 Under Assumption 1, for t = 1, ..., T , (i) C(k)t+1(xt+1, ft+1) ≥ 0, k = 1, ..., K−1,
∀xt+1, ft+1; (ii) C(i)t+1(xt+1, ft+1) ≤ C
(j)
t+1(xt+1, ft+1), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ K − 1, ∀xt+1 such that
K−1∑
k=1
xk,t+1 < ȳt, ∀ft+1; (iii) C(k)t+1(xt+1, ft+1) ≤ w/β, k = 1, ..., K − 1, ∀xt+1 such that
K−1∑
k=1
xk,t+1 < ȳt, ∀ft+1.
Lemma 3 implies that when FIFO is an optimal issuing policy (i.e., Assumption 1),
the optimal cost-to-go function is non-decreasing in the inventory levels; and if the total
inventory level is small (≤ ȳt), the incremental of the optimal cost-to-go caused by an
increase of an older unit is higher than that caused by a younger unit, and both are bounded
by w/β. Then, since units are only moved from older to younger positions under policy
IM , it is intuitive that the expected total cost of policy IM is no more than that of policy
OPT , which leads to the following result.
Lemma 4 Under Assumption 1, E[C (IM)] ≤ E[C (OPT )].
Comparison of PoliciesB and IM . With Lemma 4, to establish the worst-case perfor-
mance guarantee of policyB, it remains to show that E[C (B)] ≤ 2E[C (IM)]. To compare
the expected total cost under policies B and IM , we first provide a key lemma as follows.
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Proof. (i) For any given sample path fT+1, after the movements of units under policy








P IMt with probability one.
(ii) To show that the total holding cost charged for units ordered at t ∈ TH under
policy B is no more than the total holding cost under policy IM , it is sufficient to show
that under the dynamic unit-matching scheme described in §2.4.2, all matched units under
policy B stay in inventory no longer than their permanently matched units under policy
IM . Consider the following two cases:
Case 1: If a unit ordered at t ∈ TH under policyB is used to satisfy demand (call it u1),
then by construction, its permanently matched unit under policy IM is used to satisfy the
same unit of demand. Consider a temporarily matched pair of units, by Inequality (2.3),
the unit under policy IM is consumed no earlier than its matched unit under policy B.
Therefore, u1’s last temporarily matched unit under policy IM , which has the same index
and age as u1, is consumed no earlier than u1. Then, given the FIFO issuing policy, u1’s
permanently matched unit, which is used to satisfy the same unit of demand as u1, must be
no younger than u1.
Case 2: If a unit ordered at t ∈ TH under policy B is outdated or still in inventory at
the end of the planning horizon (call it u2), then its permanently matched unit under policy
IM is defined as its last temporarily matched unit. Since each temporarily matched pair of
units have the same age, and further considering possible movements from older to younger
positions for units under policy IM , u2 must have stayed in inventory no longer than its
permanently matched unit.
Since the permanent matchings are defined on a one-to-one correspondence and the









(iii) By the dynamic unit-matching scheme, for a matched unit under policy B that is
outdated, the permanently matched unit under policy IM must be outdated at the same
period. Since the permanent matchings are defined on a one-to-one correspondence and








With the above result, now it is easy to reach to the following conclusion.
Lemma 6 E[C (B)] ≤ 2E[C (IM)].
Proof. Let 1(t ∈ TP ) and 1(t ∈ TH) be two indicator functions. Then, we have












































where the third equality follows from the definition of the balancing policy and the fact
that 1(t ∈ TP ),1(t ∈ TH) are deterministic for given ft; and the inequality follows from
Lemma 5. 
Based on the above results, we now state our main theorem as follows.
Theorem 1 Under Assumption 1, the marginal-cost dual-balancing policy (B) has a worst-
case performance guarantee of two. That is, the expected total cost of the marginal-cost
27
dual-balancing policy is at most twice that of an optimal ordering policy, i.e., E[C (B)] ≤
2E[C (OPT )].
Proof. Since we have E[C (IM)] ≤ E[C (OPT )] from Lemma 4 and E[C (B)] ≤
2E[C (IM)] from Lemma 6, we have E[C (B)] ≤ 2E[C (IM)] ≤ 2E[C (OPT )], which
completes the proof. 
2.4.4 A Tight Example.
We now present an example to show that the performance guarantee of two is tight. Con-
sider an instance with product lifetime K = 1, planning horizon T = 1, and cost parame-





















Consider an alternative policy A whose ordering quantity at t = 1 is qA1 = 1. Clearly,
there is no shortage under policy A, and hence the expected total cost under policy A is 1
2
.





2.4.5 A Counterexample When FIFO Is Not Optimal.
We next present a counterexample to show that when FIFO is not optimal, the expected
total cost of the balancing policy can be strictly more than twice that of an optimal policy.
Consider an instance with product lifetime K = 3, planning horizon T = 5, cost param-
eters p  1, h = 1, w = 0, and discount factor β = 1. Let ε > 0 be a small number.
Assume that demand across different periods is independent, and D1 = 0,P(D2 = 0) =
1− ε,P(D2 = 1) = ε,P(D3 = 0) = 1− ε,P(D3 = 2) = ε,D4 = 1 and D5 = 0.
28
Then, under the balancing policy, the ordering quantity at t = 1 is clearly qB1 = 0, and
the ordering quantity at t = 2 (i.e., qB2 ) is determined by solving:
εp(1− qB2 ) = (1− ε)qB2 + (1− ε)2qB2 .
Suppose the realized demand at t = 2 is d2 = 0 (with probability 1−ε). Then, the balancing
ordering quantity at t = 3 (denoted as qB3,d2=0) is determined by solving:
εp(2− qB2 − qB3,d2=0) = (1− ε)q
B
3,d2=0
+ (1− ε)× 2× (qB2 + qB3,d2=0 − 1).
Suppose the realized demand at t = 2 is d2 = 1 (with probability ε). Then, the balancing
ordering quantity at t = 3 (denoted as qB3,d2=1) is determined by solving:
εp(2− qB3,d2=1) = (1− ε)q
B
3,d2=1
+ (1− ε)× 2× (qB3,d2=1 − 1).
Let p → ∞. Then qB2 → 1, qB3,d2=0 → 1, q
B
3,d2=1











where we use o(ε) to denote a small quantity that goes to zero when ε goes to zero.
Consider an alternative policyAwhose ordering quantities at different periods are qA1 =
1, qA2 = 0, q
A
3,d2=0




5 = 0. Clearly, there is no shortage
under policy A, and it is not difficult to show that the expected total cost under policy A is
E[C (A)] = 4 + o(ε).









In this section, we first prove that a myopic policy under the marginal-cost accounting
scheme provides a lower bound on the optimal ordering quantity at each period. Then, by
combining the specific lower bound we derive and any upper bound on the optimal ordering
quantity with the balancing policy, we present a more general class of algorithms that we
call the truncated-balancing policy. We later show that while both the balancing policy and
the truncated-balancing policy have the same worst-case performance guarantee of two, the
latter performs much better in the computational studies (see §4.7 for details).
In the following proposition, we show that when FIFO is optimal, the minimizer of the
expected total marginal costs provides a lower bound on the optimal ordering quantity. We
note that while a similar result has been developed in [25] for the nonperishable backlog-
ging case (where the total inventory level is known to be a sufficient statistic for the system
state), generalizing this result to the lost sales case (where a pipeline inventory vector is
needed to describe the system state) remains an open problem. Our problem is similar to
the lost sales case in the sense that we also need an inventory vector to describe the system
state, and the analysis for the nonperishable backlogging case is not applicable to our case.
At any period t, given xt and ft, let qOPTt and qLt be an optimal ordering quantity and the
smallest quantity that minimizes Pt(xt, ft, qt) +Ht(xt, ft, qt) +Wt(xt, ft, qt), respectively.
Then:
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, qLt ≤ qOPTt .
Remark 2 The key reason why a myopic ordering quantity under the marginal-cost ac-
counting scheme provides a lower bound on the optimal ordering quantity is that, un-
der the marginal-cost accounting scheme, the optimal cost-to-go function is monotonically
non-increasing in the inventory levels of all ages. Thus, ordering more units can decrease
the optimal cost-to-go of the next period, and the minimizer of the single-period cost, which
ignores the benefit of ordering more for future, tends to order less than optimal. We remark
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that while this monotonicity result for the optimal cost-to-go function is easily established
for the nonperishable inventory case, it can in fact be violated for the perishable inventory
case in general. However, as we show in the proof of Proposition 1, the optimality of FIFO
issuing policy is a sufficient condition to establish the monotonicity result, which we believe
is a new and important contribution to the literature.
Based on the above result, we next define the truncated-balancing policy (denoted as
TB) as follows. At each period t, given xt and ft, let qBt be the balancing ordering quantity
defined by Equation (2.1), let qLt be the lower bound on the optimal ordering quantity
defined in Proposition 1 (or any looser lower bound), and let qUt be any upper bound on the




qBt , if q
L
t ≤ qBt ≤ qUt ,










Theorem 2 Under Assumption 1, the truncated-balancing policy (TB) has a worst-case
performance guarantee of two. That is, the expected total cost of the truncated-balancing
policy is at most twice that of an optimal ordering policy, i.e., E[C (TB)] ≤ 2E[C (OPT )].
Remark 3 We remark that policy TB is not guaranteed to perform at least as good as
policy B (thus the proof of Theorem 2 is nontrivial). While it may appear that qTBt is at
least as good as qBt , this is only true if an optimal policy is implemented at the following
periods.
Remark 4 We also remark that unlike the nonperishable inventory case where the lower
and upper bounds in the definition of policy TB can be replaced with any (tighter) ones,
in our case, the lower bound qLt , as a minimizer of the single-period marginal cost, is
special and cannot be tightened. To see why this is the case, let yTBt and y
IM
t be the total
inventory levels after ordering at period t under policies TB and IM , respectively; also,
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given xTBt and ft, let yBt denote the total inventory level after ordering if the balancing






t . Then, it is possible that
yBt ≤ yIMt < yTBt (while for the nonperishable case, since a base-stock policy is optimal,










t ≤ yOPTt ). In this case,
since yIMt < y
TB
t , it is not possible to match all the q
TB
t units to units under policy IM .
Therefore, we instead only match the first qBt units ordered under policy TB to units under
policy IM , and then show that the expected total marginal cost at period t for ordering
qTBt is no more than that for ordering q
B





the minimizer of the single-period expected marginal cost (see more details in the proof of
Theorem 2 in the appendix).
2.6 Sufficient Conditions for Optimality of FIFO Issuing Policy.
In §2.4-2.5, we have shown that our proposed algorithms have a worst-case performance
guarantee of two when FIFO is an optimal issuing policy (i.e., Assumption 1). In this sec-
tion, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition and a easy-to-check sufficient condi-
tion that ensure the optimality of FIFO issuing policy, which extends the existing literature
and provides insights into the key trade-offs of different issuing policies.
In Lemma 3, we have presented a necessary condition for the optimality of FIFO issuing
policy. In the following proposition, we show that this condition is also sufficient (in fact,
we only need a part of that condition), which leads to a necessary and sufficient condition
for the optimality of FIFO issuing policy.
Proposition 2 Assumption 1 holds if and only if for t = 1, ..., T , C(k)t+1(xt+1, ft+1) ≤
w/β, k = 1, ..., K − 1, ∀xt+1 such that
K−1∑
k=1
xk,t+1 < ȳt, ∀ft+1.
Proposition 2 says that FIFO is optimal if and only if the incremental of the discounted
optimal cost-to-go caused by a unit increase of the inventory of any age is bounded by the
unit outdating cost. This provides an overall insight into the key trade-off in ensuring the
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optimality of FIFO issuing policy. In particular, a unit increase of inventory can potentially
increase both holding and outdating costs but decrease the shortage penalty. Consider a
case where demand for future periods is sufficiently large so that the decrease in shortage
penalty offsets the increase in holding cost. In this case, the incremental of the total cost
is bounded by the unit outdating cost, i.e., the condition in Proposition 2 holds. Also, if
the unit outdating cost is sufficiently large, then the total discounted holding and outdating
costs for future periods may also be bounded by the unit outdating cost, regardless of the
demand distribution. In this case, the condition in Proposition 2 also holds.
Based on the above intuition, we next present an easy-to-check sufficient condition that
ensures the optimality of FIFO issuing policy. This condition involves both cost parame-
ters and demand distributions, and extends the existing findings on the optimality of FIFO
issuing policy ([6, 7]). We describe in further details below.








Φt(ȳt), then Assumption 1
holds.
We believe this is an authentic result and provides key insights into the main trade-offs
of FIFO issuing policy. In particular, Proposition 3 says that for fixed shortage penalty p,
holding cost h and discount factor β, FIFO is optimal when demand over time does not
“drop” significantly (so that γ is not too large) or the unit outdating cost is large. Moreover,
the larger the unit outdating cost, the weaker the requirement we need for the demand, and
vice versa.
We also remark that the condition in Proposition 3 does not necessarily require the
holding cost h to be small. This is because when h increases, the ratio p
p+h
would decrease,




w. Indeed, as we




w may be more likely to
hold when h increases.
In the following corollary, we show that FIFO is ensured to be optimal when demand
is independent and the critical fractile is non-decreasing in time, which extends the i.i.d.
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condition considered in [11]. We also note that this condition is more general than the inde-
pendent and stochastically non-decreasing demand (in the notion of first-order dominance)
in [32].




decreasing in t, then Assumption 1 holds.
Given Proposition 3, the proof for Corollary 1 is straightforward since if demand across
different periods is independent and ỹt = Φ−1t (
p
p+h
) is non-decreasing in t, then ȳt = ỹt



















In the following corollary, we present another condition to ensure FIFO optimality
which involves only cost parameters and does not impose any condition on demand dis-
tribution.
Corollary 2 If h ≤ 1−β
β
w, then Assumption 1 holds.












w. We also note that the condition in Corollary 2 to ensure the optimality of
FIFO issuing policy extends the zero holding cost assumption considered in [7].
We also note that the condition h ≤ 1−β
β
w is intuitive and implies that the total dis-
counted holding cost for an arbitrary number of future periods (β+β2+ ...)h = βh/(1−β)
is bounded by a unit outdating cost w at the current period. Intuitively, this condition en-
sures the optimality of FIFO because if holding a unit for ever is less expensive than letting
a unit outdate, then one would never issue a young product while letting an old product
outdate.
In the remainder of this section, we present two scenarios corresponding to zero and
positive (original) holding cost, respectively, and illustrate the conditions we identified in
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this section enables us to tighten the existing worst-case performance guarantee in both
scenarios.
Zero (Original) Holding Cost. Small or zero (original, instead of transformed) hold-
ing cost is commonly seen in the perishable inventory literature since the main concern
for over-ordering in perishable inventory systems is outdating [35, 36]. We first consider
an instance with zero holding cost ĥ = 0. Then, for any other cost parameters such that
p̂ ≥ ĉ ≥ 0 and ŵ ≥ 0, the transformed cost parameters are c = 0, p = p̂ − ĉ ≥ 0, h =
ĥ + (1 − β)ĉ = (1 − β)ĉ and w = ŵ + βĉ ≥ βĉ. Note that although the original holding
cost is ĥ = 0, the transformed holding cost h is strictly positive (as long as β < 1). How-




w, Assumption 1 holds under general demand
(Corollary 2) and hence the worst-case bound of our algorithms is two.
On the other hand, under general demand, the performance guarantee presented in Chao
et al. [32] is 2 + (K−2)h
Kh+w
= 2 + (K−2)(ĥ+(1−β)ĉ)
K(ĥ+(1−β)ĉ)+ŵ+βĉ . We set K = 5, ĉ = 1, ŵ = 0, and present
this existing worst-case bound and our bound under different values of discount factor in
Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Comparison between existing and our worst-case bound under zero holding cost.
β 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 0.99 1
γ ≤ 1 ≤ 1 ≤ 1 ≤ 1 ≤ 1 ≤ 1





w ≥ 0.2 ≥ 0.15 ≥ 0.1 ≥ 0.05 ≥ 0.01 0
Existing bound 2.33 2.28 2.21 2.13 2.03 2
Our bound 2 2 2 2 2 2
We remark that for the existing performance bound presented by Chao et al. [32] to
be exactly two, the transformed holding cost h = ĥ + (1 − β)ĉ needs to be zero, which
requires not only the original holding cost ĥ but also the original ordering cost ĉ to be zero
(under general lifetime K and discount factor β). In contrast, we only require ĥ to be small
(our condition h ≤ 1−β
β
w is equivalent to ĥ ≤ 1−β
β
ŵ) and we allow the original ordering
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cost ĉ to be arbitrarily large.
Positive Holding Cost. We next consider scenarios with positive holding costs. Specif-
ically, we consider product lifetime K = 5 and original cost parameters ĉ = 1 and
ĥ = p̂ = ŵ = 5. Then, the transformed cost parameters are c = 0, p = p̂ − ĉ = 4, h =
ĥ + (1− β)ĉ = 5− β and w = ŵ + βĉ = 5 + β. We consider nonstationary demand that
can be stochastically decreasing from one period to another. Specifically, we assume that
demand at periods 1, 3, 5, ... is exponentially distributed with mean of µmax, and demand at
periods 2, 4, 6, ... is exponentially distributed with mean of µmin (we note that our results
do not rely on the specific pattern of periodicity or the independence/correlation of demand
across periods; it is the gap between µmax and µmin that matters).






)). We present the existing worst-case bound and our bound under different
values of β and µmin (where µmax is fixed to be 10) in Table 2.3, where our bound being
2 suggests that the condition in Proposition 3 holds, while being “NA” suggests that the
condition does not hold.





under a wide range of model parameters even though we consider a fairly large holding
cost and allow demand to be stochastically decreasing from one period to another. These
results imply that we are able to tighten the existing worst-case bound for a large class of
perishable inventory systems.
Also, as noted earlier, our condition does not necessarily require small holding cost





see this, we consider µmax = 10, µmin = 5, and β = 0.95 (which corresponds to an “NA”
case in Table 2.3) and present existing and our worst-case bounds under a large range of
holding costs in Table 2.4.
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Table 2.3: Comparison between existing and our worst-case bounds under positive holding
cost.
β 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 0.99 1
µmax = 10, µmin = 9 γ 0.470 0.472 0.475 0.477 0.479 0.480





w 14.14 13.21 12.32 11.57 10.99 10.83
Existing bound 2.49 2.49 2.49 2.49 2.48 2.48
Our bound 2 2 2 2 2 2
µmax = 10, µmin = 7 γ 0.557 0.560 0.563 0.565 0.568 0.568





w 10.40 9.58 8.85 8.21 7.70 7.61
Existing bound 2.49 2.49 2.49 2.49 2.48 2.48
Our bound 2 2 2 2 2 2
µmax = 10, µmin = 5 γ 0.681 0.683 0.686 0.689 0.691 0.691





w 6.72 6.08 5.49 4.95 4.55 4.47
Existing bound 2.49 2.49 2.49 2.49 2.48 2.48
Our bound 2 2 2 NA NA NA
2.7 Computational Experiments.
We start with a discussion on the computation of the balancing ordering quantity in §2.7.1.
Then, in §2.7.2-2.7.3, we test the performances of our proposed policies under different
demand distributions based on both hypothetical and real data.
2.7.1 Computation of Balancing Ordering Quantity.
At each period t, given xt and ft, the marginal shortage penalty Pt(xt, ft, qt) is non-
increasing in qt, while the marginal holding and outdating costsHt(xt, ft, qt) andWt(xt, ft, qt)
are non-decreasing in qt. Thus the balancing ordering quantity qBt defined in Equation (2.1)
can be computed using a simple binary search. However, to do so, we first need to effi-
ciently compute the expected marginal costs for each given qt. Given the distribution of
Dt, the computation of Pt(xt, ft, qt) is straightforward. Thus, in this subsection, we focus
on the computation of Ht(xt, ft, qt) and Wt(xt, ft, qt).
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Table 2.4: Comparison between existing and our worst-case bounds under a large range of
holding costs.
ĥ 0 5 10 20 50 100
µmax = 10, µmin = 5 γ 1.000 0.689 0.488 0.305 0.143 0.075





w 0.31 4.95 11.08 23.70 61.82 126.89
Existing bound 2.02 2.49 2.54 2.57 2.59 2.59
Our bound 2 NA 2 2 2 2
Similar as the existing studies on balancing policies, for general demands, the expected
marginal holding and outdating costsHt(xt, ft, qt) andWt(xt, ft, qt) can be computed using
methods such as Monte Carlo simulation. However, if demand over time is independent and
integer-valued (we consider integer-valued quantities in our computational experiments),
we can further achieve closed-form expressions for the expected marginal costs as follows.
Recall that A0,t = 0, and for k = 1, ..., K − 1, Ak,t denotes the total demand over
periods t, ..., t+ k − 1 that cannot be satisfied by the inventory of (xK−k,t, ..., xK−1,t), and
A0,t = 0. Similar to [12], for given (xK−k+1,t, ..., xK−1,t) and ft, define:
Rk,t(xK−k,t) = P(Ak−1,t +Dt+k−1 < xK−k,t|ft), k = 1, ..., K,
which denotes the conditional probability that there will be outdates at the end of period
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t+ k − 1. Then, ∀u ≥ 0, we have R1,t(u) = P(Dt < u|ft), and for k = 2, ..., K:
















Rk−1,t(v + xK−k+1,t)P(Dt+k−1 = u− v|ft).
Therefore, the probabilities Rk,t can be computed efficiently by recursion. In this case,
at each period t, given xt, ft and qt, the expected marginal holding and outdating costs can
be computed as:































































2.7.2 Experiments with Hypothetical Data.
We next numerically test the performance of the proposed policies under a wide range of
data. In particular, we consider a) i.i.d. demand; b) periodic demand; and c) autoregressive
demand in this subsection to capture both nonstationarity and correlation in the demand
process (in addition to the i.i.d. case). Then, in §2.7.3, we consider a real data case based
on platelet inventory management with dynamically evolving demand.
Independent and Identically Distributed (i.i.d.) Demand. We first consider i.i.d.
demand, and similar to Cooper [17], we consider two discrete demand distributions, Pois-
son and geometric, to represent demand with small and large variances, respectively. We
assume that the mean of demand is equal to 5. We consider zero ordering cost ĉ = 0,4 fix
the unit outdating cost to be ŵ = 5, and consider different combinations of unit shortage
penalty and holding cost: p̂ = 5, 10, 20; ĥ = 0, 1, 2. Similar to many existing studies on per-
ishable inventory systems [e.g. 13, 16, 17], we consider short product lifetimes K = 2, 3
in order to benchmark with an optimal policy. Finally, we consider a planning horizon
T = 20 and a discount factor β = 0.95. We generate 10, 000 random scenarios to estimate
the expected costs. Let C̄ (π) and C̄ (OPT ) denote the estimated expected total cost under
policies π and OPT , respectively. We define the performance error of policy π as:
error(π) :=
C̄ (π)− C̄ (OPT )
C̄ (OPT )
× 100%.
We report the performance error of policies PB and DB presented in [32] and our pro-
posed policies B and TB5 under i.i.d. demand in Table 2.5, where each number represents
the performance error of each policy averaged across two different lifetimes and two differ-
ent demand distributions. From these results, we first observe that the performance error of
our proposed policies is much smaller than the worst-case performance bound of two (i.e.,
4The performance error of all policies becomes smaller with a positive ĉ due to the resulting larger optimal
cost.
5Policy TB here is truncated by the lower bound in Proposition 1 and is not truncated by any upper bound.
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Table 2.5: Performance error of different policies under i.i.d. demand.
Policy PB DB B TB
p̂ = 5 ĥ = 0 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.2%
ĥ = 1 2.5% 2.5% 2.7% 1.1%
ĥ = 2 2.9% 2.6% 2.9% 1.8%
p̂ = 10 ĥ = 0 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 0.5%
ĥ = 1 3.2% 3.2% 3.5% 0.4%
ĥ = 2 2.6% 2.6% 2.9% 1.0%
p̂ = 20 ĥ = 0 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 1.8%
ĥ = 1 5.3% 5.9% 6.2% 1.8%
ĥ = 2 3.3% 3.4% 3.9% 1.0%
an error of 100%). Second, the performances of policies PB,DB andB are similar to each
other, which is expected as all these three policies tend to balance the overage and underage
marginal costs (when ĥ = 0, these three policies become exactly the same). Finally, policy
TB performs significantly better than all other policies, especially when the unit shortage
penalty becomes large. This is because as we have shown in the tight example in §2.4.4,
the balancing policy tends to under-order when the unit shortage penalty becomes large. In
this case, the truncation by the lower bound we derive helps bring up the order quantity,
which significantly reduces the performance error.
Periodic Demand. We next consider periodic demand, which has been widely con-
sidered for the management of perishable (especially blood) inventory [35, 36]. Same to
the i.i.d. case, we consider Poisson and geometric demand. We now consider a weekly
periodicity where the mean of demand on weekdays and weekends are equal to 10 and
5, respectively (as we have shown in §2.6, the sufficient condition we present to ensure
the optimality of FIFO may not hold in this case). We consider the same cost parameters,
horizon length and discount factor as the i.i.d. case, and report the performance error of
different policies in Table 2.6. We now only benchmark with policy PB as policy DB is
only well-defined for stochastically non-decreasing demand.
Similar to the i.i.d. case, we observe that both our policies B and TB perform much
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Table 2.6: Performance error of different policies under periodic demand.
Policy PB B TB
p̂ = 5 ĥ = 0 1.8% 1.8% 1.7%
ĥ = 1 2.8% 2.9% 1.3%
ĥ = 2 2.7% 2.5% 2.0%
p̂ = 10 ĥ = 0 2.0% 2.0% 0.9%
ĥ = 1 3.6% 4.1% 0.7%
ĥ = 2 2.5% 2.7% 0.8%
p̂ = 20 ĥ = 0 3.6% 3.6% 1.6%
ĥ = 1 5.6% 6.5% 1.1%
ĥ = 2 3.9% 4.6% 0.8%
better than the worst-case performance bound, and policy TB performs significantly better
than other policies when the unit shortage penalty becomes large. Moreover, while FIFO
may not be an optimal issuing policy when demand is nonstationary and holding cost is
large (i.e., the worst-case performance guarantee of our policies may not hold), we observe
that our policy TB continues to work better than existing policies even when the sufficient
condition presented in §2.6 does not hold.
Autoregressive Demand. We next consider an autoregressive demand model, which
has also been shown by real data to be a great fit for demand of blood products [37].
Specifically, we consider an AR(1) model with Dt = Dt−1 + εt, where D0 = 5 and εt
follows a normal distribution with mean of zero and variance of 5 and 30, respectively (to
mimic to variances of Poisson and geometric distributions considered above). We further
discretize the normal distribution and truncate any negative demand by zero. In order to
benchmark with an optimal policy, we only consider product lifetime K = 2 under the
AR(1) model, in which case the state space is augmented with the demand realization from
the previous period. Other model parameters are considered the same as above, and the
performance error of different policies are presented in Table 2.7.
We observe that under AR(1) demand, the performance error of policies PB and B are
larger than in the independent cases. However, policy TB continues to perform substan-
42
Table 2.7: Performance error of different policies under AR(1) demand.
Policy PB B TB
p̂ = 5 ĥ = 0 6.6% 6.6% 1.3%
ĥ = 1 4.4% 4.4% 1.3%
ĥ = 2 3.2% 3.2% 2.1%
p̂ = 10 ĥ = 0 10.2% 10.2% 1.9%
ĥ = 1 7.1% 7.1% 1.0%
ĥ = 2 4.9% 4.9% 1.0%
p̂ = 20 ĥ = 0 14.3% 14.3% 2.2%
ĥ = 1 11.7% 11.7% 1.8%
ĥ = 2 8.9% 8.9% 0.9%
tially better than other policies, especially when the unit shortage penalty becomes large.
2.7.3 Experiments Real Data for Platelet Inventory Management.
We next consider the platelet inventory management problem at Emory University Hospital
Midtown (§4.1). At Emory Midtown, 1) platelets are ordered on a daily basis, and an order
placed at the end of each day will arrive in the morning of the next day; 2) as demand
arises, older platelets are typically issued first to reduce outdates; and 3) unmet demand
is satisfied by emergency deliveries. Therefore, our assumptions for zero lead time, FIFO
issuing policy, and lost sales are applicable in this setting.
Platelets have a short lifetime of K = 3 days, and we consider a planning horizon of 4
weeks (i.e., T = 28 days). As discussed in §4.1, we focus on the main source of demand
for platelets: cardiac surgeries, and we model daily demand for platelets by a compound
Poisson distribution ([3, 4, 5]). Similar to two recent studies by [35] and [36], we assume
that demand over time is independently distributed, but the distribution in different days
may not be identical. Based on the cardiac surgery records from January to April in 2014,
we identify a significant weekly periodicity, and estimate the average number of surgeries
from Monday to Sunday as 2.6, 5.5, 1.9, 3.2, 3.7, 0.1, and 0, respectively. We assume
the amount of platelets needed per surgery is stationary; based on the platelet transfusion
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records, we estimate it as a geometric distribution with mean of 0.32.
Cardiac surgeries are usually scheduled days or even weeks in advance; therefore fore-
cast information on the number surgeries per day is typically available. We consider a
forecast horizon three days, and assume that the forecast is perfect. That is, the number
of surgeries at day t + 2 becomes known at the beginning of day t, and will not change at
the following days. In this case, at any day t, given ft, each of the demand Dt, ..., Dt+K−1
becomes a sum of a deterministic number of i.i.d. geometric distributions (i.e., a negative
binomial distribution) instead of a compound Poisson distribution.
Based on the interaction with the blood bank manager at Emory Midtown, we estimate
the unit outdating cost w to be equal to the purchase cost $500. On the other hand, the
shortage penalty for blood inventory problems could include the cost of emergent shipment
from other blood banks and/or the penalty of postponing the surgeries, which is usually
high and often estimated as 2-10 times higher than the purchase cost ([35]). We consider
three different shortage penalties p = $1000, $2500, $5000 in this study. Also, we consider
a zero holding cost h = 0 and no discount, i.e., β = 1 (in this case, policies B and PB
become identical).
We first benchmark the performances of our policies with the optimal policy solved
by dynamic programming. The state of the dynamic program is comprised of a K − 1
dimensional vector of inventory levels of age 1, ..., K − 1, and a K dimensional vector of
forecasts on the number of surgeries at days t, ..., t+K− 1. Although the problem size we
face here is not too large, it still takes more than 50 hours to compute the optimal policy on
a standard 2.6GHz PC, whereas the ordering quantities under our policies can be computed
on the fly in an online fashion. On the other hand, while compound Poisson distribution
is widely considered in the blood inventory literature (e.g., [3, 4, 5]), none of these studies
has considered the forecast information on the number of patients per period. A natural
question is that how much do we lose by ignoring this information? Therefore, we also
compare the performances of our policies with the “optimal” policy that does not make use
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of the forecast information (i.e., it simply treats the demand at each day as a compound
Poisson distribution and thus the state of this dynamic program is simply comprised of a
K − 1 dimensional vector of inventory levels of age 1, ..., K − 1).
We use OPTwof to denote the “optimal” policy without forecast information, and char-
acterize the value of forecast information by assessing the performance improvements of
our policies over policy OPTwof . Let C̄ (π) and C̄ (OPTwof ) be the estimated total costs
under policies π and OPTwof , respectively. We define the performance improvement of
policy π as:
impr(π) :=
C̄ (OPTwof )− C̄ (π)
C̄ (OPTwof )
× 100%.
Table 2.8: Performance summary of different policies for the platelet inventory control
problem.
Policy PB/B TB OPT OPTwof
p = $1000 C̄ ($) 6813 6684 6174 7262
error (%) 10.4 8.3 0 17.6
impr (%) 6.2 8.0 15.0 0
p = $2500 C̄ ($) 10059 9666 8943 10532
error (%) 12.5 8.1 0 17.8
impr (%) 4.5 8.2 15.1 0
p = $5000 C̄ ($) 12689 11918 10990 12999
error (%) 15.5 8.4 0 18.3
impr (%) 2.4 8.3 15.5 0
The estimated total cost, performance error, and performance improvement of different
policies are reported in Table 2.8. Similar to the hypothetical data cases, we first observe
that both our policies B and TB perform much better than the worst-case performance
bound. Further, policy TB performs significantly better than policy B, especially when
the unit shortage penalty gets large. Finally, we also observe that policy OPTwof performs
poorly, whereas our policy TB has a substantial performance improvement (more than 8%)
over policy OPTwof . Therefore, the value of the forecast information is significant, and
implementing an inventory policy that takes into account such information has a potential
45
to achieve a much better performance in practice.
2.8 Conclusion.
In this paper, we consider a periodic-review fixed-lifetime perishable inventory manage-
ment problem assuming that demand is a general stochastic process which can be nonsta-
tionary, correlated, and dynamically evolving. Theoretically, an optimal ordering policy of
this problem can be solved using standard dynamic programming. However, it becomes
computationally intractable for realistic size problems due to the high dimensionality of
the state space. We first present a computationally efficient algorithm that we call the
marginal-cost dual-balancing policy. We then prove that under the marginal-cost account-
ing scheme, the minimizer of the single-period cost provides a lower bound on the optimal
ordering quantity. By combining the specific lower bound we derive and any upper bound
on the optimal ordering quantity with the marginal-cost dual-balancing policy, we present
a more general class of algorithms that we call the truncated-balancing policy. We prove
that when FIFO is an optimal issuing policy, both of our policies have a worst-case per-
formance guarantee of two, i.e., the expected total cost of our policies is at most twice
that of an optimal policy. We further provide a necessary and sufficient condition and
a easy-to-check sufficient condition that ensure the optimality of the FIFO issuing pol-
icy. Finally, we conduct extensive numerical analyses based on both hypothetical and real
data and show that i) both of our policies perform significantly better than the theoretical
worst-case performance guarantee, and ii) the truncated-balancing policy significantly out-
performs the marginal-cost dual-balancing policy especially when the unit shortage penalty
is large, which illustrates that the lower bound we derive is effective and helps to improve
the performance of the balancing policy.
Our worst-case analysis is built on two novel ideas, the imaginary operation policy and
the dynamic unit-matching scheme. In particular, we show that when FIFO is an optimal
issuing policy, moving units from older to younger positions in the inventory vector can
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only decrease the expected total cost. This result is very intuitive and helps significantly
simplify the analysis by allowing properly modifying the inventory vectors and effectively
matching units under two different policies. We believe these ideas are valuable beyond




PERISHABLE INVENTORY SHARING IN A TWO-LOCATION SYSTEM
3.1 Introduction
As a form of risk pooling, inventory sharing has been well known to be an effective way
for reducing costs and risks in multi-location inventory systems. Inventory sharing across
different locations or channels is widely implemented in practice due to ever increasing
service level requirements, integrated information technology systems, and improved cost-
efficiency for transshipments [38]. Research on inventory sharing can be dated back to the
1950s [39] and has been continuously active in the past decade (e.g. [40, 41, 42, 43]).
However, this stream of literature has primarily focused on nonperishable products that can
stay in inventory indefinitely, and research on perishable inventory sharing has been limited
(see §4.2 and [44] for literature review).
Products that will perish or become outdated after a short period of time are common
in practice (e.g. many medical products such as blood products and pharmaceuticals and
many food products such as produce, milk and fresh meat). Perishability imposes several
challenges in managing inventory systems, and it is well established from both theory and
practice perspectives that different inventory policies are needed for perishable products
[12, 45]. While there are numerous studies on perishable inventory management problems,
these studies have mostly focused on single-location systems, and few studies have con-
sidered a perishable inventory sharing problem in multi-location systems (see §4.2 for a
detailed literature review).
In this paper, we fill in this gap by studying a joint ordering and transshipment decision
problem for perishable products in a two-location system. Our analysis is motivated by
a platelet (a blood product with three days of shelf-life) inventory management problem
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in a local two-location hospital system. Each of the two hospitals makes daily ordering
decisions to replenish their platelet inventory. Further, the two hospitals belong to the same
integrated healthcare system, and there are couriers that travel between the two hospitals
on an hourly basis, which provides natural opportunities for transshipments of platelets
between the two hospitals. During our interactions with the blood bank managing team of
this hospital network, we learned that the platelet demand patterns in these two hospitals are
significantly different. In particular, at one hospital, cardiac surgeries are the main reasons
for platelet transfusions. Since both the number of surgeries per day and the number of
platelet units needed per surgery are highly varying, the demand for platelets at this hospital
is highly uncertain. In contrast, the other hospital mainly serves hematology patients, for
whom the demand for platelets is much more predictable. The established findings in
the nonperishable inventory literature suggest that the smaller the variances of demands,
the smaller the value of inventory sharing, and when the demand variance at one location
goes to zero, the value of inventory sharing also goes to zero irrespective of the demand
variance at the other location [40, 41]. However, whether these established findings in the
nonperishable inventory sharing literature carry over to the perishable setting remains an
open question. Other interesting questions include: If the results from the nonperishable
inventory literature do not generalize, then in what ways would the results differ? What are
the characteristics of efficient inventory management policies in multi-location perishable
inventory systems?
To study these questions, we consider a periodic-review, two-location perishable inven-
tory system where products can be transshipped between the two locations at each period
after demand realization, and inventory at each location is replenished using a base-stock
policy, a widely considered ordering policy for perishable inventory management [e.g., 17,
18, 19, 46]. Under given base-stock levels, we first determine the direction of transship-
ment based on the inventory levels and realized demands at each location. We then derive
upper and lower bounds on the optimal transshipment quantity. For a special case with
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two-period lifetime, we prove that the optimal cost function is L\-convex, which implies
that the optimal transshipment quantity is monotone in the inventory levels at each loca-
tion. We further show via a counterexample that this property, however, is violated in the
general case with larger lifetimes. Finally, we present an intuitive and easy-to-implement
transshipment policy (which has a simpler structure than the optimal policy), and derive ap-
proximations of the expected cost functions based on which we develop base-stock levels
for both locations. Using real-life data from the platelet inventory management problem
discussed above, we show that our proposed policy is very competitive and significantly
reduces the total costs compared with benchmark policies.
Furthermore, by comparing our findings with the existing results from the multi-location
nonperishable and single-location perishable inventory literature, we establish the follow-
ing results with important managerial implications. First, we show that under given order-
up-to levels, the optimal transshipment quantity for the nonperishable case provides a non-
tight lower bound on that for the perishable case,1 which implies that transshipment should
occur more often or with a larger quantity in perishable inventory systems than in non-
perishable ones. Second, while it is well established in the single-location setting that the
ordering decisions in the perishable case should be more conservative than that in the non-
perishable case (due to the concern of outdating) [11, 12], we find that this result does not
necessarily translate to the two-location setting: when inventory sharing is possible, it may
be optimal to order strictly more in the perishable case than in the nonperishable case. Last
but not least, we find that the value of inventory sharing for the perishable case is typically
higher than that for the nonperishable case. In particular, and contrary to the established
finding in the nonperishable inventory literature that value of inventory sharing vanishes
as the demand variance at one location goes to zero [40, 41], we find that the value of in-
ventory sharing for the perishable case can be strictly positive and substantial even when
1In the nonperishable case, it has been shown that under mild conditions on cost parameters, transshipment
only occurs when there is shortage at one location and surplus inventory at the other location and the optimal
transshipment quantity is the minimum of the shortage and the surplus [47, 48].
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demand at one location becomes deterministic.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §4.2, we present an overview of related
literature. In §4.3, we present a model formulation of the two-location perishable inven-
tory sharing problem. In §3.4, we derive structural properties of an optimal transshipment
policy. Then, in §3.5, we present an intuitive transshipment policy and derive near-optimal
base-stock levels. Finally, we present results from extensive numerical analysis in §4.7 and
draw conclusions in §4.8.
3.2 Literature Review
Our work is related to the stream of research that studies nonperishable inventory shar-
ing problems in periodic-review, multi-location systems (see [49, 50] for overviews). In
this context, [39, 51] and [52] considered two-location problems with transshipments in
a single-period case, while [53, 54, 55, 47] and [48] analyzed the structure of optimal
transshipment policies in multiperiod cases. In particular, in a nonperishable system where
transshipment takes place after demand realization, it has been shown that under mild con-
ditions on cost parameters, the optimal transshipment quantity is simply the minimum of
the shortage at one location and the surplus inventory at the other location [47, 48]. This re-
sult has been later extended to consider capacity constraints under which it may be optimal
to reserve some inventory at each location and not satisfy the shortage at the other location
[41]. A number of other extensions have also been studied in this literature. For exam-
ple, [40] considered a two-location capacitated system with virtual transshipments, [56]
and [57] studied network design problems with transshipments, [42] examined the struc-
ture of optimal transshipment policies for inventory systems with lost sales, [58] derived
asymptotics and bounds for a system with a one-time stocking decision at the beginning
of the selling season and multiple transshipment decisions throughout, and [59, 60] and
[61], among many others, considered transshipment decisions in decentralized systems.
We contribute to, and extend the literature of inventory sharing by considering joint order-
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ing and transshipment decisions for perishable products and establishing findings that are
significantly different from those in nonperishable settings.
Our work also relates to the research on periodic-review, fixed-lifetime perishable in-
ventory management at a single location (see [8, 9] and [10] for overviews). The general
multi-period lifetime perishable inventory management problem was first studied indepen-
dently by [11] and [12]. However, the structure of an optimal policy for this problem is
complicated, and finding optimal policies using standard dynamic programming is com-
putationally intractable due to the well-known “curse of dimensionality”. Therefore, later
efforts have mainly focused on heuristic policies. In particular, the base-stock policy, al-
though in general not optimal in perishable inventory systems, has been widely considered
in the perishable inventory literature due to its simplicity, practicality and near optimal
performance [e.g. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 46]. In addition, [22] and [23] examined
constant order policies, [24] presented high-order approximations, [62] considered approx-
imate dynamic programming algorithms, and [32, 63, 64] and [65] studied approximation
algorithms with performance guarantees, and a number of other studies considered perish-
able inventory management in the context of blood products, and most commonly platelets
[e.g., 35, 66, 36]. Our study contributes to and extends this literature by considering a
perishable inventory sharing problem at a two-location system.
While there is a large body of literature on both multi-location nonperishable and
single-location perishable inventory management, research on inventory sharing for per-
ishable products is limited (see [10, 44] and [67] for literature review). A number of stud-
ies examined inventory allocation decisions in multi-location perishable inventory systems
[e.g. 68, 69, 70, 71]. However, transshipment decisions are not explicitly considered in
these studies. Instead, it is assumed that at each period products at all locations are col-
lected to a central warehouse (for free) and then reallocated. Another stream of literature
studied inventory sharing in specific contexts such as the management of blood products
or slow-moving medical products [e.g. 72, 73, 74, 75, 67]. However, most of these stud-
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ies either restricted their attention to certain classes of demand distributions (e.g. Poisson
demand), or considered restricted types of transshipments (e.g., allow transshipments to
occur only when a shortage is observed), or focused on “what if” type questions using
simulation models. To the best of our knowledge, the only study that has analytically
studied a general joint ordering and transshipment decision problem for perishable prod-
ucts is by [44], who presented an efficient algorithm for finding the optimal ordering and
transshipment policies. However, [44] restricted attention to a single-period setting where
the inventory system dynamics are not captured. Further, unlike our study, [44] considered
proactive transshipment where transshipment decisions are made before demand is realized
and hence transshipment is not used to meet shortages. Our paper extends this literature
by studying a multi-period joint ordering and transshipment decision problem for perish-
able products and systematically comparing our findings with those in the nonperishable
inventory literature.
Finally, our work also relates to the stream of studies that apply the theory of L\-
convexity to analyze structural properties of optimal inventory policies. In particular, the
concept of L\-convexity was first introduced to the inventory management literature by
[76], and first applied to establish structural properties of optimal policies in inventory sys-
tems by [77]. Later, [78] extended the analysis to serial inventory systems, [79] investigated
joint pricing and inventory control problems, [19] and [80] studied a coordinated inventory
control and pricing problem and a clearance sales problem, respectively, for single-location
perishable inventory systems, and [43] examined a two-location inventory system for non-
perishable products. We contribute to this literature by considering L\-convexity in a two-
location perishable inventory system under base-stock ordering policies. In this setting,
we show that L\-convexity holds for a special case where the product lifetime is equal to
two, which requires a different analysis from the nonperishable case due to the outdat-
ing process. Further, and perhaps more interestingly, we show via a counterexample that
L\-convexity could be violated for the general case with larger lifetimes.
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3.3 Model Formulation
We now present our model for the two-location perishable inventory sharing problem,
where each of the locations faces stochastic demand, and inventory is replenished accord-
ing to a base-stock policy. We assume that products ordered arrive instantly with a zero
lead time, and unmet demand is lost. Further, we allow transshipments between the two lo-
cations, and similar to many existing studies of nonperishable inventory sharing problems
(e.g. [40, 41]), we assume that products can be transshipped from one location to the other
in each period after demands are realized but before they are satisfied. Below we formally
define the model components.
Notation: Consider a product lifetime of K > 1 periods and a planning horizon of T
periods. Let i = 1, 2 denote the index of each location. We now introduce some notation
for describing the system dynamics:
xik,t: inventory level of products of age k at location i at the beginning of period t,
k = 1, ..., K − 1.
xit: inventory vector at location i at the beginning of period t.
dit: demand at location i at period t. We assume that demand at each location is in-
dependent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Note that we allow demand across the two
locations to be correlated. Further, while the main analysis in this paper is conducted under
the i.i.d. demand assumption for tractability, our derived policy can be easily extended to
capture nonstationary demand, and we test the performance of our proposed policy under
nonstationary demand in §3.6.2.
Si: base-stock level at location i (for the nonstationary case we allow Si to be time
dependent).
xi0,t: order quantity of fresh products (i.e., of age zero) at location i at the beginning of






+, where (·)+ denotes max{·, 0}.
ut: transshipment quantity from location 1 to location 2 at period t after demands are
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realized but before they are satisfied (negative ut implies transshipments from location 2
to location 1). We assume that products are only shipped out from one location if they are
used to meet demand at the other location. Then, −d1t ≤ ut ≤ d2t .
System Dynamics: The sequence of events is as follows: 1) at the beginning of each
period t, the K − 1 dimensional inventory vector xit at each location is observed, based






+ units of fresh products are ordered (and arrive with a
zero lead time); 2) demand at each location dit is realized; 3) transshipment decisions are
made based on the inventory levels xik,t, k = 0, ..., K − 1 and realized demands dti at each
location, and products are transshipped from one location to the other with a zero lead time
in a First-In-First-Out (FIFO) manner, i.e., older products are shipped out first; 4) after
transshipment, products at each location are issued to satisfy demand in a FIFO manner,
and unmet demand is lost; 5) at the end of each period, all products left in inventory age by
one, and the products reaching age K are disposed from inventory.
Clearly, products of age k − 1 at each location i will only be consumed after all of
the units of age greater than or equal to k are consumed (either used to meet demand or
transshipped out), and the surplus inventory (i.e., inventory left after satisfying demand) of
age k − 1 becomes of age k at the next period. Therefore, the inventory vectors at the two




















, k = 1, ..., K − 1. (3.2)
Costs and Optimality Equations: At each period, we consider a shortage penalty pi
for each unit of stock-out at location i, a holding cost hi for each unit of surplus inventory
at location i, an outdating cost wi for each unit of outdate at location i, and a transshipment
cost ri for each unit of transshipment from location i to location −i, where we use −i to
55
denote the location other than i. Without loss of generality, we assume zero unit order-
ing cost at each location, because any problem with a positive unit ordering cost can be
transformed to an equivalent problem with zero ordering cost (see appendix for details).
Similar to several studies on nonperishable inventory sharing (e.g. [47, 41]), we assume
that pi ≤ p−i + r−i, i = 1, 2, which implies that the unit shortage penalty at one location is
no larger than the unit shortage penalty at the other location plus a unit transshipment cost.
That is, when there are shortages at both locations, the total cost is no larger if a product is
used to satisfy demand at its own location. Similarly, we assume that hi ≤ h−i+ri, i = 1, 2,
and hi + wi ≤ h−i + w−i + ri, i = 1, 2, which imply that the unit holding (and outdating)
cost at one location is no larger than the unit holding (and outdating) cost at the other
location plus a unit transshipment cost. Finally, we assume that ri < hi + p−i, i = 1, 2, so
that it is worthwhile to trigger transshipments to meet shortages.
For simplicity, we assume that the system starts from zero inventory, i.e., xik,1 = 0, i =





Si, i = 1, 2 at any period t, and the one-period cost function is defined as follows:
Lt(x1t , x
2
t , ut) := p
1(d1t+ut−S1)++p2(d2t−ut−S2)++h1(S1−d1t−ut)++h2(S2−d2t+ut)+
+w1(x1K−1,t − d1t − ut)+ + w2(x2K−1,t − d2t + ut)+ + r1(ut)+ + r2(−ut)+.
LetCt(x1t , x2t ) be the optimal expected cost-to-go function at period t, and defineCT+1(x1T+1, x2T+1) =
0,∀x1T+1, x2T+1. Then, the optimality equation of our problem is defined as:
Ct(x1t , x
2













, t = 1, ..., T,
where β is a discount factor, the inventory vectors x1t+1 and x2t+1 are updated according to
Equations 3.1-3.2, and the base-stock levels S1 and S2 are selected so that the expected
total discounted cost C1(x11, x21) is minimized.
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3.4 Structural Properties of Optimal Transshipment Policy
In this section, we first characterize the direction of optimal transshipment in §3.4.1. Then,
in §3.4.2, we show that the optimal transshipment quantity in a nonperishable inventory
problem provides a lower bound for that in a perishable inventory problem. In §3.4.3, we
further show that when the product lifetime is equal to two, the optimal cost-to-go function
is L\-convex and hence the optimal transshipment quantity is monotone in the inventory
level of each location. These results enable us to generate insightful findings on efficient
perishable inventory management strategies, and lead to the development of a competitive
transshipment policy, as presented in the next section. The proofs of all analytical results
are presented in the appendix.
3.4.1 Direction of Optimal Transshipment
We first characterize the direction of optimal transshipment, i.e., whether products should
be transshipped from location 1 to location 2 or vice versa, based on the inventory levels
and realized demands at each location.
We start with a preliminary result, Lemma 7. For any inventory vectors x1t and x2t
at the two locations and for k = 1, ..., K − 1, define C(k)t (x1t , x2t ) := ∂Ct(x1t , x2t )/∂x1k,t
and Ĉ(k)t (x1t , x2t ) := ∂Ct(x1t , x2t )/∂x2k,t for the continuous case, where we use ∂y(x)/∂x
to denote the right partial derivative of y(x) with respect to x throughout the paper; define
C
(k)
t (x1t , x2t ) := Ct(x1t +ek, x2t )−Ct(x1t , x2t ) and Ĉ
(k)
t (x1t , x2t ) := Ct(x1t , x2t +ek)−Ct(x1t , x2t )
for the discrete case, where ei is a (K − 1)-dimensional vector with the ith entry equal to 1
and all other entries equal to 0.
Lemma 7 At any period t, for 1 ≤ j < k ≤ K − 1, we have 0 ≤ C(j)t (x1t , x2t ) ≤
C
(k)
t (x1t , x2t ) ≤ w1, and 0 ≤ Ĉ
(j)
t (x1t , x2t ) ≤ Ĉ
(k)











Lemma 7 implies that an additional unit of inventory (of any age) at location i leads to
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an increase of the expected total cost that is bounded bywi, and the older the additional unit
of inventory, the larger the increase of the total cost. We remark that when wi = 0, i = 1, 2,
the problem reduces to the nonperishable case, which we discuss further in §3.4.2.
With this result, we now characterize the direction of optimal transshipment. At any
period t, given the inventory levels xik,t, k = 1, ..., K − 1, and realized demands dit at
each location i = 1, 2, let u∗t denote the optimal transshipment quantity.
2 The direction of
optimal transshipment (i.e., the sign of u∗t ) is presented in the following proposition and
summarized in Figure 3.1.
Proposition 4 At any period t, when d1t < S1, d2t > S2 (i.e., regions 1,2 in Figure 3.1),
then u∗t > 0; when d
1
t ≤ x1K−1,t, x2K−1,t < d2t ≤ S2 (i.e., region 4), then u∗t ≥ 0; when
d1t ≤ x1K−1,t, d2t ≤ x2K−1,t, or d1t ≥ S1, d2t ≥ S2 (i.e., regions 3,7), then u∗t = 0; when
x1K−1,t < d
1
t ≤ S1, d2t ≤ x2K−1,t (i.e., region 8), then u∗t ≤ 0; when d1t > S1, d2t < S2 (i.e.,




t ≤ S1, x2K−1,t < d2t ≤ S2 (i.e., region 5),
u∗t can be either positive, negative or zero.
Proposition 4 is intuitive: for i = 1, 2, when demand at location i is smaller than its own
base-stock level while demand at location −i is larger than its own base-stock level (i.e.,
regions 1, 2 and 6, 9), products should be transshipped from location i to location −i (i.e.,
u∗t > 0 in regions 1, 2 and u
∗
t < 0 in regions 6, 9). When demand at location i is smaller
than the inventory level of the oldest products (xiK−1,t), while demand at location −i is
larger than the inventory level of the oldest products but smaller than its base-stock level
(i.e., regions 4 and 8), products are either transshipped from location i to location −i or no
transshipment is needed (i.e., u∗t ≥ 0 for region 4 and u∗t ≤ 0 for region 8). When demands
at the two locations are both larger than their own base-stock levels or both smaller than
the inventory level of the oldest products (i.e., regions 3, 7), no transshipment is needed
(i.e., u∗t = 0). Finally, when demands at both locations are larger than the inventory level
2In the case of multiple optimal solutions, we break the tie by defining u∗t as the optimal transshipment






















Figure 3.1: Direction of optimal transshipment for the perishable case (captured by the sign
of u∗t ).
Note. Transshipping ut units of products from location 1 to location 2 can be interpreted as transferring ut units of
demand from location 2 to location 1; with the transfer, the “artificial demands” at locations 1 and 2 are d1t + ut and
d2t − ut, respectively. Under this setup, a transshipment from location 1 (2) to location 2 (1) can simply be interpreted
as moving the demands (d1t , d
2
t ) on the -45 degree line in the southeast (northwest) direction.
of the oldest products but smaller than the base-stock level (i.e., region 5), transshipment
can go in either direction depending on the inventory vectors, cost parameters and demand
distributions.
Next, we further present an upper bound on the optimal transshipment quantity, which
is closely related to the direction of optimal transshipment presented in Proposition 4.
Proposition 5 −min{(d1t − x1K−1,t)+, (S2 − d2t )+} ≤ u∗t ≤ min{(S1 − d1t )+, (d2t −
x2K−1,t)
+}.
Proposition 5 can be described using Figure 3.1 if transshipment of products is inter-
preted as transfer of demands: transshipping ut units of products from location 1 to location
2 is equivalent to transferring ut units of demand from location 2 to location 1; with the
transfer, demands at locations 1 and 2 become d1t + ut and d
2
t − ut, respectively; call these
quantities the “artificial demands”. Under this setup, a transshipment from location 1 to
location 2 can simply be interpreted as moving the demands (d1t , d
2
t ) on the -45 degree line
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in the southeast direction in Figure 3.1, and vice versa. Then, Proposition 5 says that if
the demands (d1t , d
2
t ) lie in regions 1, 2, 4 or 5, (i.e., d
1
t ≤ S1 and d2t ≥ x2K−1,t), then the






t − u∗t )
must also lie in regions 1, 2, 4 or 5. Similarly, if (d1t , d
2





t − u∗t ) must also lie in regions 5, 6, 8 or 9. The underlining intuition of this
structure is that if the transshipment quantity goes beyond this upper bound, a location will
be transshipping out products when there is shortage at its own location or when there is
outdate at the other location, which is clearly not preferred.
3.4.2 Comparison with the Nonperishable Case: A Lower Bound on Optimal Transshipment
Quantity
In this subsection, we first present an optimal transshipment quantity for a nonperishable
inventory problem, and show that this quantity i) is optimal for the perishable case when the
unit outdating costs are sufficiently small, and ii) provides a lower bound for the perishable
case in general.
In the nonperishable inventory literature, it is well established under mild conditions on
the cost parameters that transshipment occurs only when there is shortage at one location
and surplus inventory at the other location, and the optimal transshipment quantity is equal
to the minimum of the shortage and the surplus. In the following proposition, we extend
this result to the perishable inventory case when the unit outdating costs wi, i = 1, 2 are
sufficiently small (recall that when w1 = w2 = 0, our problem becomes equivalent to a
nonperishable inventory problem). In particular, let uN∗t denote the optimal transshipment
quantity for the nonperishable case, then we have the following result:
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min{(S1 − d1t )+, (d2t − S2)+},
if S1 ≥ d1t , d2t ≥ S2;
−min{(d1t − S1)+, (S2 − d2t )+},
if d1t ≥ S1, S2 ≥ d2t ;
0, otherwise.
(3.3)
Proposition 6 says that when the unit outdating costs are sufficiently small compared
with the unit transshipment costs, the optimal transshipment policy for the perishable case
is the same as that for the nonperishable case. The structure of such a policy is presented
in Figure 3.2. In this case, if the demands (d1t , d
2
t ) lie in regions 1, 2, then the artificial




t − uN∗t ) must lie at the boundary between regions 1, 2 and regions
3, 4 or 5. Similarly, if (d1t , d
2






t − uN∗t ) must lie at the



















Figure 3.2: Direction of optimal transshipment for the nonperishable case or the perishable
case with sufficiently small outdating costs (captured by the sign of uN∗t ).
When the unit outdating costs become large, however, results can be very different.
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We show in the following proposition that for the general case, the optimal transshipment
quantity for the nonperishable case (Equation 3.3) provides a lower bound on that for the
perishable case. We further present an example to show that this lower bound is non-tight,
i.e., the optimal transshipment quantity for the perishable case can be strictly higher than
that for the nonperishable case.
Proposition 7 |u∗t | ≥ |uN∗t |.
Proposition 7 is intuitive because while transshipment can be used to meet shortages
in a nonperishable system, it can also be used to meet shortages in a perishable system
(given that other conditions are the same). That is, whenever there are transshipments
in a nonperishable system, there should also be transshipments in a perishable system.
However, the reverse is not true. As we show in the example below, transshipment can be
valuable for the perishable case even if there is no shortage at either location.
Example 1 Consider an instance where K = 2 and T = 1. Consider base-stock levels
S1 = S2 = 1, and assume that the initial inventory levels are x11 = 1 and x
2
1 = 0, respec-
tively. Then after ordering, the inventory vectors at the two locations are (0, 1) and (1, 0),
respectively. Suppose the realized demands at the two locations are d11 = 0 and d
2
1 = 1, re-
spectively. Then, there will be no shortage at either location and an optimal transshipment
policy for the nonperishable case will suggest no transshipment. However, if no transship-
ment occurs, then there will be a unit of outdate at location 1. In contrast, if we transship
one unit of product from location 1 to location 2, the unit of outdate can be avoided and the
total cost will be smaller than no transshipment if per unit transshipment cost is smaller
than per unit outdating cost, which is typically the case in perishable inventory systems.
The situation presented in Example 1 lies in region 4 of Figures 3.1 and 3.2. Comparing
Figures 3.1 and 3.2, we observe that a similar situation could also occur in regions 5 and 8,
where the optimal transshipment quantity for the nonperishable case is always zero, while
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that for the perishable case could be strictly positive or negative. Moreover, the optimal
transshipment quantity for the perishable case in regions 1, 2, 6 and 9 could also be strictly
larger than that for the nonperishable case (in terms of absolute value). For instance, if
(d1t , d
2
t ) lie in regions 1, 2, the artificial demands will only hit the boundary between regions
1, 2 and regions 3, 4 or 5 under the optimal transshipment policy in the nonperishable case.
However, this is not true for the perishable case, where the artificial demands could fall into
the interior of regions 4 and 5.
The implication of the above results is that when managing perishable inventory, one
should expect transshipments to occur more often or in larger quantities compared with
the nonperishable case. This is because in the perishable case, transshipments are valuable
not only for reducing shortages but also for balancing the age of the products at different
locations so as to reduce outdates. We remark that although intuitive, this result is impor-
tant as it provides significant practical implications, and to the best of our knowledge, it
has not been formally characterized or highlighted in the existing literature of inventory
sharing/transshipment.
3.4.3 Monotonicity of Optimal Transshipment Quantity
In this subsection, we explore how the optimal transshipment quantity changes with respect
to the inventory levels at each location.
In the nonperishable inventory literature, it has been shown that the optimal transship-
ment quantity from location 1 to location 2 is non-decreasing in the inventory level at
location 1 and non-increasing in the inventory level at location 2 [40, 41, 43]. Intuitively,
one would expect the same result to hold also for the perishable case. Indeed, we were
able to show via L\-convexity that the monotonicity result holds for a special case with a
two-period lifetime. However, somewhat counterintuitively, we also find that monotonicity
could be violated for the general lifetime case, which we show through an example at the
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end of this subsection.3
Let F be either the real space R or the integer space Z. Following [81] and [82], we
first define submodularity and L\-convexity on Fn as follows (note that our analysis is
applicable to both continuous and discrete quantities). Let ∨ and ∧ be the componentwise
maximum and minimum respectively, F+ and F− be the set of nonnegative and nonpositive
elements in F respectively, and e be the vector of 1’s.
Definition 1 (Submodularity) A real-valued function g(x) defined on a lattice X ⊆ Fn
(i.e., ∀x, x′ ∈ X, x ∨ x′ ∈ X and x ∧ x′ ∈ X) is submodular if ∀x, x′ ∈ X:
g(x) + g(x′) ≥ g(x ∨ x′) + g(x ∧ x′).
Definition 2 (L\-convexity) A real-valued function g(x) defined on an L\-convex set X ⊆
Fn (i.e., ∀x, x′ ∈ X, ∀α ∈ F+, x ∨ (x′ − αe) ∈ X and (x + αe) ∧ x′ ∈ X) is L\-convex if
function ψ(x, ξ) = g(x− ξe), ξ ≤ 0, is submodular on X × F−.





t ) denote the optimal cost-to-go function at period t. We now perform a state
transformation, and show that the optimal cost-to-go function under transformed state vari-
ables is L\-convex, which leads to the monotonicity result. In particular, let s1t := x
1
t ,
s2t := −x2t , and define C̃t(s1t , s2t ) := Ct(s1t ,−s2t ), t = 1, ..., T . Then:
Theorem 3 When K = 2, the optimal cost-to-go function C̃t(s1t , s2t ) is L\-convex.
In the following corollary, we show that the optimal transshipment quantity is monotone
in the inventory levels at the two locations, and the sensitivity is bounded by one [77].
More specifically, when the inventory level at location 1 (2) increases by one, the optimal
transshipment quantity would increase (decrease) and increases (decreases) at most by one.
3We also remark that our proof for L\-convexity for the two-period lifetime case relies on the base-stock
ordering policy assumption and does not extend to general ordering policies.
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Corollary 3 When K = 2, u∗t (x1t , x2t ) is non-decreasing in x1t and non-increasing in x2t ,
where u∗t (x
1
t + δ, x
2
t ) ≤ u∗t (x1t , x2t ) + δ, and u∗t (x1t + δ, x2t ) ≥ u∗t (x1t , x2t )− δ, for δ > 0.
As discussed above, while the monotonicity result holds for the case with a two-period
lifetime, it does not extend to the general lifetime case, which is shown through the follow-
ing example:
Example 2 Consider an instance whereK = 3 and T = 2. Suppose demand is distributed
as follows: P(dit = 0) = ε,P(d
i
t = 1) = 1−2ε,P(dit = 2) = ε, i = 1, 2; t = 1, 2, where ε is
a small number. Consider base-stock levels S1 = S2 = 2. Then, there will be no shortage
at both locations as the demands are no larger than 2. Assume that the initial inventory
levels at the two locations are x11,1 = 0, x
1
2,1 = 1, and x
2
1,1 = 2, x
2
2,1 = 0, respectively.
Then after ordering, the inventory vectors at the two locations are (1, 0, 1) and (0, 2, 0),
respectively. Consider outdating costs w1 = w2 = 5, transshipment costs r1 = r2 = 1,
zero holding costs, and discount factor β = 1 (i.e., no discount). Suppose that the realized
demands at t = 1 are d11 = 0 and d
2
1 = 1. If the transshipment quantity u1 = 0, then there
will be one unit of outdate at location 1 and it is not difficult to check that the expected total
cost in the system is 5 + o(ε). If u1 = 1, then there should be one unit of transshipment
from location 2 to location 1 at t = 2 with probability at least (1 − 2ε)2 (otherwise, there
will be one unit of outdate at location 2). In this case, the expected total cost is 2 + o(ε).
Therefore, the optimal transshipment quantity is u∗1 = 1. However, if the inventory level
at location 1 increases to x11,1 = 1, then after ordering, the inventory vectors at the two
locations become (0, 1, 1) and (0, 2, 0), respectively. If u1 = 0, then the expected total cost
in the system is 5 + o(ε). If u1 = 1, then there will be one unit of outdate at location 2
at t = 2 with probability at least (1 − 2ε)2, and hence the expected total cost is 6 + o(ε).
Therefore, the optimal transshipment quantity becomes u∗1 = 0.
Example 2 illustrates that when the inventory level at location 1 increases, the optimal
transshipment quantity from location 1 to location 2 may decrease. The main reasoning is
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that when the total inventory level at location 1 is not too high, transshipping some units
out may help reduce outdates and hence is valuable. However, when the inventory level
at location 1 becomes high, a transshipment may only delay outdates instead of avoiding
them while also incurring an additional transshipment cost. This result implies that the
established monotonicity result for the nonperishable case does not extend to the perishable
case in general, and that the optimal transshipment policy for the perishable case can be
complicated. In the next section, we present a simple transshipment policy that satisfies the
monotonicity property (hence not optimal in general), and we show via extensive numerical
analyses that it has a very competitive performance.
3.5 A Simple Transshipment Policy and Approximations on One-Period Cost
In this section, we first present an intuitive transshipment policy in §3.5.1, and show that
our proposed transshipment policy provides a lower bound on the optimal transshipment
quantity when the unit outdating costs are sufficiently large. Then, in §3.5.2, we derive
approximations on the expected costs, which are used to compute the base-stock levels at
both locations.
3.5.1 A Simple Transshipment Policy for Reducing Both Shortages and Outdates
As shown in §3.4.2, transshipment in the perishable case can be used not only for reducing
shortages but also for reducing outdates. We next present a simple intuitive transshipment
policy, under which transshipment is triggered under either of the following two circum-
stances: i) without transshipment, there is shortage at one location while there is surplus
inventory at the other location; and ii) without transshipment, there is outdate at one lo-
cation while younger products are consumed at the other location. Specifically, given the
inventory levels xik,t and realized demands d
i
t at each location, we denote our transshipment
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quantity at period t as ût, which is defined as follows:
ût :=

max{min{(S1 − d1t )+, (d2t − S2)+},min{(x1K−1,t − d1t )+, (d2t − x2K−1,t)+}},
if S1 ≥ d1t , d2t ≥ S2, or x1K−1,t ≥ d1t , d2t ≥ x2K−1,t;
−max{min{(d1t − S1)+, (S2 − d2t )+},min{(d1t − x1K−1,t)+, (x2K−1,t − d2t )+}},
if d1t ≥ S1, S2 ≥ d2t , or d1t ≥ x1K−1,t, x2K−1,t ≥ d2t ;
0, otherwise.
(3.4)
The structure of our policy ût is presented in Figure 3.3. Under our policy, if the
demands (d1t , d
2
t ) lie in regions 1, 2, 4, then the artificial demands (d
1
t + ût, d
2
t − ût) must
lie at the boundary between regions 1, 2, 4 and regions 3, 5 or 7. Similarly, if (d1t , d
2
t ) lie in
regions 6, 8, 9, then (d1t + ût, d
2
t − ût) must lie at the boundary between regions 6, 8, 9 and
regions 3, 5 or 7. Clearly, ût lies between the lower and upper bounds we derived in §3.4



















Figure 3.3: Direction of transshipment under our policy (captured by the sign of ût).
Comparing Figures 3.1 and 3.3, we observe that the main differences between our pol-
icy ût and the optimal policy u∗t lie in regions 4, 5, 8. First, in regions 4 and 8, |ût| is
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always strictly positive, while u∗t may be zero (e.g. when the unit outdating costs are suf-
ficiently small as shown in Proposition 6). However, we later show that the gap between
our policy and the optimal policy in these two regions disappears when the unit outdating
cost is sufficiently large, as is typical in perishable inventory problems (see Proposition 8).
Second, in region 5, ût is always zero, while u∗t may be strictly positive or negative. That
is, younger products (i.e., products of age less thanK−1) will never be transshipped under
our policy when there is no shortage, while these products may be transshipped under an
optimal policy. Clearly, the structure of our policy is simpler than that of an optimal policy,
but we later show via extensive numerical analyses that such a simplification comes only
with a small loss of optimality. This is mainly because transshipments of the oldest prod-
ucts are the most critical for reducing outdates, which have been captured by our policy.
While transshipments of younger products can also be beneficial in balancing the inventory
at the two locations, such transshipments can be largely made up by future transshipment
opportunities.
Comparing Figures 3.2 and 3.3, we observe that the main difference between our policy
ût and the optimal policy for the nonperishable case uN∗t lies in regions 4 and 8, where |ût|
is always strictly positive, while uN∗t is always zero. In these two regions, the demand
at each location is no larger than its own base-stock level, hence there is no shortage at
either location. However, as the demand at one location is smaller while that at the other
location is larger than the inventory level of the oldest products, there will be outdates at
one location while younger products are consumed at the other location. The difference
between our policy and uN∗t in these two regions suggests that while transshipment is only
triggered when a shortage is observed under uN∗t , our policy also uses transshipment to
redistribute the inventory of the oldest products to reduce outdates; we show in §4.7 that
this difference leads to a substantial cost reduction.
Next, we show that under mild conditions, our policy provides a lower bound on the
optimal transshipment quantity (clearly, a tighter lower bound than uN∗t ).
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Proposition 8 Suppose wi > ri − hi + h−i + βw−i, i = 1, 2. Then |u∗t | ≥ |ût|.
Proposition 8 implies that when the unit outdating costs are sufficiently large compared
with the unit transshipment costs, our policy provides a lower bound on the optimal policy.
In this case, the only difference between our policy and the optimal policy lies in region 5,
where the optimal transshipment quantity can be either positive, zero or negative, while the
transshipment quantity under our policy is always zero. That is, while younger products
may also be transshipped for reducing (future) outdates under an optimal policy, we only
transship the oldest products, which is intuitive and appealing from a practical perspective.
3.5.2 Approximations on the One-Period Cost
Given the transshipment quantity ût, we now derive approximations of the one-period cost
function that depend on the inventory levels of the two locations only through the base-
stock levels. These approximations are then used to determine the base-stock levels at
both locations. As we show in §4.7, the ordering decisions in the two-location perish-
able setting can be significantly different from those in the two-location nonperishable and
single-location perishable settings.
Given the base-stock levels S1, S2, demand realizations d1t , d
2
t and transshipment quan-
tity ût (defined in Equation 3.4), the single-period cost is as follows:
Lt(x1t , x
2
t , ût) = p
1(d1t+ût−S1)++p2(d2t−ût−S2)++h1(S1−d1t−ût)++h2(S2−d2t+ût)+
+w1(x1K−1,t − d1t − ût)+ + w2(x2K−1,t − d2t + ût)+ + r1(ût)+ + r2(−ût)+.
Recall that under our transshipment policy, transshipment is used for reducing both
shortages and outdates. Define ûSt as the transshipment quantity if transshipment is only
considered when a shortage is observed, and define ûOt as the additional transshipment
quantity that is used for reducing outdates. Then ûSt = u
N∗
t (defined in Equation 3.3), and
ûOt = ût − ûSt .
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To come up with approximations of Lt(x1t , x2t , ût) that depend on the inventory levels
of both locations only through the base-stock levels, we first observe that if the system
starts with zero inventory, i.e., xik,t = 0, k = 1, ..., K − 1; i = 1, 2, then ût = ûSt , and the
one-period cost is as follows:
Γt(S
1, S2) := Lt(0, 0, ûSt ) = p
1(d1t + û
S
t −S1)+ +p2(d2t − ûSt −S2)+ +h1(S1−d1t − ûSt )+
+h2(S2 − d2t + ûSt )+ + r1(ûSt )+ + r2(−ûSt )+.
Clearly, Γt(S1, S2) depends on the inventory vectors only through the base-stock levels, and
the one-period shortage penalty, holding cost and transshipment cost incurred for meeting
shortages are well captured in Γt(S1, S2). However, no outdating cost or transshipment
cost incurred for reducing outdates is charged in Γt(S1, S2). Since products ordered at
period t will not outdate until period t + K − 1, we next define our first approximation of
the one-period cost function by including the outdating costs and the transshipment costs
incurred for reducing outdates at period t + K − 1 into the cost function at t [12, 13]. In
particular, define:
Ot+K−1(S
1, S2) := w1(x1K−1,t+K−1−d1t+K−1−ûOt+K−1)++w2(x2K−1,t−d2t+K−1+ûOt+K−1)+
+r1(ûOt+K−1)
+ + r2(−ûOt+K−1)+,
where xiK−1,t+K−1 is the inventory level of age K − 1 at location i at period t + K − 1.
Assuming that the system starts with zero inventory, there will be no outdates at any period
t, ..., t + K − 2. Then, transshipments only occur to meet shortages at these periods, i.e.,
ûτ = û
S
τ , τ = t, ..., t+K − 2. In this case, the inventory level of age K − 1 at location i at











, i = 1, 2,
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which clearly depends on the inventory levels of both locations only through the base-
stock levels. Therefore, we define our first approximation of the one-period cost function
as follows:
Π1(S
1, S2) := Γt(S
1, S2) + βK−1Ot+K−1(S
1, S2).
As shown by [13], in a single-location system with no transshipment, the counterpart of
Ot+K−1(S






the outdating cost at period t+K−1 with probability one (for any given initial inventory at
period t and demand realizations at periods t, ..., t+K−1). This is because when the system
starts with zero inventory, products will be consumed at a slower rate than otherwise, and
hence there will be more units of age K − 1 left in inventory at the beginning of period
t+K − 1, leading to a larger amount of outdates at t+K − 1.4 Based on this observation,
we expect that E[Π1(S1, S2)] tends to overestimate the expected one-period cost.
To address this potential overestimation, we next present a second approximation of
the one-period cost which approximates the one-period outdating cost as the average of
the total outdating costs across all periods t, ..., t + K − 1 (instead of the outdating cost at
t+K− 1) [15]. In particular, if the system starts with zero inventory at period t, then there
will be no outdates at periods t, ...t + K − 2, and all outdates in periods t, ..., t + K − 1
will occur at t+K − 1. Therefore, we define our second approximation of the one-period
cost function as follows:
Π2(S
1, S2) := Γt(S
1, S2) + αβK−1Ot+K−1(S
1, S2).
where α = 1−β
1−βK if β < 1, and α =
1
K
if β = 1.
As shown by [15], in a single-location system with no transshipment, the counterpart of
αE[Ot+K−1(S
1, S2)] underestimates the long-run average one-period outdating cost. This
4We remark that in the two-location setting however, it is not always guaranteed that Ot+K−1(S1, S2)
overestimates the sum of the outdating costs and the transshipment costs incurred for reducing outdates at
period t+K − 1.
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is because by assuming that the system starts with zero inventory t, the total amount of
outdates at periods t, ..., t+K−1 will be smaller than otherwise. Based on this observation,
we expect that E[Π2(S1, S2)] tends to underestimate the expected one-period cost.
Given that E[Π1(S1, S2)] tends to overestimate while E[Π2(S1, S2)] tends to under-
estimate the expected one-period cost, we take the average of these two approximations








Then, the base-stock levels can be determined as (Ŝ1, Ŝ2) ∈ arg min(S1,S2) E[Π̄(S1, S2)].
Finally, we remark that although our analyses are conducted based on stationary de-
mands, our transshipment and ordering policies derived in this section are both applicable
to consider nonstationary demands, where we compute different base-stock levels for dif-
ferent periods.
3.6 Numerical Results
In this section, we numerically test the performance of our proposed policy and compare
it with other benchmark policies. In particular, we first consider stationary demand in
§3.6.1, and then consider nonstationary demand based on a platelet inventory management
problem in §3.6.2.
3.6.1 Stationary Demand
In §3.6.1, we first consider a symmetric case where demands at the two locations are iden-
tically distributed. Then in §3.6.1, we consider an asymmetric case where demand at one




Similar to many existing studies on perishable inventory systems [e.g. 13, 16, 17], we con-
sider short product lifetimes K = 2, 3 (while the optimal policy becomes computationally
intractable for larger lifetimes, as we show in the appendix, our policy continues to per-
form better than other benchmark policies as lifetime gets larger). For each location, we
consider two demand distributions, Poisson and geometric, to represent demand with small
and large variances, respectively. We assume that the mean of demand is equal to 5, the
discount factor is β = 0.95, and similar to [13], we consider the following cost parameters:
p = 5, 10, w = 5, 10, h = 0.5, 1, and r = 1, 2. Considering all combinations of model
parameters, we have a total of 64 problem instances. For each instance, we generate 10, 000
random scenarios and simulate a planning horizon of 100 periods.
We first benchmark our policy with an optimal policy, where the optimal transshipment
policy is solved using standard application of dynamic programming and the optimal base-
stock levels are found by simulation optimization. Let C(π) and C(OPT) be the expected
total discounted cost of a policy π and an optimal policy, respectively. We define the





The average performance error of our proposed policy across all 96 problem instances is
0.2% and the maximum performance error is 1.9%, which demonstrate that our policy has
a very competitive performance. In order to quantify the value of inventory sharing and
better understand the performance of our policy, we further benchmark our policy with the
following three policies:
• No Sharing (NS): No transshipment is allowed, and each location follows a single-
location optimal base-stock policy.
73
• Sharing Policy 1 (S1): Transshipment is conducted based on transshipment policy
uN∗t as defined in Equation 3.3, and each location follows a single-location optimal
base-stock policy assuming no transshipment.
• Sharing Policy 2 (S2): Transshipment is conducted based on transshipment policy
uN∗t as defined in Equation 3.3, and base-stock levels are jointly determined at the
two locations in a similar way as described in §3.5.2 (by plugging in uN∗t instead of
ût).
In particular, we benchmark with policy NS to assess the value of inventory sharing. We
also benchmark with policies S1 and S2 because the improvement of S1 over NS captures
the value of transshipment used for meeting shortages, and the improvement of S2 over
S1 captures the value of jointly determining the base-stock levels at the two locations.
Finally, the improvement of our policy over S2 captures the value of transshipment used
for reducing outdates (note that in the nonperishable case, our policy and policy S2 are
essentially the same and are optimal).
The expected total discounted cost of each policy under different model parameters
are presented in Table 3.1. From these results, we first observe that all policies that allow
transshipment perform significantly better than policy NS, which indicates that inventory
sharing has a substantial value. Second, we observe that the marginal improvement of pol-
icy S2 over S1 is minor under most problem instances.5 That is, under symmetric demand,
the benefit of jointly determining ordering quantities is small under most circumstances
(however as we show in §3.6.1 that this is not the case for asymmetric demands). Fi-
nally, and perhaps most interestingly, we observe a significant performance improvement
from our policy over policy S2, an optimal policy for the nonperishable case. This result
highlights the value of transshipment not only for meeting shortages but also for reducing
outdates in the perishable case (and the value is especially large when the holding cost is
5Note that S2 may not always perform better than S1. This is because while the base-stock levels under S1
are optimal for single-location systems, the joint ordering decisions under S2 are made in a heuristic manner.
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Table 3.1: Expected total costs under different policies: symmetric case (percentages of
cost reduction over policy NS are included in parenthesis).
Policy NS S1 S2 Our Policy
Poisson K = 2 p = 5, h = 0.5 125.2 91.0 (27.3%) 87.5 (30.1%) 77.8 (37.9%)
p = 5, h = 1 169.1 118.4 (30.0%) 118.4 (30.0%) 111.0 (34.4%)
p = 10, h = 0.5 163.4 127.1 (22.2%) 105.5 (35.5%) 92.2 (43.6%)
p = 10, h = 1 216.0 147.2 (31.9%) 147.8 (31.6%) 133.9 (38.0%)
K = 3 p = 5, h = 0.5 86.0 70.4 (18.2%) 63.7 (26.0%) 62.8 (27.0%)
p = 5, h = 1 137.4 105.4 (23.3%) 102.5 (25.4%) 102.0 (25.8%)
p = 10, h = 0.5 101.9 90.2 (11.5%) 72.3 (29.0%) 70.7 (30.6%)
p = 10, h = 1 167.9 133.9 (20.3%) 119.8 (28.7%) 118.9 (29.2%)
Geometric K = 2 p = 5, h = 0.5 493.1 348.3 (29.4%) 345.8 (29.9%) 329.6 (33.2%)
p = 5, h = 1 546.2 390.3 (28.5%) 390.3 (28.5%) 376.6 (31.1%)
p = 10, h = 0.5 716.9 477.0 (33.5%) 469.9 (34.5%) 446.6 (37.7%)
p = 10, h = 1 804.8 541.8 (32.7%) 540.6 (32.8%) 519.7 (35.4%)
K = 3 p = 5, h = 0.5 365.8 245.0 (33.0%) 245.0 (33.0%) 231.1 (36.8%)
p = 5, h = 1 443.8 310.9 (30.0%) 310.9 (30.0%) 300.0 (32.4%)
p = 10, h = 0.5 507.5 326.0 (35.8%) 313.1 (38.3%) 292.6 (42.3%)
p = 10, h = 1 629.2 418.3 (33.5%) 409.1 (35.0%) 388.5 (38.3%)
Note. Other cost parameters are w = 5, r = 1; the patterns for other outdating and transshipment costs are similar.
small, i.e., when the outdating cost constitutes the majority of the overage cost).
To examine the effect of perishability, we present the value of inventory sharing (i.e.,
the percentage of cost reduction of our policy over policy NS) under different unit trans-
shipment costs for both perishable and nonperishable cases in Figure 3.4 (recall that in the
nonperishable case, our policy is the same as policy S2 and is optimal). We observe that
under both Poisson and geometric demand, the value of inventory sharing is significantly
higher in the perishable case, which underlines the importance of transshipments for per-
ishable products. Also note that when demand variance is small (i.e., Poisson demand), the
value of inventory sharing decreases rapidly when the product lifetime increases. However,
this is not the case when the demand variance is large (i.e., geometric demand), where the
value of inventory sharing is even higher when K = 3 than when K = 2.
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Figure 3.4: Value of inventory sharing under different unit transshipment costs for Poisson
(left) and Geometric (right) demands. (The nonperishable case is captured by K →∞.)
Note. Other cost parameters are p = 5, w = 5, h = 0.5; the patterns for other costs are similar.
Asymmetric Case
To mimic the motivating example described in §3.1, we now consider an asymmetric case
where demand at one location is variable while that at the other is constant. In particular, we
consider two demand distributions for location 1, Poisson and geometric, both with mean
equal to 5, and assume that demand at location 2 is deterministic and is equal to 5. Other
parameters considered are the same as in the previous subsection. In this case, the average
performance error of our proposed policy across all problem instances is 0.5% and the
maximum performance error is 3.8%, which again illustrates the near-optimal performance
of our policy.
The expected total discounted costs of different policies are presented in Table 3.2.
From these results, we first observe that policy S1 always has the same expected total cost
as policy NS. This is because under policy S1, the base-stock level at location 2 is always
equal to 5, where there will be no shortage or surplus inventory after demand realization.
Therefore, transshipment never occurs under policy S1 and the system dynamics of policies
S1 and NS are exactly the same.
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Table 3.2: Expected total costs under different policies: asymmetric case (percentages of
cost reduction over policy NS are included in parenthesis).
Policy NS S1 S2 Our Policy
Poisson K = 2 p = 5, h = 0.5 62.6 62.6 (0.0%) 56.6 (9.5%) 47.3 (24.4%)
p = 5, h = 1 84.4 84.4 (0.0%) 80.9 (4.1%) 71.3 (15.4%)
p = 10, h = 0.5 82.0 82.0 (0.0%) 63.8 (22.2%) 55.1 (32.8%)
p = 10, h = 1 107.9 107.9 (0.0%) 97.6 (9.5%) 88.3 (18.1%)
K = 3 p = 5, h = 0.5 43.1 43.1 (0.0%) 43.1 (0.0%) 41.4 (3.9%)
p = 5, h = 1 68.7 68.7 (0.0%) 68.7 (0.0%) 68.0 (1.0%)
p = 10, h = 0.5 51.2 51.2 (0.0%) 50.3 (1.8%) 47.7 (6.8%)
p = 10, h = 1 84.1 84.1 (0.0%) 84.1 (0.0%) 82.4 (2.0%)
Geometric K = 2 p = 5, h = 0.5 246.6 246.6 (0.0%) 195.6 (20.7%) 181.4 (26.4%)
p = 5, h = 1 273.1 273.1 (0.0%) 248.8 (8.9%) 218.6 (19.9%)
p = 10, h = 0.5 358.3 358.3 (0.0%) 263.6 (26.4%) 260.8 (27.2%)
p = 10, h = 1 402.3 402.3 (0.0%) 321.2 (20.2%) 317.5 (21.1%)
K = 3 p = 5, h = 0.5 183.2 183.2 (0.0%) 160.2 (12.5%) 139.6 (23.8%)
p = 5, h = 1 222.1 222.1 (0.0%) 215.5 (3.0%) 194.8 (12.3%)
p = 10, h = 0.5 254.0 254.0 (0.0%) 188.2 (25.9%) 173.0 (31.9%)
p = 10, h = 1 315.0 315.0 (0.0%) 278.3 (11.7%) 258.2 (18.0%)
Note. Other cost parameters are w = 5, r = 1.
Second, somewhat surprisingly, we find that policy S2 exhibits a substantial perfor-
mance improvement over S1. Given that S1 and S2 follow the same transshipment policy,
the performance improvement must come from different base-stock levels. From Table 3.3,
we observe that under policy NS or S1, the base-stock level at location 2 is always 5, i.e.,
equal to demand. However, under policy S2 or our policy, the base-stock level at location
2 can be strictly higher than 5. This may appear to be counterintuitive. However, there is a
reasonable explanation: by ordering slightly more than 5 (but less than or equal to 10 for
the case where K = 2) at location 2, there will be no outdate at location 2. In this case,
the surplus inventory at location 2 can be used as a buffer to meet the unmet demand at
location 1 without incurring an outdating risk at location 2. Thus, the base-stock level at
location 1 can be smaller than before and hence the amount of outdates at location 1 is re-
duced. This result highlights the importance of jointly determining the ordering quantities
at different locations when demand is asymmetric. It also implies that the well-established
result in the single-location setting that the optimal order-up-to level for the perishable case
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is always less than or equal to that for the nonperishable case [11, 12] does not translate to
the two-location setting where transshipment is allowed.
Table 3.3: Base-stock levels under different policies for the asymmetric case where demand
at location 2 is deterministic and equal to 5.
Policy NS S1 S2 Our Policy
Poisson K = 2 p = 5, h = 0.5 (7,5) (7,5) (6,7) (7,6)
p = 5, h = 1 (6,5) (6,5) (6,6) (7,5)
p = 10, h = 0.5 (8,5) (8,5) (6,8) (7,7)
p = 10, h = 1 (7,5) (7,5) (6,7) (7,6)
Third, similar to the symmetric case, we observe a further performance improvement
of our policy over policy S2. More importantly, unlike policy S2 under which the value
of inventory sharing relies on ordering strictly more than 5 units at location 2, there is
a significant value of inventory sharing under our policy even if the ordering quantity at
location 2 is exactly 5. This is because under our policy, transshipment is also used for
reducing outdates. Then, even if there is neither shortage nor surplus inventory at location
2, location 2 can still help consume the old products at location 1 to reduce the amount of
outdates while saving its own fresh products for future use.
Finally, from Figure 3.5, we observe that for the asymmetric case where demand at one
location is deterministic, the value of inventory sharing is always zero for the nonperishable
case, while it is strictly positive and substantial for the perishable case, which again shows
that the established findings from the nonperishable inventory literature may not hold for
the perishable case.
3.6.2 Nonstationary Demand: Platelet Inventory Management Problem in a Two-Hospital
System
In this section, we test the performance of our proposed policy using real data from the
platelet inventory management problem described in §3.1. In particular, at these two hospi-
tals, 1) platelets are ordered on a daily basis and an order placed at the end of the previous
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Figure 3.5: Value of inventory sharing under different unit transshipment costs for Poisson
(left) and Geometric (right) demands. (The nonperishable case is captured by K →∞.)
Note. Other cost parameters are p = 5, w = 5, h = 0.5.
day arrives in the morning of the next day; 2) as demand arises, older products are typically
issued first to reduce outdates; and 3) unmet demand is satisfied by emergency deliver-
ies. Therefore, our assumptions for zero lead time, FIFO issuing policy, and lost sales are
applicable in this setting.
Platelets have a short lifetime of K = 3 days. We consider a planning horizon of 4
weeks (i.e., T = 28 days). Similar to two recent studies on blood inventory management
[35, 36], we assume that at each location, demand over time is independent but that the
distribution in different days may not be identical. Based on the platelet transfusion data
from October 2015 to September 2016 at these two hospitals, we estimate the daily de-
mand at hospital 1 as a discretized normal distribution, and that at hospital 2 as a negative
binomial distribution. The means and standard deviations of daily demand at the two hos-
pitals are presented in Table 3.4. Further, we assume that demands at the two locations are
independent, which is reasonable as these two hospitals serve different types of patients, as
discussed in §3.1.
Using real data and in consultation with the blood bank managing team at this hospital
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Table 3.4: Means and standard deviations for daily demand at the two hospitals.
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
Hospital 1 Mean 26.1 24.7 23.6 24.0 25.2 17.4 17.4
Stand. dev. 7.1 4.9 5.7 6.6 6.5 4.9 5.3
Hospital 2 Mean 4.6 6.3 5.5 5.7 6.3 3.1 3.1
Stand. dev. 3.1 4.7 4.1 3.8 3.7 2.5 2.7
system, we estimated the unit outdating cost w to be equal to the purchase cost of $500,
unit holding cost h as $5, unit transshipment cost r as $50, and unit shortage penalty p
as $2000.6 Similar as before, we benchmark our policy with policies NS, S1 and S2 (the
optimal policy becomes computationally intractable in this case). The summary statistics
and expected total costs of different policies are presented in Table 3.5. First, we observe
that policy S1, which allows transshipment only when there is shortage, substantially re-
duces the expected amount of shortages compared with policy NS, but has negligible effect
on the amount of outdates. Policy S2, which has the same transshipment policy as S1 but
allows jointly determining base-stock levels at the two locations, substantially reduces the
expected amount of outdates compared with policy S1 (with only a slight increase in the
amount of shortages). Finally, our policy, under which transshipment is also triggered for
reducing outdates, further significantly reduces the amount of outdates. Overall, the ex-
pected total cost reduction of our policy is substantial compared with policies NS (77.6%),
S1 (62.5%) and S2 (26.9%).
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study a joint ordering and transshipment decision problem in a two-
location perishable inventory system. Our model and analysis provide the following three
insights for the management of perishable inventory systems. First, we show that the opti-
6The shortage penalty for blood inventory management problems typically includes the cost of emergency
shipments or the penalty of postponing blood transfusions, which is usually high and often estimated as 2-10
times higher than the purchase cost [35].
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Table 3.5: Summary statistics and expected total costs within 4 weeks under different poli-
cies for the platelet inventory management problem (percentages of cost reduction over
policy NS are included in parenthesis).
Policy NS S1 S2 Our Policy
# Shortage 4.18 0.13 0.28 0.27
# Outdate 16.26 16.20 3.43 0.38
# Transshipment 0 4.13 18.52 16.46
Total Cost ($) 19684 11729 (40.4%) 6024 (69.4%) 4400 (77.6%)
mal transshipment quantity for the perishable case is at least as high as (and can be strictly
higher than) that for the nonperishable case. In particular, in the perishable case, even when
there is no shortage, transshipment may be useful for balancing the inventory of old prod-
ucts to reduce the total amount of outdates. Second, in contrast to the single-location setting
where the optimal order-up-to level for the perishable case is always smaller than or equal
to that for the nonperishable case, we find that when inventory sharing is considered in a
multi-location system, it may be optimal to order strictly more in the perishable case than in
the nonperishable case. In particular, when demands at the two locations are asymmetric,
the low variance location should increase the order quantity, which serves as a buffer for the
high variance location, so that the amount of outdates at the high variance location can be
reduced. Finally, we find that the value of inventory sharing for the perishable case is typi-
cally higher than for the nonperishable case. Interestingly, unlike in the nonperishable case,
the value of inventory sharing in the perishable case can be strictly positive and substantial,
even when demand at one location is deterministic. This is because in the perishable case,
a deterministic location can help consume old products at the other location so as to reduce
outdates. The implication of this result is that when products are perishable, transshipment
should be considered even when existing results from the nonperishable inventory literature
may suggest little or no value of transshipment.
Meanwhile, we present a simple and near-optimal inventory management policy for
perishable inventory sharing that has the above characteristics and easily could be im-
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plemented in practice. Under our policy, transshipment is triggered when there is either
shortage or immediate outdate. In this case, only the oldest products at each location will
be transshipped unless there is shortage at the other location. Such a policy is very in-
tuitive and considered practical by the blood inventory managers at the hospital system
from which the study was inspired. As of writing this manuscript, we are also working
closely with these managers to further develop decision support tools to help manage their
platelet inventory. We believe that our policies and insights are also valuable in many other
perishable inventory systems where inventory can be shared among multiple locations.
Our analysis can be extended in several directions. First, we assumed zero fixed order-
ing cost in our model. While this is reasonable for blood inventory management problems
where orders are usually placed on a daily basis, there could be other settings where or-
ders are not necessarily placed at every period and there is a fixed cost each time an order
is placed. In that case, one needs to consider developing other ordering policies such as
the (s, S) policy which has been widely used in inventory management problems with
fixed ordering costs. Second, we did not consider capacity constraints in our analysis. In
the nonperishable inventory literature, it has been shown that with capacity constraints on
ordering decisions, it may be optimal to keep some safety stock at each location and not
satisfy the shortage of the other location. We expect that similar results could be established
for the perishable case; however, we do not anticipate such a policy to be very practical in
perishable (especially blood) inventory management problems where the shortage penalty
is typically very high. Third, we assumed FIFO issuing policy in this study. Our proposed
transshipment policy, under which only the oldest products are transshipped, works very
well in a FIFO model (which is reasonable when managing blood inventory). However,
in other inventory systems where products are issued in different manners, e.g. Last-In-
First-Out (LIFO), we anticipate that it may be important to also take younger products into




TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS FOR MEDICAL SURPLUS PRODUCT
ALLOCATION
4.1 Introduction
In the United States, healthcare organizations annually dispose of 5.9 million tons of med-
ical surplus products [83]. These products include many unused, unexpired medical sup-
plies (e.g., leftovers from post-surgical procedures, unopened clinical kits, etc.) and used
biomedical equipment (e.g., vital sign monitors, ultrasound units, infant incubators, etc.)
that are typically discarded due to safety guidelines and regulatory requirements. Mean-
while, large portions of populations in the developing world suffer from inadequate medical
supply and care. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that close
to 6 million children under the age of five died in 2015, mainly due to inadequate medical
care [84]. Given this disparity between the developed and developing world with respect
to the supply of medical products, there is a unique opportunity for bridging surplus with
need to alleviate suffering in the developing world. In this context, Medical Surplus Re-
covery Organizations (MSROs) play a critical role by collecting and recovering medical
surplus products in developed countries and redistributing them to healthcare organizations
in medically under-served communities in developing countries.
While the supply of medical surplus products is limited in proportion to the high de-
mand in the developing world, a significant portion of these products are ultimately wasted
due to the mismatch between supply and demand. Indeed, the WHO estimates that for
many recipients in low-resource countries, over seventy percent of donated medical equip-
ment was inappropriate [85]. Delivering the right product to the right recipient in MSRO
supply chains is particularly challenging for many reasons. First, unlike in a traditional
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for-profit supply chain where the supply can be managed to some extent through produc-
tion, the supply of medical surplus heavily relies on donations, which are often uncertain
and uncontrollable. Second, recipient needs for many critical medical products such as
biomedical equipment are significant and largely heterogeneous. For example, a specific
medical equipment may be critically needed by one recipient but not at all by another be-
cause of their respective medical specializations or operating conditions. In such situations,
an inappropriate allocation of products would lead to a waste of critical resources. Third,
MSROs usually serve large bases of recipients from a variety of different countries, and
hence the information about the exact needs of recipients is typically very limited. Fourth,
transportation is a major cost component for MSROs, and hence products are usually sent
to recipients using full container shipments to achieve economies of scale, which may ex-
acerbate the supply-demand mismatch. Last but not least, medical surplus products are
allocated to recipients without using monetary transfers for several reasons (e.g., MSROs
are nonprofit organizations with the objective to maximize value provision to recipients, in
which case the use of financial mechanisms such as asking a recipient with a greater need
to pay more is usually not considered a viable option [86]; also, recipients in this context
are highly cash-constrained, which further precludes the use of monetary transfers).
Resource allocation problems without monetary transfer exist in other nonprofit set-
tings such as school assignment and organ allocation as well. While the MSRO’s resource
allocation problem shares certain characteristics with these settings, the combination of
challenges faced by MSRO supply chains differentiates an MSRO’s problem from existing
problems. For example, a school assignment problem typically considers a static setting
where the number of slots for each school is given and fixed [87]. However, in the medi-
cal surplus setting, products are donated dynamically over time and in uncertain quantity.
In the context of organ allocation, most existing studies either assume known patient types
(which is reasonable because physicians assess their patient’s condition prior to listing them
on a transplant waitlist [88, 89]) or focus on the trade-off between a higher organ quality
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(which is recipient-independent) and a shorter waiting time [90]. In the medical surplus
setting however, recipients’ product preferences are typically unknown to the MSRO and
largely heterogeneous. Moreover, in both school and organ allocation settings, each recip-
ient receives only one item, while in the MSRO setting, recipients receive full containers
of different product mixes. Due to these unique challenges, matching supply with demand
is particularly difficult in an MSRO supply chain, leading to a significant wastage of the
donated medical products [85].
In this context, a Southern U.S.-based MSRO, referred to as Beta, has developed an
award-winning recipient-driven resource allocation model to better match medical surplus
with recipient needs. In particular, once Beta secures funding for a container shipment,
it provides a recipient with online access to its inventory database, and lets the recipient
determine what to fill her container with. By allowing recipients themselves to pick what
they are to receive, the recipient-driven model offers the potential to substantially reduce
the mismatch between supply and demand. However, while this approach maximizes the
container value for a given recipient at a given time, it remains unclear which recipient
would be ideal to serve at each shipping opportunity. The sequence in which the recipients
are served is important because MSROs often have low inventory levels for many critical
products (e.g., biomedical equipment). Consequently, for a randomly selected recipient,
her most-needed products may not be available in the MSRO’s existing inventory, in which
case she may fill her container with some products that are of secondary importance to
her, while those products could be of primary importance to another recipient. Hence,
appropriately determining which recipient to serve at each shipping opportunity is critical
for better matching supply with demand. However, this is challenging as recipient needs
are usually not known to the MSRO.
To improve MSROs’ value provision capability, we identify implementable strategies
to support MSROs’ recipient selection decisions when recipient needs are private informa-
tion. In particular, we propose a mechanism design approach where recipients are asked to
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report their preference rankings over a set of critical products that the MSRO has access to.
The reported preference information is then used to determine which recipients to serve de-
pending on what is available in MSRO inventory at each shipping opportunity. Motivated
by Beta’s best practice of providing recipients with online access to its inventory database,
we first study a base model where the MSRO inventory levels are public information to the
recipients. Our analysis shows that when inventory information is shared, recipients may
have an incentive to misreport their preferences to improve the likelihood of being served,
and the only truthful mechanism is random selection among recipients, which defeats the
purpose of eliciting needs information.
Motivated by this result, we subsequently propose two operational strategies to improve
MSROs’ value provision capability: i) not sharing MSRO inventory information with re-
cipients; and ii) withholding information regarding the preferences of other recipients in
the recipient pool. To compare the MSRO’s value provision under different settings char-
acterized by combinations of the proposed operational strategies, we first show that any
mechanism satisfying two natural properties called symmetry and acyclicity can be char-
acterized by a score function. This score function assigns each recipient a score at each
shipping opportunity based on her reported preference rankings and the available MSRO
inventory, and then the recipient with a higher score is selected. We characterize the set
of truthful score functions under each setting and show that, first, to ensure that recipi-
ents truthfully report their preferences, it is important for the MSRO to eliminate inventory
information provision to recipients. Second, the total value provision to recipients can
be further improved if the competitor information is eliminated, i.e., the MSRO should
not provide a recipient with information regarding other recipients. We remark that these
findings differ from those in many traditional supply chain management settings, where
information sharing typically improves system performance [91, 92, 93].
We further investigate the value of cardinal mechanisms, where recipients are asked
to report their valuations for different products, instead of just rankings. In contrast to
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what might be expected about the value of more granular information [94, 95, 96], we
find that among a wide class of easy-to-implement mechanisms characterized by additive
linear score functions, the ones that rely only on recipients’ rankings of products perform
equally well compared with those relying on valuations. This result is appealing from
a practical perspective, as it suggests that there is no added value from further eliciting
the exact valuations and it suffices for an MSRO to collect recipients’ preference ranking
information.
Finally, we develop a calibrated numerical study based on Beta’s historical data to esti-
mate the value of our proposed strategy consisting of a ranking-based scoring mechanism
in conjunction with eliminating inventory and competitor information. We show that under
this strategy, which involves only minimal change to the industry best practice, recipi-
ents can receive significantly more of their top-ranked products. Furthermore, this strategy
closes more than 50% of the gap in value provision between the status quo and a clairvoy-
ant solution which knows both recipients’ valuations and future arrival volumes of different
products. Due to its competitive performance and simplicity, the proposed strategy can be
easily implemented in practice to help MSROs improve their value provision to recipi-
ents. Indeed, our findings already led to a change in Beta’s practice for their allocation
of biomedical equipment. Beta has now blinded the inventory of biomedical equipment in
their online inventory system. They are currently working on adjusting their recipient appli-
cation system to elicit recipients’ preference rankings for different biomedical equipment,
and implementing our scoring mechanism to support their recipient selection decisions.1
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §4.2, we provide an overview of the
related literature and discuss our contributions. In §4.3, we present our model. In §4.4,
we present the mechanism design problem and characterize the set of truthful mechanisms
when the MSRO inventory information is provided to recipients. In §4.5, we show that
in order to ensure that recipients truthfully reveal their needs, it is important to eliminate
1Medical supplies, which have higher inventory availability and are needed by virtually all recipients,
continue to be managed as before.
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the provision of MSRO inventory and competitor information to recipients. In §4.6, we
discuss the value of cardinal mechanisms. Finally, we estimate the value of our proposed
mechanism using Beta data in §4.7 and draw conclusions in §4.8.
4.2 Related Literature
Our work relates to several distinct streams of literature on medical surplus product alloca-
tion and resource allocation mechanisms.
Medical Surplus Recovery. First, our work contributes to the recently growing lit-
erature on medical surplus recovery and allocation. Case studies on MSROs suggest that
the lack of operational expertise to match the uncertain supply with recipient demand is a
major challenge for MSROs [97, 98, 99, 100]. Further, existing research in this area has
focused on measuring recipients’ medical surplus utilization rates, and empirically identi-
fied a significant mismatch between supply and demand [101, 102], largely driven by the
fact that recipient needs are usually unknown to the MSRO. To our knowledge, [103] are
the first to formally analyze a resource allocation model in this context. More specifically,
[103] study a recipient-driven model where recipients are allowed to choose the content
of the container they will be receiving, and show that this model can result in rushed con-
tainer shipments and loss in value provision due to recipient competition. They suggest
that switching to a provider-driven model will significantly improve the value provision to
recipients. Yet, [103] assume known recipient valuations throughout the paper and do not
address the problem of asymmetric information, which is the key challenge in this con-
text. In contrast, we consider private recipient valuations and propose a mechanism design
approach that enables the MSRO to determine which recipient to serve at each shipping
opportunity based on revealed recipient preferences.
Resource Allocation in Humanitarian Context. Our work adds to the class of re-
source allocation problems in the broader humanitarian logistics field (see overviews in
[104] and [105]). In this context, while many existing studies focus on optimal decision
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making in centralized settings [lee2017combining, e.g., 106, 107, 108, 109], a number of
other studies consider incentive issues in decentralized systems [86, 110, 111, 112, 113,
114]. Among those, [86], who also consider a mechanism design approach, is most rele-
vant to ours. In particular, [86] study a fleet size problem where the transportation needs of
different humanitarian programs are private information. Our work is different from theirs
in two aspects: i) while [86] consider the supply (the size of the fleet) as a decision, the
supply of medical surplus is uncertain and uncontrollable; and ii) the key trade-off in their
problem is to balance the overage and underage costs for a single resource, while we con-
sider multiple product categories and the problem is to deliver the right product to the right
recipient.
Optimal Mechanism Design for Resource Allocation. Our work also relates to re-
source allocation problems without monetary transfer and with sequential product arrivals,
such as organ allocation and public housing. While most existing studies on organ allo-
cation assume known recipient types [e.g., 115, 116, 117, 88, 89], one exception is [90],
who study a kidney allocation problem where recipients report their risk types by joining
one of the waitlists. However, in [90], patients are homogeneous in their product prefer-
ences (everybody prefers a higher quality kidney) and each patient receives at most one
kidney. This is in contrast to the MSRO setting where recipients have heterogeneous prod-
uct preferences and receive multiple items. There is also a growing literature that studies
welfare-maximizing matching in public housing (or broader contexts) where items that ar-
rive over time are matched with agents with private preference information [e.g., 118, 119].
In these studies, the focus is often on the effectiveness of different queuing disciplines (e.g.,
multiple waitlists); also, each agent typically receives at most one item (e.g., house), while
we allow recipients to receive different product mixes.
Another approach for resource allocation without monetary transfer is to ask recipients
to bid using tokens. For example, [120] considers such an approach for allocating food to
food banks daily. However, [120] points out that “it is very rare to observe these kind of
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‘monopoly money’ solutions being used to allocate resources in real world settings.” A key
feature that makes this approach work in their setting is that a large number of recipients
simultaneously participate in the game repeatedly on a daily basis, which minimizes strate-
gic recipient behavior. This is in contrast to the MSRO setting where recipients around the
world receive full-container shipments sequentially and infrequently (often only once for
the foreseeable future for a given recipient), and only a limited number of recipients are
served within a given time frame.
Our work also relates to rationing games in the literature [e.g., 121, 122, 123, 124].
In particular, these studies consider resource allocation problems where recipients/retailers
have private information about their needs. A key difference is that while these studies
mainly focus on the allocation of a single resource (e.g., production capacity) where retail-
ers have the incentive to misreport their needs by exaggerating their orders, we study the
allocation of multiple product categories where recipients’ strategic behavior is to misre-
port their preference rankings of different products.
Information Disclosure in Product Allocation and Supply Chain Management.
Our results also relate to existing research on information disclosure/sharing in product
allocation and supply chain management problems. First, in the product allocation litera-
ture, information disclosure has received extensive attention in auction problems (see [125]
for a review). In these problems, the objective is to maximize the revenue of the auction-
eer, and it has been shown that disclosing product (quality) information publicly to bidders
often increases revenue [126]. This is well-known as the “linkage principle”. In this study,
we extend the discussion of information disclosure to product allocation problems in a hu-
manitarian context where there is no monetary transfer, and show that the disclosure of
MSRO inventory information can lead to strategic misreporting of recipient preferences,
which undermines the total value provision to recipients. We note that information dis-
closure has been studied less frequently in resource allocation problems without monetary
transfers. For example, in organ allocation problems, due to the perishable nature of organs
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and that each recipient receives at most one organ, it is optimal to allocate each organ upon
its arrival [90]; hence the discussion of inventory information is not relevant. In many static
allocation problems such as school assignment, the inventory levels (e.g., the school capac-
ities) are usually fixed and it suffices to ask participants to report their preferences among
the available resources. However, in our setting, to support recipient selection decisions, it
is important to ask recipients to report their preferences among the full set of products the
MSRO has access to (which may or may not be available at the current period). We also
note that our result differs from [103]’s discussion on MSRO inventory visibility, which
suggests presenting lower-than-actual inventory levels to recipients in order to induce re-
cipients to wait in a recipient-driven model. In contrast, we suggest eliminating inventory
information provision in order to elicit truthful recipient needs information and support
MSRO decision making towards recipient selection.
Second, in the supply chain management literature, a number of existing studies in
traditional supply chain settings have shown that the sharing of (inventory) information
typically improves system performance, for example, by enabling different locations to
make more informed inventory replenishment decisions [e.g., 91, 92, 93]. In contrast, we
show that sharing MSRO inventory information leads to a restricted set of truthful recipient
selection mechanisms and hence limits the MSRO’s value provision capability.
Cardinal vs. Ordinal Mechanisms. Finally, our work is also related to the literature
that compares cardinal and ordinal mechanisms in resource allocation problems. In many
contexts, each player has specific valuations for different products. If the allocation deci-
sions are made based on reported player valuations, the mechanism is called cardinal [e.g.,
127, 128]. Otherwise, if only the relative preference rankings are elicited, the mechanism is
called ordinal [e.g., 129, 130]. In a school assignment model, [94] show that mechanisms
eliciting cardinal preferences can do strictly better than those only eliciting ordinal infor-
mation. In similar contexts, [95] and [96] further show that the ratio between the optimal
social welfare of a cardinal and an ordinal mechanism can be arbitrarily large. However,
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the above work either demonstrates the value of cardinal information assuming it is given a
priori or considers static allocation in a large market where each participant is a price taker
(hence strategic behavior is minimized). Unlike the above studies, we consider a finite
market and determine which recipient to serve at each period. In this case, as described in
more detail in Section §4.6, we find zero value added from a cardinal mechanism over an
ordinal mechanism under a wide class of implementable mechanisms.
4.3 Model Setup
In our base model, we consider a setup where an MSRO allocates products to two recipients
in two periods (t = 0, 1). We present a multi-recipient extension in the appendix. Below,
we describe model components in detail and summarize key notation in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Summary of key notation.
Section Notation Description
§4.3 vi,j Valuation of recipient i for product j, i = 1, 2; j = 1, ..., N
γi,j Ranking of recipient i for product j, i = 1, 2; j = 1, ..., N
φ−i,i Probability density function (p.d.f.) for recipient −i’s belief on vi, i = 1, 2
µj Inventory level of product j at t = 0, j = 1, ..., N
εj Amount of new arrivals of product j at t = 1, j = 1, ..., N
K Total amount of products each recipient receives in one shipment
yti,j Amount of product j recipient i receives if she is served at t = 0, 1, i = 1, 2; j = 1, ..., N
δ Time discount factor the MSRO uses in measuring total value provision
§4.4 p(γ1,γ2) Probability that recipient 1 is selected given reported rankings (γ1,γ2)
xti,j Expected amount of product j recipient i receives at t = 0, 1, i = 1, 2; j = 1, ..., N
Πti(vi,γ
′
i) Expected payoff of recipient i at t = 0, 1 with true valuation vi and reported ranking γ
′
i
φ0,i Probability density function (p.d.f.) for MSRO’s belief on vi, i = 1, 2
§4.5 ψi Probability mass function (p.m.f.) for recipient i’s belief on µ, i = 1, 2
ρi,j Index of recipient i’s rank-j product, i = 1, 2; j = 1, ..., N.
gj Points each recipient gets for each unit of their rank-j product in the MSRO inventory
Valuations and Rankings. In line with practice, we assume that different recipi-
ents, which typically represent healthcare facilities with different specializations from var-
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ious regions, have heterogeneous valuations on products. In particular, let vi,j denote the
valuation of recipient i for product j, i = 1, 2; j = 1, ..., N . Similarly, let γi,j denote
the ranking of recipient i for product j, i = 1, 2; j = 1, ..., N , where a smaller num-
ber indicates a higher preference (e.g., the most preferred product has ranking 1). Let
vi
.
= (vi,1, ..., vi,N) and γi
.
= (γi,1, ..., γi,N). We assume that recipients’ preferences are
strict, i.e., vi,j 6= vi,j′ ,∀j 6= j′.2 Then, for any given valuation vi, there exists a unique
ranking γi, which is a permutation of 1, ..., N , such that for any j 6= j′, vi,j > vi,j′ if and
only if γi,j < γi,j′ . Let V
.
= {vi ∈ RN : vi,j ≥ 0, j = 1, ..., N ; vi,j 6= vi,j′ ,∀j 6= j′},
and let Γ be the set of all possible rankings γi. In line with practice, we assume that vi
is private information of recipient i, i = 1, 2. Let −i denote the other recipient, and we
assume that recipient −i has a belief on vi with joint probability density function (p.d.f.)
φ−i,i(vi) > 0,∀vi ∈ V .
Inventory Levels. Let µ = (µ1, ..., µN) denote the MSRO inventory levels of products
1, ..., N at t = 0, and let ε = (ε1, ..., εN) denote the amount of random arrivals of products
1, ..., N at t = 1 with known distributions and finite means. We consider indivisible prod-
ucts, i.e., µj’s and εj’s are integer numbers. We assume that the total quantity of products
each recipient receives is the same and is equal to K, which represents the MSRO’s total
quantity limit placed on each recipient, the container capacity or a portion of the container
capacity dedicated for the product categories under consideration. Then, without loss of
generality, we assume that µj ≤ K, j = 1, ..., K. To ensure that at least one recipient can
be served at t = 0, we assume
∑N
j=1 µj ≥ K. Finally, in line with Beta’s existing practice,
we assume that µ is known to recipients in our base model.
Recipient Selection. In practice, based on multiple factors such as country-wise health-
care needs, donor preferences and available funding for container shipments, a few recip-
ients from the recipient pool will be considered “eligible” for receiving a container ship-
ment. Each eligible recipient will receive one container shipment and will be served se-
2Considering non-strict preferences leads to a more complicated technical exposition without adding new
insights.
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quentially over time because of the tight operational constraints faced by MSROs. To
mimic this process, we assume that the two recipients in our model (assuming both are
eligible from t = 0) are served one by one in the two respective periods, each receiving
one container shipment. As briefly discussed in §4.1, since the MSRO inventory levels
dynamically evolve over time, the total value provision to recipients can be quite different
based on the sequence in which recipients are served. Hence, in this paper, we focus on
determining which recipient to serve at each shipping opportunity.
Once a recipient is selected, in line with Beta’s current practice, we assume that the
recipient receives the best bundle (i.e., the set of items that maximizes its container value)
from the available inventory. This is appealing from both implementation and analytical
tractability perspectives. We discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption in §4.8
and in the appendix.
We next formulate the MSRO’s recipient selection problem that maximizes the total
value provision when recipient needs are known to the MSRO. For i = 1, 2 and j =
1, ..., N , let y0i,j and y
1
i,j be the amount of product j recipient i receives if she is served at
t = 0 and t = 1, respectively, and let π0i and π
1
i be the value provision to recipient i if she
is served at t = 0 and t = 1, respectively. Then, if the valuations (vi,j’s) were known, the





























Given π0i and π
1
i , the MSRO selects a recipient at t = 0 (while the other recipient
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where δ ∈ [0, 1) denotes the time discount factor the MSRO uses to discount the value
provided to recipients at t = 1, and Eε denotes the expectation over ε.
Clearly, πOPT and the optimal solution to Equation 4.3 can be easily determined if
recipient valuations were known to the MSRO. However, as discussed above, this is not
the case in practice. Therefore, we next present a mechanism design approach to help
the MSRO elicit recipient needs information and determine which recipient to serve when
recipient needs are not known.
4.4 The Mechanism Design Problem
We focus our attention on truthful direct mechanisms (in which players truthfully report
their types) because thanks to the well-known revelation principle, any equilibrium out-
come that can be implemented by an arbitrary mechanism can also be implemented by a
truthful direct mechanism [131]. Furthermore, a truthful mechanism has several advan-
tages from a practical perspective as it eliminates strategic behavior of recipients as well as
the concern that naive or honest recipients will be at a disadvantage compared to those who
are more strategic.
In particular, we focus on ordinal mechanisms where recipients only report their prefer-
ence ranking γi, since an ordinal mechanism is simple and and has been successfully imple-
mented in several other settings such as voting and school assignment [carroll2017mechanisms].
We study cardinal mechanisms in §4.6. As in the known recipient needs case described in
§4.3, we assume that one recipient is served at each period, and when served, the recipi-
ent receives the best bundle (based on its reported rankings) from the available inventory.
The problem is then to determine which recipient to serve at each period. Then, an ordinal
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mechanism is defined as a function p(γ1,γ2) that specifies which recipient to serve at t = 0
under any given ranking profile (γ1,γ2).
We first consider two deterministic priority rules for ease of implementation: serving
recipient 1 (p = 1) and serving recipient 2 (p = 0). We also consider a third option of
serving a random recipient (p = 1
2
) to break a tie (e.g., when the two recipients report the
same ranking). Then, a mechanism is a function p : Γ2 → {0, 1
2
, 1}. The sequence of
events is as follows: i) the MSRO announces a mechanism p(γ1,γ2) at the beginning of
t = 0; ii) each recipient i reports her ranking γi; and iii) based on the reported rankings
and the pre-announced mechanism, the MSRO determines which recipient to serve at t = 0
(while the other recipient is served at t = 1). We note that we do not ask recipients to
specify the quantity they need for each product because in practice, recipeints’ needs for
critical products are often truncated by MSROs’ inventory levels (or quantity limits MSROs
impose for each recipient and each product). For example, Beta usually sends only one or
at most two pieces of each biomedical equipment to a given recipient. For cases with
higher inventory levels and when there is a significantly diminishing return in recipients’
valuations, our model can be modified by treating an additional unit of each product as a
different product.
Next, we introduce additional notation which is used for defining the truthfulness of a
mechanism. Recall that the optimal solutions y0i,j and y
1
i,j to Equations 4.1 and 4.2 define the
amount of product j recipient i receives if she is served at t = 0 and t = 1, respectively, and
that y0i,j and y
1
i,j can be determined solely based on recipients’ reported rankings (γi,γ−i).


























i,j(γi,γ−i) denote the expected amount of
product j recipient i receives at t = 0 and t = 1, respectively. For each recipient i, given
her true valuation vi and reported ranking γ ′i, her expected payoff at period t under a given










i,γ−i)], t = 0, 1, where Eγ−i
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denotes the expectation over recipient i’s belief on recipient −i’s ranking γ−i.
Definition 3 An ordinal mechanism p(γ1,γ2) is truthful if for each recipient i with any
valuation vi ∈ V , the payoff (Π0i ,Π1i ) obtained from reporting her true ranking γi = γi(vi)
is not lexicographically dominated3 by that of reporting any other ranking γ ′i ∈ Γ, i.e.,
∀i,vi ∈ V,γ ′i ∈ Γ,




i); or ii) Π
0






i (vi,γi) ≥ Π1i (vi,γ ′i).
(4.4)
The truthfulness notion in Definition 3 is based on the lexicographical order, which has
been widely used in the mechanism design literature for comparison of multi-dimensional
vectors [132]. In our setting, it captures the observation that recipients are usually impatient
for critical resources and compete for the current shipping opportunity [103]. We also
consider an alternative definition of truthfulness in the appendix based on a discounted
payoff model and show that our key insights continue to hold under that definition.
Finally, we allow the MSRO to have different beliefs on recipients’ valuations compared
with recipients’ beliefs on each other’s valuations, because the MSRO may have specific
information about the recipients (e.g., geographic regions, types of hospitals, etc.), and they
may or may not share such information with recipients. For i = 1, 2, let φ0,i denote the


























subject to the truthfulness constraints characterized by Inequality 4.4 and that p(γ1,γ2) ∈
{0, 1
2
, 1}, where the expectation is taken over the MSRO’s beliefs φ0,i on recipients’ valua-
tions vi, i = 1, 2, and γi(vi) denotes the ranking vector that corresponds to vi, i = 1, 2.
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4.4.1 Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms
Intuitively, a desirable property of a mechanism that achieves high total value provision is
that the probability that each recipient is selected at t = 0 increases when her needs are
better met with the available inventory. However, in the following proposition, we show
that in order to ensure that recipients truthfully report their needs, the mechanism should be
such that each recipient assigns a fixed probability to the event of being selected no matter
what her ranking is.
Proposition 9 Suppose µ is public information. If a mechanism p(γ1,γ2) is truthful, then
the probability each recipient assigns to the event of being selected at t = 0 based on her
belief on the other recipient’s rankings is a constant independent of what she reports, i.e.,
there exists p̃ ∈ [0, 1] such that Eγ2 [p(γ1,γ2)] = p̃,∀γ1 ∈ Γ, and Eγ1 [1 − p(γ1,γ2)] =
1− p̃,∀γ2 ∈ Γ.
Proposition 9 says that to ensure truth telling, the probability each recipient assigns to
being selected at t = 0 cannot depend on what she reports. In other words, the MSRO can
only rely on its own belief on recipients’ preferences to determine the allocation sequence.
This result is to some extent disappointing as it defeats the purpose of eliciting preference
information. The intuition here is that if reporting different rankings results in different
probabilities of being selected, a recipient can try to obtain a better chance to be selected
by misreporting her rankings. More importantly, the incentive for recipients to misreport
stems from the fact that recipients know the MSRO inventory levels. Suppose that the
mechanism prioritizes a recipient who can benefit more from the available inventory. Then,
recipients knowing the MSRO inventory levels may have an incentive to claim that they
have higher rankings for the products with high inventory levels, so as to have a better
chance of being selected (a better chance of being selected implies a higher expected payoff
Π0i if the recipient’s valuations of different products are sufficiently close to each other).
Inspired by the above result, we next compare two cases where the MSRO inventory
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information is and is not provided to recipients, respectively. We first show that any mecha-
nism that satisfies two natural properties, symmetry and acyclicity (defined in §4.5), can be
characterized by a score function. Then, we characterize the set of truthful score functions
under each setting and show that the total value provision to recipients can be improved
when inventory information provision is eliminated, but the extent of the improvement
depends on recipients’ beliefs on each other’s rankings. We quantify the value of eliminat-
ing inventory and competitor information by comparing the cases where inventory and/or
competitor information is and is not provided, respectively.
4.5 Value of Eliminating Inventory and Competitor Information
When the MSRO inventory information is not provided to recipients, we assume that each
recipient i has a belief on the inventory levels µ = (µ1, ..., µN). In particular, let M
.
=
{µ ∈ ZN : 0 ≤ µj ≤ K, j = 1, ..., N ;
∑N
j=1 µj ≥ K} be the set of all possible inventory
levels. Assume that each recipient i believes that there is a probability ψi(µ) for the true
inventory levels to be µ, where
∑
µ∈M ψi(µ) = 1. Note that this definition captures both
cases where inventory information is and is not provided to recipients (for the case where
inventory information is provided to recipients, ψi is simply a deterministic distribution
with probability one attributed to the true inventory levels).
Recall that the MSRO’s problem is to determine which recipient to serve at each pe-
riod based on recipients’ reported rankings. When the MSRO inventory information is not
provided to recipients, the MSRO needs to specify the decision rule under all possible in-
ventory levels. Then, a mechanism is a function of not only the reported rankings (γ1,γ2),
but also the inventory levels µ, denoted by p(γ1,γ2,µ), where recipients take expectation
over µ to evaluate their expected payoffs.
Finding an optimal mechanism where monetary transfer is not allowed and recipients
have multi-dimensional valuations is notoriously difficult [128]. To address this challenge,
we next show that in our setting, the structure of a mechanism can be significantly sim-
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plified under two natural properties, symmetry and acyclicity. More specifically, we show
that any mechanism satisfying these two properties can be characterized by a score func-
tion. This provides an intuitive representation of the mechanism and a path for identifying
implementable approaches for practice.
Definition 4 A mechanism p(γ1,γ2,µ) is symmetric in recipients if for any γ1,γ2 ∈ Γ
and µ ∈ M , p(γ1,γ2,µ) = 1− p(γ2,γ1,µ), i.e., if the rankings of the two recipients are
exchanged, the probability for each recipient to be selected would also be exchanged.
Definition 5 A mechanism p(γ1,γ2,µ) is acyclic if for any fixed µ, p(γ1,γ2,µ) ≥ 12
and p(γ2,γ3,µ) ≥ 12 imply p(γ1,γ3,µ) ≥
1
2
, where γ1, γ2, γ3 ∈ Γ denote three ranking
vectors, and the last inequality holds as an equality if and only if the first two inequalities
are both equalities.
Symmetry in players has been widely considered in the mechanism design literature to
ensure equal treatment of equals [129]. In our context, it means the allocation probability
depends only on the reported rankings of the recipients but not on the specific indices of the
recipients. Acyclicity is also intuitive and widely considered in the literature [133]. In our
context, it implies that if recipient 1 is more likely to be selected than recipient 2 when they
report γ1 and γ2, respectively, and when they report γ2 and γ3, respectively, then recipient
1 is more likely to be selected than recipient 2 when they report γ1 and γ3, respectively.
Next, we show that any symmetric and acyclic mechanism is characterized by a score
function, where each recipient is assigned a score based on her reported rankings and the
true inventory levels. If the scores of the two recipients are equal, then each recipient is
selected with an equal probability; otherwise, the recipient with a higher score is selected.
Proposition 10 A mechanism p(γ1,γ2,µ) is symmetric and acyclic if and only if there





1 if s1 > s2,
0 if s1 < s2,
1
2
, if s1 = s2.
(4.6)
With the above result, to find a mechanism p(γ1,γ2,µ), it suffices to find a score func-
tion si = g(γi,µ). In particular, unlike in a general mechanism p(γ1,γ2,µ) where one
needs to specify which recipient to serve under all possible combinations of ranking pro-
files, the score of each recipient depends only on her own but not the other recipient’s
rankings, which is intuitive, easy to implement, and enables a multi-recipient extension of
our results (see appendix). If we further require symmetry in products, i.e., the allocation
probability depends only on the inventory levels of different products but not on the product
indices, then it can be proven that Proposition 10 holds with an even simpler score function
g(µρi,1 , ..., µρi,N ), where ρi,j denotes the product index for which recipient i’s ranking is
j. Finally, we remark that while acyclicity is essential for ensuring a score function repre-
sentation, the main insights in this section continue to hold if the symmetry assumption is
relaxed by considering recipient-specific score functions (see the appendix for details).
Scoring-based rules are simple, easy to communicate and commonly used in a number
of other settings such as voting systems and organ allocation problems [134, 89]. For exam-
ple, in liver allocation, priorities for patients on the liver transplant waitlist are determined
by the Model for End-Stage Liver Disease (MELD) scoring system [135]. Similarly, in
kidney allocation, the prioritization of patients is usually determined by the Kidney Allo-
cation Score (KAS), which consists of a weighted additive sum of several score components
that are functions of patient and/or organ characteristics [89]. In our setting, a simple and




gjµρi,j , i = 1, 2. (4.7)
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Under such a score function, each recipient i gets gj points for each unit of her rank-j
product in inventory. For example, when g1 ≥ ... ≥ gN , a recipient is assigned a higher
score if there is a higher inventory of her top-ranked products in the system.4 Intuitively,
such a score function favors the selection of a recipient whose needs are better met by
the available inventory. The determination of a mechanism of this structure reduces to
determining N parameters gj, j = 1, ..., N , which is simpler both computationally and
implementation-wise compared to the general score function si = g(γi,µ) of dimension
N !× (K + 1)N (or (K + 1)N with symmetry in products).
In the remainder of this section, we focus on an additive linear score function to quan-
tify the value of eliminating inventory information. We note that additive linearity is not
a particularly restrictive assumption in our setting as it is in line with the value provision
equations defined in Equations 4.1 and 4.2. Further, we show that the set of truthful mech-
anisms for the case where inventory information is provided (i.e., Proposition 11) remains
the same under general score functions, hence our characterization of the difference be-
tween the cases where inventory information is and is not provided allows us to obtain a
lower bound on the true value of eliminating inventory information. We characterize the
set of truthful additive linear score functions for both cases where inventory information is
and is not provided to recipients in §5.1 and §5.2, respectively.
4.5.1 With Inventory Information
We first analyze the case where the MSRO shares its inventory information with recipients
(we denote this case by subscript I). In this case, each recipient i’s belief on the inventory
levels consists of a unit mass on the true inventory vector µ, i.e., ψi(µ) = 1, i = 1, 2. Then,
truthfulness of a mechanism p(γ1,γ2,µ) is defined in the same way as that in Definition 3,
and we say that a score function is truthful if the associated mechanism defined in Equation
4In voting systems, a similar scoring method called Borda count has been widely considered [134]. The
key difference is that in voting systems a score is assigned to each candidate and used as a measure of the




Recall that in Proposition 9, we have shown that with inventory information, the prob-
ability each recipient assigns to being selected cannot depend on what she reports. This
result becomes even more intuitive when we consider mechanisms that are characterized
by score functions.
Proposition 11 For case I , the score of each recipient cannot depend on recipients’ re-
ported rankings. In particular, if a score function si =
∑N
j=1 gjµρi,j , i = 1, 2 is truthful,
then it can be characterized by any gj’s such that g1 = ... = gN .




Γ. Proposition 11 suggests that when inventory information is provided to recipients, the
score of each recipient has to be the same constant, and the mechanism reduces to ran-
dom selection among recipients. Furthermore, this result continues to hold under general
score functions (see appendix). That is, the only truthful symmetric and acyclic mecha-
nism is random selection among recipients. Yet, a randomized selection policy which does
not consider the needs of recipients can lead to a significant value loss. In the following
subsection, we show that eliminating the inventory information enlarges the set of truthful
mechanisms, leading to an improvement in value provision.
4.5.2 Without Inventory Information
We next analyze the case where the MSRO does not share its inventory information with
recipients (we denote this case by NI). In this case, first, we assume that each recipient
assigns a positive probability to all possible inventory levels, i.e., ψi(µ) > 0, ∀µ ∈ M .
Second, since we focus on a set of critical products (e.g., biomedical equipment) which
typically all have relatively small donation volumes, it is usually difficult to tell which
product has a higher inventory level than others. Hence, we assume that recipients’ belief ψi
is symmetric in products, i.e., the probability mass does not change under any permutation
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of a given inventory vector.5 Formally, for any µ,µ′ ∈ M , if µj = µ′k, µk = µ′j for some
j, k = 1, ..., N , and µl = µ′l,∀l 6= j, k, then ψi(µ) = ψi(µ′). Note that if the distributions
of the inventory levels of different products are independent, then symmetry simply implies
that the distributions of the inventory levels of different products are identical.
Let Ψ be the set of beliefs ψi that satisfy the above two properties. We next de-
fine truthfulness of a mechanism p(γ1,γ2,µ) for case NI . For that, we need to de-
fine payoff functions under all possible inventory levels, where recipients take expec-
tation over µ to evaluate their expected payoffs. In particular, we denote y0i,j and y
1
i,j
as y0i,j(γi,γ−i,µ) and y
1














For each recipient i, given her true valuation vi, reported ranking γ ′i and the MSRO inven-











t = 0, 1. Then, truthfulness for case NI is defined as follows.
Definition 6 For the case without inventory information, an ordinal mechanism p(γ1,γ2,µ)
is truthful if for each recipient i with valuation vi ∈ V and symmetric belief ψi ∈ Ψ on the
inventory vector, the expected payoff obtained from reporting her true ranking γi = γi(vi)
is not lexicographically dominated by that of reporting any other ranking γ ′i ∈ Γ, i.e.,
∀i,vi ∈ V, ψi ∈ Ψ,γ ′i ∈ Γ,











i (vi,γi,µ)] ≥ Eµ[Π1i (vi,γ ′i,µ)].
Note that the truthfulness notion in Definition 6 is “robust” to recipients’ belief ψi in
the sense that we require that truth-reporting is better off for recipients with any symmetric
belief ψi ∈ Ψ.
5For the case where the product set contains products with substantially different inventory levels, one
can divide the product set into different tiers such that the symmetric assumption is reasonable within each
tier. Then, our framework can be applied by asking recipients to report their rankings within each tier.
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Since the only truthful score function for the case with inventory information is ran-
dom selection among recipients, it is straightforward to show that the set of truthful score
functions after eliminating inventory information is at least as large as before. Let πI and
πNI be the total value provision of an optimal truthful additive linear score function (i.e.,
a truthful additive linear score function that maximizes Equation 4.5) for cases I and NI ,
respectively. Then, we have the following result. We remark that the same conclusion holds
under general score functions.
Theorem 4 πNI ≥ πI .
Theorem 4 says that the value of eliminating inventory information is always non-
negative. The basic intuition is that when the MSRO inventory information is not provided
to recipients, recipients’ incentive to claim that they like the products with high inventory
levels is eliminated, and hence the MSRO is able to use the revealed preferences to de-
termine which recipient to serve. This result has an important practical implication as it
suggests a different operational strategy regarding the disclosure of MSRO inventory in-
formation compared with the industry best practice implemented by Beta (where recipients
have online access to Beta’s inventory database and can observe its inventory levels). In
order to truthfully elicit recipients’ preference information and use that information to sup-
port the MSRO’s recipient selection decision, it is necessary to ask recipients to report their
rankings without disclosing the MSRO inventory information.
In order to quantify the value of eliminating inventory information (i.e., the gap between
πNI and πI), we next characterize the set of truthful additive linear score functions for
case NI . To do so, we note that the set of truthful mechanisms for this case depends on
recipients’ beliefs on each other’s rankings (while our result in Proposition 11 for case I
holds under any recipients’ beliefs on each other’s rankings). In that regard, we consider
the following two sub-cases: i) a recipient believes that the other recipient has a specific
ranking with a sufficiently large probability (§4.5.2); and ii) both recipients believe that it
is equally likely for the other recipient to have any ranking (§4.5.2). We refer to these two
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cases as with and without competitor information, respectively, and we particularly focus
on these two cases as they correspond to the smallest and largest set of truthful mechanisms,
respectively, among all possible beliefs φi,−i, i = 1, 2 (as Proposition 14 will demonstrate).
By comparing to case I , the value provision improvement of these two cases provide a
lower and an upper bound, respectively, on the value of eliminating inventory information.
With Competitor Information
We first analyze the case where the MSRO shares the information regarding other recipients
in the recipient pool (e.g., recipients’ identities, geographic regions, types of hospitals,
etc.; we denote this case by NI-C). In this case, we assume that the information provided
by the MSRO allows recipients to form firm beliefs about other recipients’ preferences.
Specifically, we consider a scenario where recipient 1 believes that recipient 2 has a specific
ranking with a large probability, while recipient 2’s belief can be arbitrary (i.e., our result
holds as long as one recipient has firm beliefs). Given recipient 1’s belief φ1,2 on v2, let
Pφ1,2(γ2) denote the probability that recipient 1 believes that recipient 2’s ranking is γ2.
Then, we assume that there exists γ2 ∈ Γ such that Pφ1,2(γ2) ≥ 1 − θ, where θ is a small
number.6
Proposition 12 For case NI-C, a score function si =
∑N
j=1 gjµρi,j , i = 1, 2 is truthful if
and only if g1 ≥ g2 = ... = gN , or g1 = ... = gN−1 ≥ gN .
The set of truthful mechanisms characterized in Proposition 12 is strictly larger than that
characterized in Proposition 11. Proposition 12 says that in caseNI-C, the score a recipient
gets for each unit of her rank-1 (or rank-N ) product can be different from those for other
products, but the unit score for all other products have to be the same. The intuition is as
follows: If g1 > g2 = ... = gN , then the mechanism is such that the recipient whose rank-
1 product has a higher inventory level is selected. Under this mechanism, misreporting




the rank-1 product increases the probability of being selected when the reported rank-1
product is available (or has a high inventory level), but decreases the probability of being
selected when the true rank-1 product is available. Then intuitively, recipients do not have
an incentive to misreport their rank-1 products. In contrast, if the mechanism uses the
full ranking information (i.e., g1 > ... > gN ), then a recipient who is informed about
the other recipient’s rankings may have an incentive to misreport. For example, under
some beliefs on inventory levels, if a recipient’s rank-1 and rank-2 products are the other
recipient’s rank-N and rank-1 products, respectively, then the first recipient may want to
reverse the reported rankings of her true rank-1 and rank-2 products so as to obtain a larger
probability of being selected when her true rank-2 product is available, without decreasing
the probability of being selected when her true rank-1 product is available. The proof of
Proposition 12 formalizes this argument.
In sum, Proposition 12 shows that there is value added from eliminating inventory in-
formation, but the set of truthful mechanisms remains relatively small when recipients are
informed about each other’s rankings, which implies limited value added from only elimi-
nating inventory information. In the following subsection, we show that eliminating com-
petitor information along with inventory information leads to a substantially larger set of
truthful mechanisms, and hence a further improvement in the MSRO’s value provision ca-
pability.
Without Competitor Information
We next analyze the case where the MSRO withholds information regarding other recipi-
ents in the recipient pool (we denote this case by NI-NC). In this case, we assume that
recipients have virtually no information about their competitor’s identities or preferences,
and that they have a prior belief under which their competitor can have any ranking with
an equal probability. That is, Pφ1,2(γ2) = Pφ2,1(γ1) =
1
N !
, ∀γ1,γ2 ∈ Γ. This assumption
is reasonable when the MSRO serves large recipient bases and different recipients have
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diverse needs (recall that we consider a set of critical products such as biomedical equip-
ment).
Proposition 13 For case NI-NC, a score function si =
∑N
j=1 gjµρi,j , i = 1, 2 is truthful
if and only if g1 ≥ ... ≥ gN .
The set of truthful mechanisms characterized in Proposition 13 is strictly larger than
those characterized in Propositions 11 and 12. More specifically, Proposition 13 says that
after both inventory and competitor information provision are eliminated, the set of truth-
ful mechanisms contains the full set of additive linear score functions with monotonically
decreasing coefficients. Let πNI-C and πNI-NC be the total value provision of an optimal
truthful additive linear score function for cases NI-C and NI-NC, respectively (i.e., the
optimal value of Equation 4.5 achieved by mechanisms characterized in Propositions 12
and 13, respectively). Then:
Theorem 5 πNI-NC ≥ πNI-C .
The intuition behind Theorem 5 is that when a recipient knows about the other recip-
ient’s preferences, she may have an incentive to misreport (e.g., increase) the rankings of
the products that are top-ranked by the other recipient (as explained after Proposition 12),
while this incentive can be eliminated by withholding the competitor information. This
result also has important implications because in practice, competitor information is not
necessarily hidden from recipients. For example, in Beta, recipients can observe the set of
products staged for shipment to other recipients during a warehouse tour at Beta; they may
also learn about other recipients’ preferences through previously shipped container mixes
that are occasionally disclosed to recipients. In contrast, our result suggests that to be able
to fully utilize recipients’ revealed preferences in recipient selection decisions, MSROs
should withhold the information regarding other recipients in the recipient pool.
Further, we emphasize through the following proposition that πNI-C and πNI-NC corre-
spond to the smallest and largest value provision, respectively, among all belief structures
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regarding competitor information under the case without inventory information. In particu-
lar, let πNI(φ1,2, φ2,1) denote the value provision of an optimal truthful additive linear score
function for case NI where the two recipients’ beliefs on each other’s valuations are φ1,2
and φ2,1, respectively. Then:
Proposition 14 πNI-C ≤ πNI(φ1,2, φ2,1) ≤ πNI-NC , ∀φ1,2, φ2,1.
Therefore, πNI-C − πI and πNI-NC − πI provide a lower and an upper bound, re-
spectively, on the value of eliminating inventory information for a range of information
sets regarding competitor information. Further, since πNI-C and πNI-NC are the optimal
value provision for cases with and without competitor information, respectively, we use
πNI-NC − πNI-C to denote the value of eliminating competitor information. In §4.7, we
quantify these values using real-life data.
The set of truthful additive linear score functions under different inventory and competi-
tor information scenarios are summarized in Table 4.2. We remark that while we assume
recipients’ belief on inventory and competitor preference is perfectly symmetric in products
in case NI-NC, we show in the appendix that under bounded perturbations on recipients’
beliefs, recipients remain truthful as long as each recipient’s valuations for different prod-
ucts are sufficiently different. We also note that under an additive linear score function,
the coefficient gj corresponds to each recipient’s rank-j product instead of product j. This
way, the announced gj’s do not reveal any information on inventory availability, and hence
recipients will not be able to infer the MSRO inventory levels through the announced mech-
anism. We formalize this argument in the appendix.
4.6 Value of Cardinal Mechanisms
In previous sections, we have been focusing on ordinal mechanisms where recipients are
only asked to report their preference rankings. In this section, we extend our analysis to
consider cardinal mechanisms where recipients report their valuations for different prod-
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Table 4.2: The set of truthful additive linear score functions under different information
scenarios.
With competitor Without competitor
information (C) information (NC)
With inventory g1 = ... = gN g1 = ... = gN
information (I)
Without inventory g1 ≥ g2 = ... = gN or g1 ≥ ... ≥ gN
information (NI) g1 = ... = gN−1 ≥ gN
ucts, and we investigate the value of cardinal mechanisms over ordinal mechanisms. Intu-
itively, a cardinal mechanism elicits more information than an ordinal mechanism, hence
it is natural to expect that the optimal value provision of a cardinal mechanism should be
higher than that of an ordinal mechanism. However, we show that for the class of im-
plementable mechanisms we study, the extra information from eliciting exact valuations
(beyond rankings) does not help improve the value provision.
We start with the definition of a cardinal mechanism, and we directly focus on the case
without inventory information because when inventory information is provided to recip-
ients, the incentive for recipients to misreport presented in Proposition 11 exists in the
cardinal setting as well, and hence the only truthful mechanism is random selection among
recipients. When inventory information is not provided to recipients, a cardinal mechanism
is a function of the valuation profile (v1,v2) of the two recipients and the MSRO inventory
levels µ, denoted by p(v1,v2,µ).












= (1 − pi)Eε[y1i,j(γi,γ−i,µ)]. For each recipient i, given her true val-











i,v−i,µ)], t = 0, 1. Then, the truthfulness of a cardi-
nal mechanism can be defined in same manner as before.
As before, we consider mechanisms that are characterized by additive linear score
functions, which now capture both ordinal and cardinal information. In particular, for
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i = 1, 2; j = 1, ..., N , let ṽi,j =
vi,j∑N
j′=1 vi,j′
∈ [0, 1) be the normalized valuation of recipient







h(ṽi,j)µj, i = 1, 2, (4.8)
where we assume that h(0) = 0 and h(ṽi,j) is nondecreasing in ṽi,j . We focus on normal-
ized valuations because if recipients are prioritized based on their absolute valuations, they
may have the incentive to present themselves as high valuation recipients (hence if h was a
function of vi,j , then we can trivially conclude that h(vi,j) has to be zero for all vi,j to ensure
truth telling). Further, by considering normalized valuations, we allow h(ṽi,j) to depend
on the valuations for all products: When a recipient’s valuation of a product increases, she
gets a higher score for each unit of that product in MSRO inventory but a lower score for
all other products, which is very intuitive.
The score function for the cardinal setting (Equation 4.8) clearly includes that for the
ordinal setting (Equation 4.7) as a special case. By eliciting more information, one may ex-
pect that a cardinal mechanism can do strictly better than an ordinal mechanism. However,
as we show in the following proposition, the additional valuation information does not help
improve the total value provision (while we only present the result for case NI-NC below,
the same conclusion holds for case NI-C).




j=1 h(ṽi,j)µj, i =
1, 2 with h(0) = 0 and h nondecreasing is truthful if and only if g1 ≥ ... ≥ gN and
h(ṽi,j) = 0, ∀ṽi,j ∈ [0, 1).
Proposition 15 says that a truthful mechanism can only incorporate ordinal information.
The underlying intuition is as follows: Under a cardinal mechanism in Equation 4.8, while
both gj’s and the h function are chosen by the MSRO, recipients have the flexibility to
manipulate the score they get for each unit of product j in the MSRO inventory by reporting
different values of vi,j (or equivalently, ṽi,j). In particular, suppose the h function is not a
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constant. Then, a recipient may have an incentive to misreport (increase) the valuations
of her top-ranked products so as to gain a larger probability of being served should these
products be available in the MSRO inventory.
Let πNI-NC and πCNI-NC be the total value provision of an optimal additive linear score
function for case NI-NC in ordinal and cardinal settings, respectively. Then, we have the
following result.
Theorem 6 πCNI-NC = πNI-NC .
Theorem 6 implies that under a wide class of implementable mechanisms (i.e., additive
linear score functions), there is no value added from eliciting exact valuations in addition
to rankings. This finding differs from those in many existing studies on resource allocation
in the literature, where the value of cardinal mechanisms is typically positive and could be
arbitrarily large [e.g., 94, 95, 96]. However, as discussed earlier in §4.2, these studies ei-
ther consider a large market or assume that cardinal information is given a priori (note that
cardinal information will be valuable in our setting as well if it is given a priori). Another
difference between the above studies and ours is that the above studies focus on determin-
ing what each player receives in a static setting, while in our setting recipients are served
sequentially and our decision is to determine which recipient to serve at each shipping
opportunity. In the former case, the outcome of a mechanism is a multi-dimensional allo-
cation vector that specifies the probability for each recipient to receive each product. In our
setting however, the outcome is a single-dimensional number that specifies the probability
for each recipient to be selected, which limits the degree of freedom for leveraging the
cardinal information. In that regard, our result parallels that in a two-product assignment
problem, where the allocation vector for each recipient becomes single-dimensional (the
two probabilities sum up to one), in which case it has been shown that there is no value
added from eliciting cardinal information [128].
The implication of Theorem 6 is that it is sufficient for the MSRO to ask recipients
to report their preference rankings under additive linear score function mechanisms. This
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is appealing from a practical perspective, because it is much easier for recipients to rank
different products rather than to determine their valuations. Indeed, in other settings such
as voting and school assignment, even though it has been shown that the value of cardinal
information can be arbitrarily large, ordinal mechanisms are still widely considered both in
the literature and in practice [carroll2017mechanisms].
4.7 Numerical Results
We now evaluate the performance of the proposed mechanisms and estimate the value of
eliminating inventory and competitor information using Beta data.
Medical surplus products are typically classified into two broad categories: medical
supplies and biomedical equipment. Medical supplies (e.g., masks, gloves, syringes, surgi-
cal instruments, etc.) usually have lower value and higher donation volume, while biomed-
ical equipment (e.g., ultrasound units, examination tables, infant incubators, etc.) usually
has higher value and lower donation volume. Our interactions with managers from Beta
revealed that determining the fit between recipient needs and the available inventory of
biomedical equipment is especially challenging and important to Beta’s value provision
because of the limited supply and the heterogeneous and unknown recipient preferences of
these products. Hence, in our numerical analysis, we focus on recipient selection decisions
determined by the availability of critical biomedical equipment.
Our data set contains biomedical equipment shipping data from 39 containers shipped
between July 2015 and April 2016 at Beta. We develop a calibrated numerical study based
on initial inventory levels, donation arrival rates and product valuations derived from this
data set (please refer to the appendix for a detailed description). In particular, during the
above period, Beta provided recipients access to its inventory database and allowed them
to select their own products from the available inventory. This practice provides the basis
for us to construct a set of recipient-specific product valuations that are consistent with
recipients’ observed picking behavior and allow for a systematic comparison of the value
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provision under different mechanisms.
4.7.1 Comparison of Value Provision under Different Mechanisms
Among the more than one hundred kinds of biomedical equipment Beta shipped out during
the considered period of this study, we focus on the allocation of twenty so-called “Tier-1”
biomedical equipment in Beta’s practice. The Tier-1 equipment has high donor values and
low supply volumes compared with other equipment, and hence is deemed the most critical
and challenging to allocate. From the shipment data for the 39 containers considered in our
study, we observe that on average each recipient receives about five pieces of the Tier-1
equipment, and typically at most one or two pieces within each equipment category due to
the scarcity of these products (e.g., one ECG monitor, one infant incubator, one ultrasound
unit and two electronic beds). In order to compare different mechanisms under a unified
framework, we assume that each recipient receives K = 5 pieces of products among the
considered N = 20 product categories and receives at most one piece within each product
category. We consider the following three mechanisms:
• Mechanism I: the mechanism characterized in Proposition 11, where each recipient
is selected with an equal probability; we also call this mechanism a random priority
mechanism.
• Mechanism NI-C: a mechanism characterized in Proposition 12, where parameters
for the score function are chosen as g1 = 1, g2 = ... = gN = 0 (with the tie-
breaking rule modified for the multi-recipient setting as described in the appendix:
If two recipients have the same rank-1 product, then we randomly select a recipient
and update her score as the inventory level of her rank-2 product, and so on). This
mechanism is truthful when inventory information is not provided.
• Mechanism NI-NC: a mechanism characterized in Proposition 13, where parame-
ters for the score function are chosen as gj = K − j + 1 for j ≤ K and gj = 0 for
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K < j ≤ N .7 This mechanism is truthful when neither inventory nor competitor
information is provided.
Note that mechanism I to some extent mimics the existing practice where the recipi-
ent selection decisions are not based on recipients’ preferences. To characterize the value
loss due to recipient needs being private information, we would also like to benchmark
the proposed mechanisms with the first-best recipient selection sequence assuming that re-
cipient needs are known to the MSRO. However, the optimal sequence for a multi-period
problem is computationally intractable due to the dynamic and high-dimensional nature of
our problem. Therefore, we instead compare with an optimal certainty-equivalent (CE)
solution and a clairvoyant solution, a lower and upper bound respectively on the first best
solution. The former is defined as an optimal recipient selection sequence assuming that
the arrival quantity of each product in each period is equal to its mean arrival rate, while the
latter is defined as an optimal recipient sequence assuming that the future arrival quantities
are known in advance. We implement the optimal CE solution on a rolling horizon basis.
That is, after serving the first recipient and observing realizations of new arrivals in the next
period, we re-compute an optimal CE solution for the remaining recipients, and so on.
Finally, Beta usually has about 5-10 recipients in the system for whom funding has been
secured for a container shipment. In this section, we consider a 5-recipient case, mainly
because an optimal CE/clairvoyant solution becomes computationally challenging as the
number of recipients increases (e.g., finding an optimal CE/clairvoyant solution for a 10-
recipient problem requires comparing 10! = 3628800 scenarios). In §4.7.2, we discuss a
larger number of recipients and show that the value added from the proposed mechanisms
increases with the number of recipients.
To generate a problem instance, we randomly select 5 recipients from the pool of 39
recipients and simulate the inventory arrival process using the estimated arrival rates of each
product. The expected total value provision of each mechanism (estimated as the mean
7Given the MSRO’s belief on recipients valuations, the optimal parameters gj’s can be found by maximiz-
ing the total value provision to recipients; here we choose a set of well-structured parameters for practicality.
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Figure 4.1: Total value provision of different mechanisms (percentages of improvement
over the random priority mechanism are provided in parenthesis).
Figure 4.2: Performance improvement over the random priority mechanism regarding the
allocation of rank-1 products and rank-1 to 5 products.
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across 500 random problem instances) is presented in Figure 4.1. From these results, we
observe that compared with the random priority mechanism I , all mechanisms that consider
recipient needs information in recipient selection decisions significantly improve the total
value provision. In particular, while the optimal CE solution and the clairvoyant solution
improve the total value provision by 8.9% and 12.0%, respectively, mechanisms NI-C
and NI-NC improve the total value provision by 3.7% and 6.7%, respectively. Hence,
by eliminating both inventory and competitor information, we are able to close about 75%
(≈6.7/8.9) of the gap between the optimal CE solution and the random priority mechanism,
and 56% (≈6.7/12.0) of the gap between the clairvoyant solution and the random priority
mechanism. We remark that such an improvement in value provision is significant, given
that the sequence of donation arrivals and the set of recipients served are exactly the same
under different mechanisms, and the only difference lies in when each recipient is served
(and hence the container mix each recipient receives).
To better illustrate how the proposed mechanisms can help improve value provision to
recipients, we further compare the proposed mechanisms with the random priority mech-
anism regarding the allocation of rank-1 products and rank-1 to 5 products (Figure 4.2).
Clearly, both mechanisms NI-C and NI-NC significantly improve the allocation of rank-
1 and rank-1 to 5 products (i.e., recipients receive more of their rank-1 and rank-1 to 5 prod-
ucts). In particular, mechanism NI-C, which prioritizes recipients whose rank-1 product
is available, substantially improves the allocation of rank-1 products (11.7%), while also
improving the allocation of rank-1 to 5 products (2.2%). On the other hand, mechanism
NI-NC improves the allocation of rank-1 products (rank-1 to 5 products, respectively) by
8.7% (5.9%, respectively), which closes about 74% (86%, respectively) of the gap between
the optimal CE solution and the random priority mechanism, and 60% (55%, respectively)
of the gap between the clairvoyant solution and the random priority mechanism.
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4.7.2 Effects of Recipient and Product Characteristics
Intuitively, both the recipient and product characteristics can potentially affect the value
of the proposed mechanisms. We next analyze how the total number of recipients, total
inventory levels of products, and heterogeneity among recipient needs affect our numerical
results.
(a) (b)
Note: K in (b) represents the total amount of products each recipient receives and is equal to 5 in our numerical study. The initial inventory level in
Figure (a) is equal to 4K while the number of recipients in Figure (b) is equal to 5.
Figure 4.3: Performance of mechanisms NI-C and NI-NC under different numbers of
recipients and initial inventory levels.
First, we examine the effect of the number of recipients. In particular, we consider a
range of 5 to 25 recipients. The value added from mechanisms NI-C and NI-NC (com-
pared with random priority) under different number of recipients are presented in Figure
4.3 (a). From these results, we observe that the value of both mechanisms increases as the
number of recipients increases. This is intuitive because when the number of recipients
increases, it is more likely to find a recipient from the recipient pool whose needs are best
met by the available inventory, and hence the benefit of appropriately selecting a recipient
increases. The implication of this result is that the proposed mechanisms are particularly
valuable for MSROs who serve large bases of recipients.
Second, we examine the effect of total inventory levels. In particular, we scale the
inventory levels of all products proportionally to generate cases with different initial inven-
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tory levels (Figure 4.3 (b)). From these results, we observe that the value of the proposed
mechanisms decreases as the inventory level increases. This is also intuitive because when
the inventory levels are tight, the value provision may be small for a randomly selected
recipient, and hence the benefit of appropriately selecting a recipient is large. When the
inventory levels are high, this benefit becomes smaller. The implication of this result is that
the proposed mechanisms are particularly valuable for MSROs who have a limited volume
of donations (e.g., for critical products such as biomedical equipment) or maintain low in-
ventory levels to keep warehousing costs low and inventory turnover high, practices MSRO
aspire to because they signal operational excellence to potential donors.
(a) Mechanism NI-C (b) Mechanism NI-NC
Figure 4.4: Performance of mechanisms NI-C and NI-NC under different distances
among recipients.
Finally, we study the effect of heterogeneity among recipients. To do so, we first define
a distance measure to quantify the heterogeneity among recipients’ valuations. Consider
two recipients with valuations v1 and v2, respectively. Recall ṽi,j = vi,j/
∑N
j=1 vi,j . Then,
we define the distance between these two recipients as the L1-norm of the difference be-
tween their normalized valuations, i.e.,
∑N
j=1 |ṽ1,j − ṽ2,j|. For the case with more than two
recipients, we define the distance among recipients as the average of the distance between
each pair of recipients. Similar to the base scenario, we consider a 5-recipient case. The
value added from mechanisms NI-C and NI-NC under different distances among recip-
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ients are presented in Figure 4.4, where each data point represents one problem instance
generated by randomly selecting 5 different recipients from the recipient pool. From these
results, we observe that the value added from the proposed mechanisms increases as the
distance among recipients increases (the hypothesis that the slope is positive is supported
at a p-value< 0.01 in both cases). The implication of this result is that the proposed mecha-
nisms are particularly valuable for MSROs who serve heterogeneous recipients (e.g., recip-
ients that are from different regions or those representing healthcare facilities with different
specializations and needs).
4.8 Conclusion
The unique challenges faced by MSROs and the possible lack of operational expertise
therein make matching supply and demand in an MSRO supply chain particularly difficult
[85]. In particular, the key barrier that limits MSROs’ value provision capabilities in this
context is unknown recipient needs, which makes it challenging for the MSRO to deter-
mine the ideal recipient to serve at each shipping opportunity. Accordingly, we propose a
mechanism design approach to elicit recipients’ preference information to improve MSRO
decision making.
We first show that what is considered industry best practice, i.e., providing recipi-
ents with MSRO inventory information to reduce the supply and demand mismatch, has
its shortcomings. More specifically, we find that when inventory information is shared
with recipients, the set of truthful mechanisms is highly restricted, which precludes using
recipient-specific information in MSRO decision making. We then show that eliminating
inventory information provision enlarges the set of truthful mechanisms, thereby increasing
the total value provision to recipients. We also show that further withholding information
about other recipients leads to an even larger set of truthful mechanisms and an additional
increase in the total value provision. Finally, we show that it suffices for MSROs to elicit
recipients’ product ranking information under a class of implementable mechanisms, and
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there is no additional benefit from eliciting recipients’ exact valuations. We also provide
additional results that extend these insights to other scenarios (with multiple recipients,
recipient-specific score functions, bounded perturbations on recipient beliefs, Bayesian up-
date of recipient beliefs on MSRO inventory, and an alternative definition of truthfulness)
in the appendix.
Based on these findings, we recommend that MSROs use a strategy consisting of a
product ranking-based scoring mechanism in conjunction with withholding inventory and
competitor information. Under this strategy, recipients are first asked to report their pref-
erence rankings over the full set of critical products the MSRO has access to (without
providing inventory or competitor information). Then, recipients are prioritized based on a
simple and intuitive scoring rule, and selected recipients are provided with the best bundle
that meets their needs from the available inventory. Through a calibrated numerical study
based on partner MSRO data, we show that this strategy can significantly improve MSROs’
value provision capabilities. Moreover, the added value from this strategy increases in re-
cipient heterogeneity and decreases in inventory levels, implying that this strategy is es-
pecially valuable for MSROs who serve large bases of heterogeneous recipients, or have
highly constrained supplies of products and maintain low inventory levels.
We further note that our proposed strategy is flexible and can be adapted to handle other
practical complexities. For example, when the number of product categories increases, it
may be difficult to elicit recipients’ full rankings of products. In this case, one could ask
recipients to rate each product on a scale (with constraints on the number of products in
each rating category). This yields a partial ranking of the products, which can be accom-
modated by appropriately defining the score functions (e.g., each recipient gets the same
score for each unit of product within the same rating category). Our proposed strategy can
also offer additional benefits beyond the scope of this paper. For example, eliciting recipi-
ent preferences may not only help MSROs better allocate their existing inventory, but also
help improve the medical surplus acquisition processes (e.g., to solicit more donations of
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product categories that are highly ranked by many recipients).
As one of the first studies that model and analyze medical surplus recovery supply
chains, we hope that this paper will encourage future work in this area. For example, in ad-
dition to determining the right recipient to serve at each shipping opportunity, another way
of reducing the supply-demand mismatch is to wait until the MSRO inventory is a better
match for the needs of recipients waiting to be served. A key trade-off here is that waiting
imposes an opportunity cost on recipients. Hence, it would be interesting to determine con-
tainer shipment times based on an evaluation of recipient needs relative to MSRO inventory
availability. Another way of further improving the total value provision to recipients is to
optimally determine the container mixes based on the reported preferences of all recipients.
While we present a heuristic approach to improve upon the existing practice (i.e., the best
bundle assumption) in the appendix, we remark that the general problem is challenging as
even the centralized version of the problem (i.e., assuming recipient valuations are known
to the MSRO) is intractable due to the high dimensionality of both state and action spaces.
Finding competitive yet simple and implementable solutions that simultaneously determine
which recipient to serve and which products to allocate to the chosen recipient is another





APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
A.1 Proofs of Analytical Results





t −Dt)+ − (XπK−1,t −
Dt)
+, where (Y πt − Dt)+ is the amount of inventory after demand realization at period t, and
(XπK−1,t −Dt)+ is the amount of outdates at period t. Then we have:
































































as explained above, and the third equality comes from the fact that (Dt − Y πt )+ − (Y πt −Dt)+ =
Dt − Y πt . 
Proof of Lemma 2. Without loss of generality, assume that τi− τ1 ≤ K−1 (otherwise, we can










= 0, k = τi − τ1 + 1, ...,K − 1. Therefore, Inequality
2.3 holds for k = τi − τ1, ...,K − 1.















= 0, k = τi− τj + 1, ..., τi− τj−1− 1. Therefore, Inequality
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2.3 holds for k = τi − τj , ..., τi − τj−1 − 1.










0, k = 1, ..., τi − τi−1 − 1. Therefore, Inequality 2.3 holds for k = 1, ..., τi − τi−1 − 1, which
completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3. We prove this lemma in the following two steps:
Step 1: We first prove statement (iii) holds for all t = 1, ..., T under Assumption 1, i.e., for




∀ft+1. Suppose at t + 1, there exist some xt+1 such that
K−1∑
k=1
xk,t+1 < ȳt and some ft+1 ∈ Ft+1
such that C(k)t+1(xt+1, ft+1) > w/β for some k ∈ {1, ...,K − 1}. We next show that FIFO is not
an optimal issuing policy for some inventory vector and demand at period t (i.e., Assumption 1
does not hold). In particular, consider any demand dt > 0, and let xt and qt be such that xk−1,t =
xk,t+1 + ε, xm−1,t = xm,t+1,m = 1, ..., k − 1, k + 1, ...,K − 1, and xK−1,t = dt, where x0,t = qt







Then, FIFO issuing policy will issue dt units of ageK−1. Consider another issuing policy γ which
issues dt− ε units of ageK−1 and ε units of age k−1. Then, there will be εmore units of outdates
under issuing policy γ and ε more inventory of age k at the beginning of period t + 1 under FIFO
issuing policy. By assumption, C(k)t+1(xt+1, ft+1) > w/β; thus γ is strictly better than FIFO, which
is a contradiction.
Step 2: We next prove that if statement (iii) holds for all t = 1, ..., T , then statements (i)
and (ii) both holds for all t = 1, ..., T . Statements (i) and (ii) clearly both hold for T since
CT+1(xT+1, fT+1) = 0,∀xT+1, fT+1. Assume that Statements (i) and (ii) hold for t. We next
show that they also hold for t− 1.




xk,t < ȳt. Consider the following two systems (both following FIFO
issuing policy): System 1 starts from xt and System 2 starts from x′t, where x′k,t = xk,t + ε and
x′m,t = xm,t,m = 1, ..., k − 1, k + 1, ...,K − 1 (i.e., System 2 has ε more units of age k), and ε is
positive but sufficiently small such that
K−1∑
k=1
xk,t + ε ≤ ȳt. Let System 2 follow an optimal ordering
decision rule at each period, and let System 1 order ε more units than System 2 at t and follow an
optimal ordering decision rule afterward. Then, it is sufficient to show that System 1 has no more
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expected total cost than System 2. Clearly, both the shortage penalty and the holding cost at period t
in the two systems are the same. Also, the total inventory level after ordering in both systems must be
no more than ȳt, because ordering up to more than ȳt(≥ ỹt(ft)) increases both the expected cost at
period t and the future optimal cost-to-go (sinceC(k)t+1(xt+1, ft+1) ≥ 0, k = 1, ...,K−1, ∀xt+1, ft+1
by induction assumption). For any realization of demand dt, let xt+1 and x′t+1 be the inventory
vectors at period t + 1 for Systems 1 and 2, respectively. Assume that there are ξ ≤ ε more units

















t+1(xt+1, ft+1) ≤ w/β, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ K − 1, ∀xt+1 such that
K−1∑
k=1
xk,t+1 < ȳt, ∀ft+1. Therefore,




xk,t ≥ ȳt. Consider the following two systems (both following FIFO
issuing policy): System 1 starts from xt and System 2 starts from x′t, where x′k,t = xk,t + ε and
x′m,t = xm,t,m = 1, ..., k − 1, k + 1, ...,K − 1 (i.e., System 2 has ε more units of age k), and
ε is any positive number. Let System 2 follow an optimal ordering decision rule at each period,
and let System 1 order nothing at period t and follow an optimal ordering decision rule afterward.
Then, it is sufficient to show that System 1 has no more expected total cost than System 2. Let
yt and y′t be the total inventory levels after ordering at period t in Systems 1 and 2, respectively.
Then, ȳt ≤ yt ≤ y′t. Thus the expected cost at period t in System 1 is no more than that in
System 2 (because a total inventory level of ỹt(ft)(≤ ȳt) minimizes the expected sum of shortage
penalty and holding cost at period t and the costs are convex in order quantities). For any demand
realization dt, let xt+1 and x′t+1 be the inventory vectors at period t + 1 for Systems 1 and 2,
respectively. Then we have xk,t+1 ≤ x′k,t+1, k = 1, ...,K − 1. By induction assumption, we have
C
(k)
t+1(xt+1, ft+1) ≥ 0, k = 1, ...,K − 1,∀xt+1, ft+1. Therefore, System 1 has no more expected
total cost than System 2.
Combining both Cases 1 and 2, we have C(k)t (xt, ft) ≥ 0, k = 1, ...,K − 1, ∀xt, ft.
We next show C(i)t (xt, ft) ≤ C
(j)




∀ft. Given xt, ft such that
K−1∑
k=1
xk,t < ȳt−1, consider the following two systems (both following
FIFO issuing policy): System 1 starts from x′t and System 2 starts from x′′t , where x′i,t = xi,t +
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ε, x′k,t = xk,t, k 6= i, and x′′j,t = xj,t+ε, x′′k,t = xk,t, k 6= j, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ K−1 (i.e., System 1 starts




xk,t + ε ≤ ȳt. Let System 2 follow an optimal ordering decision rule at each
period, and let System 1 order the same amount as System 2 at t and follow an optimal decision
rule afterward. Then, it is sufficient to show that System 1 has no more expected total cost than
System 2. For any demand realization dt, let x′t+1 and x′′t+1 be the inventory vectors at period t+ 1
in Systems 1 and 2, respectively. Then, we have x′k,t+1 = x
′′
k,t+1, k = 1, ..., i, x
′
i+1,t+1 ≥ x′′i+1,t+1,
and x′k,t+1 ≤ x′′k,t+1, k = i + 2, ...,K − 1. Assume that there are ξ ≤ ε more units of outdates in






x′′k,t0+1 + ξ ≤ ȳt. By induction
assumption, we have C(i)t+1(xt+1, ft+1) ≤ C
(j)




xk,t+1 < ȳt, ∀ft+1. Therefore, System 1 has no more expected total cost than System
2, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 4. As discussed in the proof of Lemma 3, if the initial inventory level at
period t is less than or equal to ȳt, then the total inventory level after ordering under an optimal
ordering decision rule must also be less than or equal to ȳt (because ordering up to more than ȳt
increases both the expected cost at period t and the future optimal cost-to-go). Therefore, given that
we start from zero inventory and an optimal ordering decision rule is followed at each period under
policy IM , we have
K−1∑
k=1
xIMk,t+1 ≤ ȳt, t = 1, ..., T . Similarly, for the case where we start from




xIMk,t ≤ ȳt, before which no units will be moved under policy IM since the inventory
level under policy IM will be no more than that under policy B. Therefore, we always have
K−1∑
k=1
xIMk,t+1 ≤ ȳt at t+ 1 if units are moved at t.
Recall that for each given sample path, TH = {τ1, ..., τn}. Consider a variation of policy
IM , call it IM1; under IM1, the movements of units are only performed at τ1, and an optimal
ordering rule is followed and no movements are performed at the following periods. Then, to show
E[C (IM)] ≤ E[C (OPT )], it is sufficient to show E[C (IM1)] ≤ E[C (OPT )]; since if this is true,
following a similar argument, movements at future periods can only further decrease the expected
total cost. Consider any realization of τ1. Clearly, the total cost under policies IM1 and OPT are
the same for all periods 1, ..., τ1 − 1. Without loss of generality, further assume that at τ1, we only
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moved ε units of age k to age zero, k = 1, ...,K − 1. Then, after the movements, there are ε more
units of age zero but ε fewer units of age k under policy IM1 than under policy OPT .
Consider the following two cases. First, suppose the amount of outdates at τ1 under policies
IM1 and OPT are the same. Then, the total cost at τ1 under the two policies are the same, and total
inventory level at τ1 + 1 under the two policies are also the same but the inventory vector under













2, ...,K − 1. By Lemma 3, we have C(i)t+1(xt+1, ft+1) ≤ C
(j)




xk,t+1 < ȳt, ∀ft+1. Therefore, policy IM1 has no more expected total cost
than policy OPT .
Second, suppose there are ξ ≤ ε more units of outdates at τ1 under policy OPT than under













xOPTk,τ1+1,m = 2, ...,K − 1.
By Lemma 3, we have C(i)t+1(xt+1, ft+1) ≤ C
(j)




xk,t+1 < ȳt, ∀ft+1. Therefore, policy IM1 has no more expected cost than policy
OPT , which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 1. We start with proving a structural property on the optimal cost-to-go
function under the marginal-cost accounting scheme. For t = 1, ..., T , given xt and ft, let Ĉt(xt, ft)
denote the optimal cost-to-go function at period t under the marginal-cost accounting scheme, and
let Γt(xt, ft, qt) = Pt(xt, ft, qt) + Ht(xt, ft, qt) + Wt(xt, ft, qt). Then, the optimality equation
under the marginal-cost accounting scheme is as follows:
Ĉt(xt, ft) = min
qt≥0
{
Γt(xt, ft, qt) + E[Ĉt+1(Xt+1, Ft+1)|ft]
}
.
For k = 1, ...,K − 1, for the continuous case, let Ĉ(k)t (xt, ft) denote the right partial derivative
of Ĉt(xt, ft) with respect to to xk,t; for the discrete case, let Ĉ
(k)
t (xt, ft) denote the incremental of
Ĉt(xt, ft) caused by a unit increase of xk,t. Then, we have the following result.
Lemma 8 Under Assumption 1, for t = 1, ..., T , Ĉ(k)t+1(xt+1, ft+1) ≤ 0, k = 1, ...,K−1, ∀xt+1, ft+1.
Proof. The claim in Lemma 8 is clearly true for T since ĈT+1(xT+1, fT+1) = 0,∀xT+1, fT+1.
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xk,t < ȳt. Consider the following two systems (both following FIFO
issuing policy): System 1 starts from xt and System 2 starts from x′t, where x′k,t = xk,t + ε and
x′m,t = xm,t,m = 1, ..., k − 1, k + 1, ...,K − 1 (i.e., System 2 has ε more units of age k), and ε is
positive but sufficiently small such that
K−1∑
k=1
xk,t + ε ≤ ȳt. Let System 1 follow an optimal ordering
decision rule at each period. To define the ordering policy in System 2, along a given sample path,
let t0 ∈ (t, t + K − 1] be such that at all periods t, ..., t0 − 1, there are still some products that are
ordered in periods < t in System 2, while at the beginning of period t0, all of these products are
gone (either used to satisfy demand or outdated) and all products in inventory are ordered at periods
≥ t. Then, for each period t, ..., t0 − 1, let System 2 order up to the same level as System 1 (order
nothing if System 2 already has more inventory than System 1), and let System 2 follow an optimal
ordering decision rule in periods ≥ t0.
Then, to prove the lemma, it is sufficient to show that the expected total cost under the marginal-
cost accounting scheme in System 2 is no more than that in System 1. By definition of t0, no units
ordered at periods ≥ t will be outdated by the beginning of period t0. Then, the total cost under
the marginal-cost accounting scheme in each system is comprised of the following three parts: i)
the shortage penalties that occur at periods t, ..., t0 − 1, ii) the holding costs that occur at periods
t, ..., t0 − 1 charged for units ordered at periods ≥ t, and iii) the total costs (shortage penalties,
holding and outdating costs) that occur at periods ≥ t0.
i) Consider the shortage penalties that occur at periods t, ..., t0−1. By definition of the ordering
policy under System 2, after ordering, there is at least the same amount of inventory in System 2
as that in System 1 at each period t, ..., t0 − 1. Therefore, the total shortage penalty at periods
t, ..., t0 − 1 in System 2 is no more than that in System 1 with probability one.
ii) Consider the holding costs that occur at periods t, ..., t0 − 1 charged for units ordered at
periods ≥ t. If the ordering quantity in System 2 is zero for all t, ..., t0 − 1, then there is nothing to
prove. Otherwise, let s0 ∈ [t, t0) be the first period such that the ordering quantity in System 2 is
strictly positive. Let qs and q′s be the ordering quantity in Systems 1 and 2 at period s, respectively,
and ys and y′s be the total inventory level after ordering in Systems 1 and 2 at period s, respectively.
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Since System 2 started with more inventory than System 1, the amount of outdates in System 2 is








s ≥ qs, and y′s = ys,∀s = s0 + 1, ..., t0 − 1. Units ordered at period t will be of age













of t0, all units ordered at periods ≥ t in System 2 are still in inventory at the beginning of period
t0 − 1. Further considering q′s = 0, ∀s = t, ..., s0 − 1 and q′s ≥ qs,∀s = s0 + 1, ..., t0 − 2, the
holding cost that occurs at periods t, ..., t0 − 2 charged for units ordered at periods ≥ t in System
2 is no more than that in System 1 with probability one. It remains to consider the holding costs
that occur at period t0 − 1. At the beginning of period t0, all units in inventory in both systems are
ordered at periods ≥ t, and there is no more inventory in System 2 than in System 1. Therefore, the
holding cost that occurs at period t0 − 1 charged for units ordered at periods ≥ t in System 2 is no
more than that in System 1 with probability one.
iii) Consider the total costs that occur at periods ≥ t0. If the ordering quantity in System 2 is
zero for all t, ..., t0− 1, then System 2 will be empty at the beginning of period t0, and the expected
total cost that occurs at periods ≥ t0 in System 2 is no more than that in System 1 because of
C
(k)
t+1(xt+1, ft+1) ≥ 0, k = 1, ...,K − 1, ∀xt+1, ft+1 (Lemma 3). Otherwise, define s0 in the same



















t+1(xt+1, ft+1), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ K − 1, ∀xt+1 such that
K−1∑
k=1
xk,t+1 < ȳt, ∀ft+1. Therefore, the




xk,t ≥ ȳt. Consider the following two systems (both following FIFO
issuing policy): System 1 starts from xt and System 2 starts from x′t, where x′k,t = xk,t + ε and
x′m,t = xm,t,m = 1, ..., k − 1, k + 1, ...,K − 1 (i.e., System 2 has ε more units of age k), and




xk,t ≥ ȳt, the ordering quantities in both systems are zero at period t.
Let yt and y′t be the total inventory levels after ordering in Systems 1 and 2, respectively. Then,
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ȳt ≤ yt ≤ y′t. Hence the expected marginal shortage penalty at period t in System 2 is no more
than that in System 1, and there is no marginal holding or outdating cost in either system. Let xt+1
and x′t+1 be the inventory vectors at period t + 1 for Systems 1 and 2, respectively. Then we have
xk,t+1 ≤ x′k,t+1, k = 1, ...,K − 1. By induction assumption, we have Ĉ
(k)
t+1(xt+1, ft+1) ≤ 0, k =
1, ...,K − 1,∀xt+1, ft+1. Therefore, under the marginal-cost accounting scheme, System 2 has no
more expected total cost than System 1. 
With the above result, we next prove the proposition by contradiction. Suppose for some pe-
riod t, given xt and ft, we have qLt > qOPTt . Consider a policy L, under which qLt units are
ordered at period t and an optimal ordering decision rule is followed at the following periods.
Then, the total expected cost of policy L is Γt(xt, ft, qLt ) + E[Ĉt+1(XLt+1, Ft+1)|ft]. On the other
hand, the total expected cost of policy OPT is Γt(xt, ft, qOPTt ) + E[Ĉt+1(XOPTt+1 , Ft+1)|ft]. By
definition of qLt , we have Γt(xt, ft, qLt ) < Γt(xt, ft, qOPTt ). Further, since qLt > qOPTt , we have
XLk,t+1 ≥ XOPTk,t+1, k = 1, ...,K − 1 for any realization of Dt. Therefore, by Lemma 8, we have
Ĉt+1(XLt+1, Ft+1) ≤ Ĉt+1(XOPTt+1 , Ft+1) with probability one. Then:
Γt(xt, ft, qLt ) + E[Ĉt+1(X
L
t+1, Ft+1)|ft] < Γt(xt, ft, qOPTt ) + E[Ĉt+1(XOPTt+1 , Ft+1)|ft].
That is, policy OPT is not optimal for periods t, ..., T , which is a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof of Theorem 2 follows a similar way as that for Theorem 1. The
main difference lies in the construction of the bridging policy, policy IM . In particular, now policy
IM is constructed as follows: At each period t, given xt and ft, let the system under policy IM
follow an optimal ordering decision rule. What differentiates policies IM and OPT is that under
policy IM , at each period after ordering and before demand realization, 1) products in the inventory
vector can be “moved” from older positions to the position of age 0; and 2) products of age 0 can
be intendedly disposed.
At each period t, let yTBt and y
IM
t be the total inventory levels after ordering under policies TB
and IM , respectively (before any disposal of units under policy IM at period t). Also, given xTBt




ordered. Then, we assign period t into one of the following four subsets of the decision epochs:
TP = {t : yBt ≥ yIMt },TH = {t : yBt < yIMt , yTBt = yBt },
TLH = {t : yBt < yIMt , yTBt > yBt },TUH = {t : yBt < yIMt , yTBt < yBt }.
Note that our partition of the decision epochs is different from that in the nonperishable case in
[136] (in which case only two subsets are needed because of the optimality of a base-stock policy).
We next define the rules of movements and disposals under policy IM in order to bound the the total
shortage penalty of policy TB at each period t ∈ TP ∪ TUH and the total holding and outdating
cost of policy TB charged for the first qBt units ordered at each period t ∈ TH ∪ TLH . We allow
movements of units at period t if t ∈ TH ∪TLH ∪TUH . Let t ∈ TH ∪TLH ∪TUH = {τ1, ..., τn}.
The rules of movements are defined in a similar way as before such that after the movements at each
τi, we have:
(i) There is only positive inventory of age 0 and τi− τj under policy IM , for all j = 1, ..., i− 1
such that τj ∈ TH ∪TLH .









where xBτi−τj ,τi denotes the inventory of age τi − τj at period τi under policy TB if q
B
τj instead





τj ∈ TH ∪ TLH ; also note that property (ii) is equivalent to Equation (2.2) for τj ∈ TH because
we have qTBτj = q
B
τj for all τj ∈ TH ).
In addition to movements, we also allow disposals of units at period t if t ∈ TUH . For t ∈ TUH ,




t . After the movements of units, there must be at least y
IM
t −yTBt units of
age 0 under policy IM . Then, we dispose yIMt − yTBt units of age 0 under policy IM so that after
the disposal, we have yIMt = y
TB
t , and none of the above two properties resulted from movements
of units is violated.
Then, similar as before, to show E[C (TB)] ≤ 2E[C (OPT )], it is sufficient to show E[C (IM)] ≤
E[C (OPT )] and E[C (TB)] ≤ 2E[C (IM)], respectively. We have shown in Lemma 4 that moving
units from older to younger positions does not increase the expected total cost. We next show that
disposing units at periods in TUH does not increase the expected total cost either. For t ∈ TUH ,
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since yTBt < y
B







t provides an upper bound on
the optimal order-up-to level (i.e., total inventory level after ordering) for given xTBt and ft. Also,
similar to before, the inventory vector under policy IM is “younger” than that under policy TB






xTBm,t, k = 1, ...,K − 1). Then, it is not difficult to
show that yTBt also provides an upper bound on the optimal order-up-to level for given xIMt and ft.
Therefore, disposal of inventory from yIMt to y
TB
t will not increase the expected total cost. Then
we have:
E[C (IM)] ≤ E[C (OPT )]. (A.1)
We next show E[C (TB)] ≤ 2E[C (IM)], which together with Inequality (A.1) lead to our




t be the marginal shortage penalty, holding and outdating costs





the marginal shortage penalty, holding and outdating costs by following the balancing quantity qBt
at period t, given xTBt and ft. By construction of policy IM , after the movements and disposals,






P IMt . (A.2)
Define the dynamic unit-matching scheme in a similar way as before, such that the first qBt units
ordered at each t ∈ TH ∪ TLH under policy TB are matched to units under policy IM on a one
to one correspondence, and a matched unit under policy TB stays in inventory no longer than its





















W IMt . (A.3)
Finally, recall that Γt(xt, ft, qt) = Pt(xt, ft, qt) + Ht(xt, ft, qt) + Wt(xt, ft, qt). Consider the
following three cases. First, suppose qTBt = q
B
t . Then clearly, Γt(xTBt , ft, qTBt ) = Γt(xTBt , ft, qBt ).
Second, suppose qTBt > q
B




t . Given xt and ft, it is straightforward to check
that Γt(xt, ft, qt) is convex in qt. Further, since qTBt = qLt minimizes Γt(xTBt , ft, qt), we must have
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Γt(xTBt , ft, qTBt ) ≤ Γt(xTBt , ft, qBt ) (this is why the lower bound qLt in the definition of policy TB
cannot be replaced by any tighter ones). Last, suppose qTBt < q
B





Γt(xTBt , ft, qt) is convex in qt, qLt minimizes Γt(xTBt , ft, qt), and qBt > qTBt ≥ qLt , we also have
Γt(xTBt , ft, qTBt ) ≤ Γt(xTBt , ft, qBt ). By definition, for any given ft, E[P TBt +HTBt +W TBt |ft] =





t |ft] ≤ E[PBt +HBt +WBt |ft] (A.4)
With Inequalities A.2-A.4, the remaining steps to prove E[C (TB)] ≤ 2E[C (IM)] follow the
same way as before, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Due to Lemma 3, it remains to prove the “if” part of the propo-
sition, i.e., if for t = 1, ..., T , C(k)t+1(xt+1, ft+1) ≤ w/β, k = 1, ...,K − 1, ∀xt+1 such that
K−1∑
k=1
xk,t+1 < ȳt, ∀ft+1, then Assumption 1 holds. First, since C
(k)
T+1(xT+1, fT+1) = 0, k =
1, ...,K − 1, ∀xT+1, fT+1, issuing products of age K − 1 at T clearly results in less cost than is-
suing younger products and letting the oldest products outdate. Also, how we issue products of age
less than K − 1 at T does not affect the total cost. Therefore, Assumption 1 holds for T .
Assume that Assumption 1 holds for t + 1, i.e., at period t + 1, if yt+1 ≤ ȳt+1 and an optimal
ordering decision rule is implemented at t+ 2, ..., T , then for any any demand dt+1 ≥ 0 and future
demand distribution defined by ft+2 ∈ Ft+2, FIFO minimizes the future expected cost. We next




xk,t+1 ≤ ȳt. Thus, under an optimal ordering decision rule, we have yt+1 ≤ ȳt+1.
Then, by induction assumption, FIFO is optimal for t + 1, ..., T . It remains to show that FIFO is
also optimal at period t. First, issuing products of age K − 1 at period t results in less total cost
than issuing younger products and letting the oldest products outdate because C(k)t+1(xt+1, ft+1) ≤
w/β, k = 1, ...,K − 1. Thus, an optimal issuing policy will issue as many oldest products as
possible at period t. Let γ be such an issuing policy. Then, the costs that occur at period t by
following FIFO and γ are exactly the same. Further, let xt+1 and x′t+1 be the inventory vectors at












x′k,t+1,m = 2, ...,K − 1. From the proof of Lemma 3, we know that if for
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t = 1, ..., T , C(k)t+1(xt+1, ft+1) ≤ w/β, k = 1, ...,K − 1, ∀xt+1 such that
K−1∑
k=1
xk,t+1 < ȳt, ∀ft+1,
then for t = 1, ..., T , C(i)t+1(xt+1, ft+1) ≤ C
(j)
t+1(xt+1, ft+1), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ K − 1, ∀xt+1 such that
K−1∑
k=1
xk,t+1 < ȳt, ∀ft+1. Therefore, FIFO is also optimal at period t. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Due to Proposition 2, to show Assumption 1 holds, it is sufficient to





The claim is clearly true for T since CT+1(xT+1, fT+1) = 0, ∀xT+1, fT+1. Assume that the




xk,t < ȳt−1, consider the following two systems (both following FIFO issuing policy):
System 1 starts from xt and System 2 starts from x′t, where x′k,t = xk,t + ε, x
′
m,t = xm,t,m 6=




xk,t + ε ≤ ȳt. Let System 1 follow an optimal ordering decision rule, and let
System 2 order up to the same level as System 1 at period t (order nothing if this is not feasible) and
follow an optimal ordering decision rule afterward. Then, it is sufficient to show that the expected
total cost in System 2 is at most wε/β more than that in System 1.
Let yt and y′t be the total inventory levels after ordering at period t in Systems 1 and 2, respec-
tively. Then, by construction, we have yt ≤ y′t ≤ ȳt. Let η := y′t − yt =≤ ε. Since Φt(ȳt) ≤ γ,
there will be at most γhη more expected holding cost and at least (1− γ)pη less expected shortage
penalty in System 2 than in System 1 at period t. For any demand realization dt, let xt+1 and x′t+1
be the inventory vectors at period t+ 1 under Systems 1 and 2, respectively. Then, by construction,
we have x1,t+1 ≥ x′1,t+1, xk,t+1 ≤ x′k,t+1, k = 2, ...,K − 1. Assume that there are ξ ≤ ε more






xk,t = ε − ξ.
Since 0 ≤ C(k)t+1(xt+1, ft+1) ≤ w/β, k = 2, ...,K − 1, ∀xt+1 such that
K−1∑
k=1
xk,t+1 < ȳt, ∀ft+1, the
expected total cost in System 2 is at most γhη − (1 − γ)pη + wε + β(ε − ξ)w/β ≤ wε/β more





APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
B.1 Cost Transformation
In this section, we consider a problem with a positive unit ordering costs ci for each location i = 1, 2.
We also consider an end-of-horizon salvage value at each location i which we assume is the same as
the ordering cost ci. In the following, we conduct a cost transformation to construct a new problem
instance with zero ordering cost, and we show that the transformed problem is equivalent to the
original problem with positive ordering costs. In particular, for i = 1, 2, define the cost parameters
for the transformed problem as ĉi = 0, p̂i = pi − ci, ĥi = hi + ci − βci, ŵi = wi + βci, and
r̂i = ri + ci − c−i. We next show that the original and transformed problems are equivalent, i.e.,





k,t be the total inventory level at location i at period t before ordering. Since
we assume that the system starts with zero inventory, we must have zit ≤ Si, i = 1, 2. Then, the
total costs of the original and transformed problems at period t are as follows:
Lt(x1t , x
2
t , ut) = c
1(S1−z1t )+c2(S2−z2t )+p1(d1t+ut−S1)++p2(d2t−ut−S2)++h1(S1−d1t−ut)+
+h2(S2− d2t + ut)+ +w1(x1K−1,t− d1t − ut)+ +w2(x2K−1,t− d2t + ut)+ + r1(ut)+ + r2(−ut)+,
L̂t(x1t , x
2
t , ut) = p̂
1(d1t +ut−S1)+ + p̂2(d2t −ut−S2)+ + ĥ1(S1−d1t −ut)+ + ĥ2(S2−d2t +ut)+
+ŵ1(x1K−1,t − d1t − ut)+ + ŵ2(x2K−1,t − d2t + ut)+ + r̂1(ut)+ + r̂2(−ut)+.
For a given sample path, the total costs of the original and transformed problems are
∑T
t=1 β





t−1L̂t(x1t , x2t , ut) respectively. To show that the original and trans-
formed problems have the same optimal policy, it is sufficient to show that the difference between
the costs of the two problems is a constant independent of the ordering and transshipment policies.
For location 1, we have (d1t + ut − S1)+ − (S1 − d1t − ut)+ = d1t + ut − S1, and (S1 − d1t −
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ut)
+ − (x1K−1,t − d1t − ut)+ = z1t+1. Similarly, for location 2, we have (d2t − ut − S2)+ − (S2 −
d2t + ut)
+ = d2t − ut − S2, and (S2 − d2t + ut)+ − (x2K−1,t − d2t + ut)+ = z2t+1. Finally, we have
(ut)










t , ut) + β







− c1(S1 − z1t )− c2(S2 − z2t )− c1(d1t + ut − S1)+ − c2(d2t − ut − S2)+
+ (c1 − βc1)(S1 − d1t − ut)+ + (c2 − βc2)(S2 − d2t + ut)+ + βc1(x1K−1,t − d1t − ut)+
+ βc2(x2K−1,t − d2t + ut)+ + (c1 − c2)(ut)+ + (c2 − c1)(−ut)+
)







− c1(S1 − z1t )− c2(S2 − z2t )− c1(d1t + ut − S1)− c2(d2t − ut − S2)
− βc1z1t+1 − βc2z2t+1 + (c1 − c2)ut
)
+ βT (c1z1t+1 + c
2z2t+1)








where zi1, i = 1, 2 are the initial inventory levels and d
i
t are the demands at the two locations, all of
which are independent of the ordering and transshipment policies. That is, the difference between
the costs of the original and transformed problems is a constant. Therefore, these two problems
must have the same set of optimal policies, which completes the proof.
B.2 Proofs of Analytical Results
Proof of Lemma 7. Due to symmetry, it is sufficient to prove the lemma for location 1. The
conclusion clearly holds for t = T + 1 since CT+1(x1T+1, x
2
T+1) = 0,∀x1T+1, x2T+1. Assume that
the conclusion holds for t + 1. We now show that it also holds for t. We prove this result in the
following three steps.














ε ≤ S1. Consider the following two systems in parallel: System A starting with initial inventory
(x1At , x2At ) and System B starting with (x1Bt , x2Bt ), where x1At = x1t , x1BK−1,t = x
1




x1j,t, j 6= K − 1, and x2At = x2Bt = x2t , i.e., System B has ε more units of age K − 1 product
at location 1 than System A, while the two systems have the same inventory levels of all ages at
location 2. Let both systems follow the same base-stock levels S1 and S2. Further, let System A
follow an optimal transshipment policy, and let System B follow the same transshipment quantity as
System A at each period (this is possible because the two systems have the same base-stock levels).
Then, to prove C(K−1)t (x1t , x2t ) ≤ w1, it is sufficient to show that the expected total cost of System
B is at most w1ε more than that of System A. By construction, the inventory at location 2 in the
two systems will be the same in all periods, but it may not be the case for location 1. Assume that
there are ξ ∈ [0, ε] more units of outdates at location 1 at t in System B than in System A. Then, by









By induction assumption, the expected total cost of System B is at most w1ξ+β(ε−ξ)×w1 ≤ w1ε
more than that of System A.
Second, we show that C(j)t (x1t , x2t ) ≤ C
(k)











2, and any 1 ≤ j < k ≤ K − 1, let ε > 0 be a




k,t + ε ≤ S1. Consider the following two systems:
System A starting with (x1At , x2At ) and System B starting with (x1Bt , x2Bt ), where x1Aj,t = x1j,t +
ε, x1Al,t = x
1
l,t, l 6= j, x1Bk,t = x1k,t + ε, x1Bl,t = x1l,t, l 6= k, and x2At = x2Bt = x2t , i.e., System A
has ε more units of age j product while System B has ε more unit of age k product at location
1, and the two systems have the same inventory levels of all ages at location 2. Let both systems
follow the same base-stock levels S1 and S2. Further, let System B follow an optimal transshipment
policy, and let System A follow the same transshipment quantity as System B at each period. Then,
it is sufficient to show that the expected total cost of System A is no more than that of System
B. Clearly, the inventory at location 2 in the two systems will be the same at all periods. For
location 1, assume that there are ξ ∈ [0, ε] more units of outdates at location 1 in System B than















k,t+1, l = 1, ...,K − 1. Since
−w1ξ + βξ × w1 ≤ 0, by induction assumption, the expected total cost of System A is no more
than that of System B.















k,t + ε ≤ S1.
Consider the following two systems: System A starting with initial inventory (x1At , x2At ) and Sys-
tem B starting with (x1Bt , x2Bt ), where x1At = x1t , x1B1,t = x11,t + ε, x1Bj,t = x1j,t, j = 2, ...,K − 1,
and x2At = x2Bt = x2t , i.e., System B has ε more units of age 1 product at location 1 than System
A, while the two systems have the same inventory levels of all ages at location 2. Let both systems
follow the same base-stock levels S1 and S2. Further, let System B follow an optimal transshipment
policy, and let System A follow the same transshipment quantity as System B at each period. Then,
it is sufficient to show that the total cost of System A is no more than that of System B. Clearly,
the inventory at location 2 in the two systems will be the same at all periods. Further, the total















k,t+1, l = 1, ...,K − 2. By induction assumption, the expected total cost of
System A is no more than that of System B, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Define:
Gt(x1t , x
2














Gt(x1t , x2t , ut)
}]
. Due to symmetry, it is sufficient to
consider regions 1-5 and region 7.
(i) d1t < S
1, d2t > S
2 (i.e., regions 1 and 2). Suppose ut ≤ 0, i.e., demands (d1t , d2t ) move in the
northwest direction or do not move. Consider the following two cases:






t −ut) fall into region 1). Then, increasing one unit of
ut will decrease one unit of outdate at location 1 and one unit of shortage at location 2, but possibly
increase one unit of transshipment from location 1 to 2 (will increase if ut = 0). Therefore:
∂Gt(x1t , x
2
t , ut)/∂ut ≤ −h1 − w1 − p2 + r1 < 0,
where ∂Gt(x1t , x2t , ut)/∂ut denotes the right partial derivative of Gt(x1t , x2t , ut) with respect to ut,
and should be interpreted as Gt(x1t , x2t , ut + 1)−Gt(x1t , x2t , ut) for the discrete case.
Case 2: d1t + ut ≥ x1K−1,t (i.e., (d1t + ut, d2t − ut) fall into region 2). Then, increasing one unit
of ut will decrease one unit of surplus inventory of age k < K − 1 at location 1 (which becomes of
139
age k + 1 at period t + 1) and one unit of shortage at location 2, but possibly increase one unit of
transshipment from location 1 to 2 (will increase if ut = 0). Therefore:
∂Gt(x1t , x
2






t+1)− p2 + r1 ≤ −h1 − p2 + r1 < 0.
Combining the above two cases, we have u∗t > 0.
(ii) d1t ≥ S1, d2t ≥ S2 (i.e., region 3). Suppose ut < 0, i.e., demands (d1t , d2t ) move in the
northwest direction. Consider the following two cases:
Case 1: d1t + ut < S
1 (i.e., (d1t + ut, d
2
t − ut) fall into regions 1,2). Then, increasing one unit
of ut will decrease one unit of surplus inventory (and possibly also outdate) at location 1, one unit
of shortage at location 2, and one unit of transshipment from location 2 to 1. Therefore:
∂Gt(x1t , x
2
t , ut)/∂ut ≤ −h1 − p2 − r2 < 0.
Case 2: d1t +ut ≥ S1 (i.e., (d1t +ut, d2t −ut) fall into region 3). Then, increasing one unit of ut
will increase one unit of shortage at location 1, but decrease one unit of shortage at location 2 and
one unit of transshipment from location 2 to 1. Therefore:
∂Gt(x1t , x
2
t , ut)/∂ut = p
1 − p2 − r2 ≤ 0.
Combining the above two cases, we have u∗t ≥ 0 (recall that in the case of multiple optimal
solutions, u∗t is defined as the one with the smallest magnitude). Due to symmetry, we also have
u∗t ≤ 0. Therefore, u∗t = 0.
(iii) d1t ≤ x1K−1,t, x2K−1,t < d2t ≤ S2 (i.e., region 4). Suppose ut < 0, i.e., demands (d1t , d2t )
move in the northwest direction. Consider the following two cases:
Case 1: d2t − ut > S2 (i.e., (d1t + ut, d2t − ut) fall into region 1). Then, increasing one unit of
ut will decrease one unit of outdate at location 1, one unit of shortage at location 2, and one unit of
transshipment from location 2 to 1. Therefore:
∂Gt(x1t , x
2
t , ut)/∂ut = −h1 − w1 − p2 − r2 < 0.
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Case 2: d2t − ut ≤ S2 (i.e., (d1t + ut, d2t − ut) fall into region 4). Then, increasing one unit
of ut will decrease one unit of outdate at location 1, increase one unit of surplus inventory of age
k < K − 1 at location 2 (which becomes of age k + 1 at period t + 1), and decrease one unit of
transshipment from location 2 to 1. Therefore:
∂Gt(x1t , x
2






t+1)−r2 ≤ −h1−w1+h2+w2−r2 ≤ 0.
Combining the above two cases, we have u∗t ≥ 0.
(iv) x1K−1,t < d
1
t ≤ S1, x2K−1,t < d2t ≤ S2 (i.e., region 5). To prove the conclusion for this
region, it is sufficient to construct problem instances where the optimal transshipment is positive,
negative and zero, respectively. Consider an instance where the transshipment costs ri = 0, i = 1, 2.
Then, the system becomes equivalent to a single-location system, where FIFO is the optimal issuing
policy when inventory is replenished based on a base-stock policy [15]. In this case, inventory
should be transshipped from location 1 (2) to location 2 (1) when the age of the oldest product after
meeting demand but before transshipment at location 1 is larger (smaller) than that at location 2,
and no transshipment is needed when the age of the oldest product after meeting demand but before
transshipment at the two locations is the same.
(v) d1t ≤ x1K−1,t, d2t ≤ x2K−1,t (i.e., region 7). Suppose ut < 0, i.e., demands (d1t , d2t ) move in
the northwest direction. Consider the following three cases:
Case 1: d2t − ut > S2 (i.e., (d1t + ut, d2t − ut) fall into region 1). Then, increasing one unit of
ut will decrease one unit of outdate at location 1, one unit of shortage at location 2, and one unit of
transshipment cost for transshipment from location 2 to 1. Therefore:
∂Gt(x1t , x
2
t , ut)/∂ut = −h1 − w1 − p2 − r2 < 0.
Case 2: x2K−1,t < d
2
t − ut ≤ S2 (i.e., (d1t + ut, d2t − ut) fall into region 4). Then, increasing
one unit of ut will decrease one unit of outdate at location 1, increase one unit surplus inventory of
age k < K − 1 at location 2 (which becomes of age k+ 1 at period t+ 1), and decrease one unit of
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transshipment cost for transshipment from location 2 to 1. Therefore:
∂Gt(x1t , x
2






t+1)−r2 ≤ −h1−w1+h2+w2−r2 ≤ 0.
Case 3: d2t − ut ≤ x2K−1,t (i.e., (d1t + ut, d2t − ut) fall into region 7). Then, increasing one unit
of ut will decrease one unit of outdate at location 1, increase one unit of outdate at location 2, and
decrease one unit of transshipment cost for transshipment from location 2 to 1. Therefore:
∂Gt(x1t , x
2
t , ut)/∂ut = −h1 − w1 + h2 + w2 − r2 ≤ 0.
Combining the above three cases, we have u∗t ≥ 0. Due to symmetry, we also have u∗t ≤ 0.
Therefore, u∗t = 0.
Combining all scenarios (i)-(v), the conclusion in Proposition 4 holds. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Due to symmetry, it is sufficient to prove that u∗t ≤ min{(S1 −
d1t )
+, (d2t − x2K−1,t)+}. Then, it is sufficient to consider the case where d1t ≤ S1, d2t ≥ x2K−1,t
(i.e., regions 1,2,4,5), since in other regions, we have already shown in Proposition 4 that u∗t ≤ 0.
In regions 1,2,4,5, suppose ut > min{(S1 − d1t )+, (d2t − x2K−1,t)+}. Consider the following three
cases:
Case 1: d1t +ut > S
1, d2t −ut > S2 (i.e., (d1t +ut, d2t −ut) fall into region 3). Then, increasing
one unit of ut will increase one unit of shortage at location 1, decrease one unit of shortage at
location 2, and increase one unit of transshipment from location 1 to 2. Therefore:
∂Gt(x1t , x
2
t , ut)/∂ut = p
1 − p2 + r1 ≥ 0.
Case 2: d1t+ut > S
1, d2t−ut ≤ S2 (i.e., (d1t+ut, d2t−ut) fall into regions 6,9). Then, increasing
one unit of ut will increase one unit of shortage at location 1, one unit of surplus inventory (and
possibly also outdate), and one unit of transshipment from location 1 to 2. Therefore:
∂Gt(x1t , x
2
t , ut)/∂ut ≥ p1 + h2 + r1 > 0.
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Case 3: d1t + ut ≤ S1, d2t − ut < x2K−1,t (i.e., (d1t + ut, d2t − ut) fall into regions 7,8). Then,
increasing one unit of ut will decrease one unit of surplus inventory (and possibly also outdate) at
location 1, but increase one unit of outdate at location 2 and one unit of transshipment from location
1 to 2. Therefore:
∂Gt(x1t , x
2
t , ut)/∂ut ≥ −h1 − w1 + h2 + w2 + r1 ≥ 0.
Combining the above three cases, we have u∗t ≤ min{(S1− d1t )+, (d2t −x2K−1,t)+} (recall that
in the case of multiple optimal solutions, u∗t is defined as the one with the smallest magnitude). 
Proof of Proposition 6. Due to symmetry, it is sufficient to consider the case where d1t ≤
S1, d2t ≥ x2K−1,t (i.e., regions 1,2,4,5). Consider the following two scenarios:
(i) d1t < S
1, d2t > S
2 (i.e., regions 1,2). Suppose ut 6= min{S1 − d1t , d2t − S2}. Consider the
following four cases:
Case 1: ut < min{S1 − d1t , d2t − S2} (i.e., (d1t + ut, d2t − ut) fall into regions 1,2). Then,
increasing one unit of ut will decrease one unit of surplus inventory (and possibly also outdate) at
location 1 and one unit of shortage at location 2, but possibly increase one unit of transshipment
from location 1 to 2 (will increase if ut ≥ 0). Therefore:
∂Gt(x1t , x
2
t , ut)/∂ut ≤ −h1 − p2 + r1 < 0.
Case 2: S1−d1t < ut < d2t −S2 (i.e., (d1t +ut, d2t −ut) fall into region 3). Then, increasing one
unit of ut will increase one unit of shortage at location 1, decrease one unit of shortage at location
2, and increase one unit of transshipment from location 1 to 2. Therefore:
∂Gt(x1t , x
2
t , ut)/∂ut = p
1 − p2 + r1 ≥ 0.
Case 3: d2t − S2 < ut < S1 − d1t (i.e., (d1t + ut, d2t − ut) fall into regions 4,5,7,8). Then,
increasing one unit of ut will decrease one unit of surplus inventory (and possibly also outdate) at
location 1, but increase one unit of surplus inventory (and possibly also outdate) at location 2 and
one unit of transshipment from location 1 to 2. The cost of increasing one unit of surplus inventory
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at location i is bounded by hi + wi (no matter whether this unit is outdated at the current period or
is carried to the next period). Therefore:
∂Gt(x1t , x
2
t , ut)/∂ut ≥ −h1 − w1 + h2 + r1 ≥ 0.
Case 4: ut ≥ max{S1 − d1t , d2t − S2} (i.e., (d1t + ut, d2t − ut) fall into regions 6,9). Then,
increasing one unit of ut will increase one unit of shortage at location 1, one unit of surplus inven-




t , ut)/∂ut ≥ p1 + h2 + r1 > 0.
Combining the above four cases, we have u∗t = min{S1 − d1t , d2t − S2}.
(ii) d1t ≤ S1, x2K−1,t ≤ d2t ≤ S2 (i.e., regions 4,5). Suppose ut 6= 0. Consider the following
four cases:
Case 1: ut < d2t − S2 (i.e., (d1t + ut, d2t − ut) fall into regions 1,2). Then, increasing one unit
of ut will decrease one unit of surplus inventory (and possibly also outdate) at location 1, one unit
of shortage at location 2, and one unit of transshipment from location 2 to 1. Therefore:
∂Gt(x1t , x
2
t , ut)/∂ut ≤ −h1 − p2 − r2 < 0.
Case 2: d2t−S2 ≤ ut < 0 (i.e., (d1t +ut, d2t−ut) fall into regions 4,5 and ut < 0). Then, increas-
ing one unit of ut will decrease one unit of surplus inventory (and possibly also outdate) at location
1, increase one unit of surplus inventory at location 2, and decrease one unit of transshipment from
location 2 to 1. Therefore:
∂Gt(x1t , x
2
t , ut)/∂ut ≤ −h1 + h2 − r2 ≤ 0.
Case 3: 0 ≤ ut ≤ S1 − d1t (i.e., (d1t + ut, d2t − ut) fall into regions 4,5,7,8 and ut > 0). Then,
increasing one unit of ut will decrease one unit of surplus inventory (and possibly also outdate) at
location 1, but increase one unit of surplus inventory (and possibly also outdate) at location 2 and
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one unit of transshipment from location 1 to 2. Therefore:
∂Gt(x1t , x
2
t , ut)/∂ut ≥ −h1 − w1 + h2 + r1 ≥ 0.
Case 4: ut > S1− d1t (i.e., (d1t +ut, d2t −ut) fall into regions 6,9). Then, increasing one unit of
ut will increase one unit of shortage at location 1, one unit of surplus inventory (and possibly also
outdate) at location 2, and one unit of transshipment from location 1 to 2. Therefore:
∂Gt(x1t , x
2
t , ut)/∂ut ≥ p1 + h2 + r1 > 0.
Combining the above four cases, we have u∗t = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Due to symmetry, it is sufficient to consider the case where d1t ≤
S1, d2t ≥ x2K−1,t (i.e., regions 1,2,4,5). There is nothing to prove in regions 4 and 5 because we
always have |u∗t | ≥ 0. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that u∗t ≥ min{S1 − d1t , d2t − S2} when
d1t < S
1, d2t > S
2 (i.e., regions 1,2), the proof for which follows from Scenario (i) Case 1 of the
proof for Proposition 6. 
Proof of Theorem 3. The claim is clearly true for T+1 since C̃T+1(s1T+1, s
2
T+1) = 0,∀s1T+1, s2T+1.































Since L\-convexity is preserved i) under minimization when each of the constraints involves ei-
ther only one variable or two variables with opposite signs, and ii) under expectation [77, 82], to
show that C̃t(s1t , s
2
t ) is L
\-convex in (s1t , s
2









In order to do so, we next reformulate the problem of each period into a two-stage problem. In
particular, we assume that in addition to the ordering and transshipment quantities, we also need to
determine how many units issue from inventory (either used for meeting demand or simply disposed
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from inventory with an outdating cost wi). Suppose given demand realization dit, i = 1, 2, we issue
(either to meet demand or dispose) ξ1t units out of S
1−ut, and ξ2t units out of S2+ut. To ensure that
we dispose all the outdated units but dispose no more than we have in hand, we need the following
constraints: 
s1t − ut ≤ ξ1t ≤ S1 − ut,
− s2t + ut ≤ ξ2t ≤ S2 + ut.
From Lemma 7, we know that one additional unit in inventory increases the expected total cost, but
the cost is bounded by wi. Therefore, the reformulation will give us exactly the same solution as the
original problem, i.e., we will issue the products to satisfy as much as demand as possible, and will
issue no more than what is needed to meet demand plus what is outdated. Let η1t = −S1 + ut + ξ1t ,
and η2t = S
2 + ut − ξ2t . Then, the above constraints become as follows:
s1t − S1 ≤ η1t ≤ 0,
0 ≤ η2t ≤ s2t + S2.
Further, the system dynamics can be described as follows:
s1t+1 = S
1 − ut − ξ1t = −η1t ,











:=p1(d1t − ξ1t )+ + p2(d2t − ξ2t )+ + h1(S1 − ut − ξ1t ) + h2(S2 + ut − ξ2t )
+ (h1 + w1)(ξ1t − d1t )+ + (h2 + w2)(ξ2t − d2t )+ + r1(ut)+ + r2(−ut)+
=p1(d1t − S1 + ut − η1t )+ + p2(d2t − S2 − ut + η2t )+ + h1(−η1t ) + h2η2t



























Clearly, L̃t(s1t , s
2




t ) is L
\-convex in (s1t , s
2




t ) because each term involves ei-
ther only one variable or two variables with opposite signs. Further, by Lemma 6 in [82], C̃t+1(s1t+1, s
2
t+1) =
C̃t+1(−η1t ,−η2t ) is also L\-convex in (s1t , s2t , ut, η1t , η2t ). Since L\-convexity is preserved under
minimization when each of the constraints involves either only one variable or two variables with
opposite signs, G̃t(s1t , s
2
t , ut) is L
\-convex in (s1t , s
2
t , ut), which concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 8. Due to symmetry, it is sufficient to consider the case where d1t ≤
S1, d2t ≥ x2K−1,t (i.e., regions 1,2,4,5). There is nothing to prove in region 5. Further, given
Proposition 7, we know that when (d1t , d
2





t−ut) will at least hit the boundary between regions 1,2 and regions 3,4 and 5. Then, it remains
to prove that u∗t ≥ ût in region 4.
When d1t ≤ x1K−1,t, x2K−1,t < d2t ≤ S2 (i.e., region 4), we know that u∗t ≥ 0 (Proposition 4).
Suppose 0 ≤ ut < ût = min{x1K−1,t−d1t , d2t −x2K−1,t}. Then, (d1t +ut, d2t −ut) still lie in region
4. In this case, increasing one unit of ut will decrease one unit of outdate at location 1, but increase
one unit of surplus inventory of age k < K − 1 at location 2 (which becomes of age k+ 1 at period
t+ 1) and one unit of transshipment from location 1 to 2. Therefore:
∂Gt(x1t , x
2







1 ≤ −h1−w1+h2+βw2+r1 < 0.
Then, we have u∗t ≥ ût = min{x1K−1,t − d1t , d2t − x2K−1,t}, which completes the proof. 
B.3 Numerical Results for Larger Lifetimes
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Table B.1: Expected total costs under different policies: symmetric case (percentages of
cost reduction over policy NS are included in parenthesis).
Policy NS S1 S2 Our Policy
Poisson K = 4 p = 5, h = 0.5 82.1 67.1 (18.2%) 63.1 (23.1%) 63.1 (23.1%)
p = 5, h = 1 136.2 104.8 (23.1%) 102.6 (24.6%) 102.6 (24.6%)
p = 10, h = 0.5 93.7 82.4 (12.1%) 70.5 (24.8%) 70.4 (24.9%)
p = 10, h = 1 164.0 130.8 (20.2%) 119.9 (26.9%) 119.9 (26.9%)
K = 6 p = 5, h = 0.5 81.9 67.0 (18.2%) 63.1 (23.0%) 63.1 (23.0%)
p = 5, h = 1 136.1 104.8 (23.1%) 102.6 (24.6%) 102.6 (24.6%)
p = 10, h = 0.5 93.3 82.0 (12.1%) 70.4 (24.6%) 70.4 (24.6%)
p = 10, h = 1 163.8 130.7 (20.2%) 119.9 (26.8%) 119.9 (26.8%)
Geometric K = 4 p = 5, h = 0.5 299.3 203.0 (32.2%) 200.0 (33.2%) 191.5 (36.0%)
p = 5, h = 1 396.9 280.1 (29.4%) 280.1 (29.4%) 274.4 (30.9%)
p = 10, h = 0.5 400.7 278.5 (30.5%) 243.2 (39.3%) 229.7 (42.7%)
p = 10, h = 1 544.5 368.6 (32.3%) 352.6 (35.2%) 342.6 (37.1%)
K = 6 p = 5, h = 0.5 248.5 182.9 (26.4%) 171.5 (31.0%) 169.5 (31.8%)
p = 5, h = 1 368.1 267.2 (27.4%) 265.4 (27.9%) 264.7 (28.1%)
p = 10, h = 0.5 311.0 240.0 (22.8%) 199.1 (36.0%) 195.8 (37.0%)
p = 10, h = 1 484.1 343.2 (29.1%) 321.2 (33.6%) 319.5 (34.0%)
Note. Other cost parameters are w = 5, r = 1.
Table B.2: Expected total costs under different policies: asymmetric case (percentages of
cost reduction over policy NS are included in parenthesis).
Policy NS S1 S2 Our Policy
Poisson K = 4 p = 5, h = 0.5 41.0 41.0 (0.0%) 41.0 (0.0%) 40.9 (0.2%)
p = 5, h = 1 68.0 68.0 (0.0%) 68.0 (0.0%) 68.0 (0.0%)
p = 10, h = 0.5 46.8 46.8 (0.0%) 46.8 (0.0%) 46.7 (0.4%)
p = 10, h = 1 81.9 81.9 (0.0%) 81.9 (0.0%) 81.9 (0.1%)
K = 6 p = 5, h = 0.5 40.9 40.9 (0.0%) 40.9 (0.0%) 40.9 (0.0%)
p = 5, h = 1 68.0 68.0 (0.0%) 68.0 (0.0%) 68.0 (0.0%)
p = 10, h = 0.5 46.6 46.6 (0.0%) 46.6 (0.0%) 46.6 (0.0%)
p = 10, h = 1 81.9 81.9 (0.0%) 81.9 (0.0%) 81.9 (0.0%)
Geometric K = 4 p = 5, h = 0.5 150.0 150.0 (0.0%) 143.8 (4.1%) 129.2 (13.9%)
p = 5, h = 1 199.0 199.0 (0.0%) 199.3 (-0.2%) 186.7 (6.2%)
p = 10, h = 0.5 200.6 200.6 (0.0%) 171.6 (14.5%) 157.0 (21.8%)
p = 10, h = 1 272.7 272.7 (0.0%) 261.8 (4.0%) 247.2 (9.4%)
K = 6 p = 5, h = 0.5 124.5 124.5 (0.0%) 124.9 (-0.4%) 119.6 (3.9%)
p = 5, h = 1 184.5 184.5 (0.0%) 184.5 (0.0%) 182.8 (0.9%)
p = 10, h = 0.5 155.6 155.6 (0.0%) 152.7 (1.9%) 146.2 (6.1%)
p = 10, h = 1 242.5 242.5 (0.0%) 243.0 (-0.2%) 237.6 (2.0%)
Note. Other cost parameters are w = 5, r = 1.
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4
C.1 Proofs of Analytical Results
Proof of Proposition 1. First, note that the existence of a truthful mechanism is trivial: If p(γ1,γ2)
is equal to the same constant for all possible pairs of γ1,γ2 ∈ Γ, then recipients do not have an
incentive to misreport because i) their probability of being selected is the same regardless of what
they report, and ii) when selected, truth-reporting maximizes their container value.
Next, we show that when the MSRO inventory information is shared with recipients (our anal-
ysis is implicitly built on this assumption since recipients compute expectations under known in-
ventory levels), if a mechanism p(γ1,γ2) is truthful, then there must exist p̃1, p̃2 ∈ [0, 1] such that
Eγ2 [p(γ1,γ2)] = p̃1,∀γ1 ∈ Γ, and Eγ1 [1 − p(γ1,γ2)] = p̃2,∀γ2 ∈ Γ. Due to symmetry, it
is sufficient to prove this result for recipient 1. Then, it suffices to show that Eγ2 [p(γ1,γ2)] =
Eγ2 [p(γ
′
1,γ2)],∀γ1,γ ′1 ∈ Γ. Suppose this is not true, i.e., ∃γ1,γ ′1 such that Eγ2 [p(γ1,γ2)] <
Eγ2 [p(γ
′
1,γ2)]. Let p1 = Eγ2 [p(γ1,γ2)], and p
′
1 = Eγ2 [p(γ
′
1,γ2)]. Then, p1 < p
′
1. Without loss
of generality, assume that γ1 = (1, ..., N). We next show that recipient 1 with true ranking γ1 will
have an incentive to misreport if her valuations of different products are sufficiently close to each
other. In particular, suppose recipient 1’s true valuations are v1,j = 1 − jη, j = 1, ..., N , where
η is a small number such that p1 < p′1(1 − Nη). If recipient 1 truthfully reports her ranking γ1,
then her expected payoff at t = 0 is at most p1K. If she misreports her ranking as γ ′1, then her
expected payoff at t = 0 is at least p′1(1−Nη)K, which is strictly larger than p1K by construction.
Therefore, the payoff vector of truth telling is lexicographically dominated by that of misreporting,
which contradicts truthfulness.
Finally, it remains to show that p̃1 + p̃2 = 1. Note that Eγ2 [p(γ1,γ2)] = p̃1,∀γ1 ∈ Γ implies
that if recipient 2 plays a mixed strategy of ranking reporting that is consistent with recipient 1’s
belief on γ2, then no matter what recipient 1 reports, the probability for recipient 1 to be selected is
always p̃1. Then, the probability for recipient 1 to be selected must be p̃1 if recipient 1 plays a mixed
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strategy that is consistent with recipient 2’s belief on γ1 while recipient 2 plays a mixed strategy that
is consistent with recipient 1’s belief on γ2. Similarly, Eγ1 [1 − p(γ1,γ2)] = p̃2,∀γ2 ∈ Γ implies
that the probability for recipient 1 to be selected is 1− p̃2 if recipient 1 plays a mixed strategy that is
consistent with recipient 2’s belief on γ1 while recipient 2 plays a mixed strategy that is consistent
with recipient 1’s belief on γ2. Therefore, we must have p̃1 = 1− p̃2. 
Proof of Proposition 2. We first prove the “if” part of the proposition, i.e., given a score func-
tion si = g(γi,µ), i = 1, 2, the associated mechanism (defined in Equation 6) is both symmetric
and acyclic. First, the mechanism is symmetric because the two recipients share the same score
function, i.e., the score of each recipient only depends on the recipient’s reported rankings, but not
the specific index of the recipient. Second, for any fixed inventory vector µ, if p(γ1,γ2,µ) ≥ 12
and p(γ2,γ3,µ) ≥ 12 , then we have g(γ1,µ) ≥ g(γ2,µ) and g(γ2,µ) ≥ g(γ3,µ). Hence, we
have g(γ1,µ) ≥ g(γ3,µ), which implies that p(γ1,γ3,µ) ≥ 12 (clearly, the last inequality holds
as equality if and only if the first two inequalities in the condition are both equalities). Therefore,
the mechanism is also acyclic.
We now prove the “only if” part, i.e., if a mechanism p(γ1,γ2,µ) is symmetric and acyclic, then
it can be characterized by a score function si = g(γi,µ), i = 1, 2. First note that if a mechanism
is symmetric and acyclic, then for any given µ, we are able to define a total order on the set of
rankings Γ. In particular, we define a relation ≤µ as follows: For any pair of rankings γ1,γ2 ∈ Γ,
we say γ1 ≤µ γ2 if p(γ1,γ2,µ) ≤ 12 , and γ1 =µ γ2 if p(γ1,γ2,µ) =
1
2 . Then, it is not
difficult to check that ≤µ satisfies the following four properties of a total order: reflectivity (i.e.,
γ1 ≤µ γ1,∀γ1 ∈ Γ), antisymmetry (i.e., γ1 ≤µ γ2 and γ2 ≤µ γ1 implies γ1 =µ γ2), transitivity
(i.e., γ1 ≤µ γ2 and γ2 ≤µ γ3 implies γ1 ≤µ γ3), and comparability (i.e., for any γ1,γ2 ∈ Γ,
either γ1 ≤µ γ2 or γ2 ≤µ γ1). Therefore, by definition, ≤µ defines a total order on Γ. Let <µ be
the associated strict total order, for which we say γ1 <µ γ2 if and only if γ1 ≤µ γ2 and γ1 6=µ γ2.
Then, we are able to assign a score g(γi,µ) to each ranking vector γi such that for any pair of
rankings γ1,γ2 ∈ Γ, g(γ1,µ) < g(γ2,µ) if γ1 <µ γ2, and g(γ1,µ) = g(γ2,µ) if γ1 =µ γ2.
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Then, by construction, we have:
p(γ1,γ2,µ) =

1 if g(γ1,µ) > g(γ2,µ),
0 if g(γ1,µ) < g(γ2,µ),
1
2 , if g(γ1,µ) = g(γ2,µ),
which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3. First note that if µ1 = ... = µN , then the score of each recipient i is




j=1 gjµ1. In this case, the score of the two recipients are always
equal no matter what they report. Therefore, it is sufficient to consider the case where the inventory
levels of some products are different. Suppose µ1 < µ2 and that there exist j, k ∈ {1, ..., N} such
that gj > gk. Then, reporting different rankings can lead to different scores. For example, let γi and
γ ′i be two ranking vectors such that γi,1 = j, γi,2 = k, γ
′
i,1 = k, γ
′
i,2 = j and γi,l = γ
′
i,l, l = 3, ..., N .
Then, reporting γ ′i leads to gkµ1 + gjµ2 − (gjµ1 + gkµ2) = (gj − gk)(µ2 − µ1) > 0 more points
than reporting γi. Therefore, under such a mechanism, recipients whose true ranking is γi may
have an incentive to misreport to obtain a higher score and hence a higher probability of being
selected (recall that φi,−i(v−i) > 0,∀v−i ∈ V , hence a strictly higher score implies a strictly
higher probability of being selected). As shown in Proposition 1, a strictly higher probability of
being selected implies a strictly higher expected payoff Π0i if recipient i’s valuations of different
products are sufficiently close to each other. By definition of truthfulness, such a recipient i has an
incentive to misreport. Therefore, we must have g1 = ... = gN . 
Proof of Theorem 1. Proposition 3 says that the only truthful additive linear score function for
case I is such that g1 = ... = gN . When g1 = ... = gN , the scores of the two recipients are always
equal under any inventory level. Clearly, such a score function is also truthful for case NI . Hence,
the set of truthful additive linear score functions for case NI is at least as large as that for case I .
Therefore, the optimal truthful additive linear score function for case NI performs no worse than
that for case I , i.e., πNI ≥ πI . 
Proof of Proposition 4. We first prove the “if” part of the proposition. In particular, we




j=1 gjµρi,j , i = 1, 2 is truthful regardless of recipients’ belief on each other’s
rankings (note that this is in fact more general than the “if” part of the proposition). First consider
g1 ≥ g2 = ... = gN . In this case, si = (g1 − g2)µρi,1 + g2
∑N
j=1 µρi,j , hence the mechanism is
such that the recipient whose reported rank-1 product has a higher inventory level is selected. Then,
it is sufficient to show that recipients do not have an incentive to misreport their rank-1 product
(because fixing the reported rank-1 product, misreporting the relative rankings of other products
will not change the probability for the recipient to be selected and may decrease the container value
when she is selected). Let γi be recipient i’s true ranking, and without loss of generality, assume
γi,1 = 1, i.e., recipient i’s true rank-1 product is product 1. Consider the following two cases:
Case 1: Recipient −i’s reported rank-1 product is product 1. Suppose recipient i truthfully
reports her rank-1 product. Then, the scores of the two recipients are the same and recipient i is
selected with probability 12 under any inventory levels. Suppose recipient i misreports her rank-1
product as some product k 6= 1. Then, recipient i is selected with probability one if µ1 < µk, with
probability zero if µ1 > µk, and with probability 12 if µ1 = µk. Let γ
′
i be any ranking vector such
that γ′i,1 = k. Then, the difference between the expected payoff at t = 0 by reporting γ
′








































































































































der any values of µ1 and µk, i.e., given that recipient i is served at t = 0, truth-reporting maximizes
the container value regardless of the inventory availability; the second inequality holds because i)
P (µ1 < µk) = P (µ1 > µk) due to symmetry, and ii) fixing µ1 + µk, the total value of recipient i’s
best bundle (defined by Equation 1 in the paper) is strictly higher when µ1 > µk than when µ1 < µk.
Therefore, misreporting leads to a strictly smaller expected payoff at t = 0, hence recipients do not
have an incentive to misreport.
Case 2: Recipient −i’s reported rank-1 product is some product k 6= 1. Suppose recipient i
truthfully reports her rank-1 product. Then, recipient i is selected with probability one if µ1 > µk,
with probability zero if µ1 < µk, and with probability 12 if µ1 = µk. Suppose recipient i misreports
her rank-1 product as product k. Then, recipient i is selected with probability 12 under any inventory
levels. Then, following a similar argument as above, we know that misreporting leads to a strictly
smaller expected payoff at t = 0 for recipient i. Hence, recipient i does not have an incentive
to misreport her rank-1 product as product k. Similarly, recipient i does not have an incentive to
misreport her rank-1 product as any product l 6= 1, k, which increases her probability of being
selected when µ1 < µl but decreases her probability of being selected when µ1 > µl.
Combining Cases 1 and 2, we know that recipients do not have an incentive to misreport when
g1 ≥ g2 = ... = gN .
When g1 = ... = gN−1 ≥ gN , the score of each recipient i is si = g1
∑N
j=1 µρi,j − (g1 −
gN )µρi,N , hence the mechanism is such that the recipient whose reported rank-N product has a
lower inventory is selected. Similar to before, it is sufficient to show that recipients do not have an
incentive to misreport their rank-N product, and the proof follows the same manner as for g1 ≥
g2 = ... = gN .
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We now prove the “only if” part, i.e., for case NI-C, if a score function si =
∑N
j=1 gjµρi,j , i =
1, 2 is truthful, then either g1 ≥ g2 = ... = gN or g1 = ... = gN−1 ≥ gN . We prove this part in the
following three steps:
Step 1: We show that if a score function si =
∑N
j=1 gjµρi,j , i = 1, 2 is truthful, then we must
have g1 ≥ ... ≥ gN regardless of recipients’ belief on each other’s rankings. Suppose this is not the
case, i.e., there exist 1 ≤ k < l ≤ N such that gk < gl. Without loss of generality, assume that
recipient 1 believes that recipient 2’s true ranking is γ2 = (1, ..., N) with probability 1 − θ > 0
(note that in Step 1, we only need θ < 1). We next construct a valuation v1 ∈ V and a belief ψ1 ∈ Ψ
so that recipient 1 has an incentive to misreport. In particular, let η1, η2 > 0 be two small numbers.
We show that recipient 1 has an incentive to reverse the rankings of products k and l if i) her true
valuation is such that γ1 = (1, ..., N) and v1,1 ≤ 1, v1,k ≥ 1 − η1, v1,l ≤ η1; and ii) she believes
that with probability 1 − η2, one of the N products has an inventory level of one while all other
products have zero inventory, i.e.,
∑N
j=1 µj = 1 (note that here we implicitly assume K = 1; if




j=1 µj = 1 (with probability 1 − η2), reversing the rankings of products k
and l affects recipient 1’s probability of being selected and payoff at t = 0 only when µk = 1
or µl = 1 (with conditional probability 1N each due to symmetry). Suppose recipient 2’s ranking
is γ2 = (1, ..., N) (with probability 1 − θ). If recipient 1 truthfully reports her ranking, then she
is selected with probability 12 under any inventory levels. If recipient 1 reverses the rankings of
products k and l while truthfully reporting the rankings of all other products, then she is selected
with probability one when µk = 1 (because s1 = gl > gk = s2), and with probability zero
when µl = 1 (because s1 = gk < gl = s2). Suppose recipient 2’s ranking γ2 6= (1, ..., N) (with
probability θ). Then similarly, reversing the rankings of products k and l will only increase recipient
1’s probability of being selected unless µl = 1. Therefore, by reversing the rankings of products k
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As discussed above, when
∑N
j=1 µj = 1, reversing the rankings of products k and l will affect
























































































× (v1,k − v1,l)





































× (v1,k − v1,l) + (1− η2)θ ×
1
N






× (1− η1 − η1)− (1− η2)θ ×
1
N
× η1 − η2
>0,
where the first inequality holds because when
∑N
j=1 µj = 1, the expected payoff loss by reversing
the rankings of products k and l is upper bounded by 1N v1,l (since there will be payoff loss only when
µl = 1), and when
∑N
j=1 µj 6= 1, the payoff loss is upper bounded by 1 (recall that by construction,
v1,1 ≤ 1 and K = 1); the second inequality holds because v1,k ≥ 1− η1 and v1,l ≤ η1; and the last
inequality holds as long as η1, η2 are sufficiently small and 1− θ > 0.
Hence, reversing the rankings of products k and l strictly increases the expected payoff at t = 0,
which contradicts truthfulness. Therefore, we have g1 ≥ ... ≥ gN .
Step 2: Without loss of generality, we assume that 1 = g1 ≥ ... ≥ gN = 0. We now show that to
ensure truthfulness for case NI-C, there must exist k ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} such that g1 = ... = gk = 1
and gk+1 = ... = gN = 0. There is nothing to prove for N ≤ 2. Consider N ≥ 3. Suppose this
is not the case, i.e., there exists k ∈ {2, ..., N − 1} such that 0 < gk < 1. Assume that recipient 1
believes that recipient 2’s true ranking is γ2 = (1, ..., N) with probability 1− θ, where θ < 13 . We
next show that recipient 1 may have an incentive to misreport her rankings of products 1 and N as
γ′1,1 = 1 and γ
′
1,N = k if her true ranking is such that γ1,1 = k and γ1,N = 1 (i.e., to improve the
ranking of product 1 from k to 1 and lower the ranking of product N from 1 to k), and she believes
that with a large probability 1 − η, one of the N products has an inventory level of one while all
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other products have zero inventory.
Conditioned on that only one product has an inventory level of one while all other products have
zero inventory, misreporting affects recipient 1’s probability of being selected only when µ1 = 1 or
µN = 1 (with conditional probability 1N each). Suppose recipient 2’s ranking is γ2 = (1, ..., N).
If recipient 1 truthfully reports her ranking, then she is selected with probability zero when µ1 = 1
(because s1 = gk < 1 = s2), and with probability one when µN = 1 (because s1 = 1 > 0 = s2).
If recipient 1 misreports her rankings of products 1 and N as γ′1,1 = 1 and γ
′
1,N = k, then she is
selected with probability 12 when µ1 = 1 (because s1 = 1 = s2), and with probability one when
µN = 1 (because s1 = gk > 0 = s2). Suppose recipient 2’s ranking γ2 6= (1, ..., N). Then
similarly, misreporting will only increase recipient 1’s probability of being selected unless µN = 1.
Therefore, by misreporting the rankings of products 1 and N , the probability for recipient 1 to be
selected will increase by at least:




− (1− η)θ × 1
N
− η × 1,
which is strictly positive for sufficiently small η since θ < 13 . That is, in this case, misreporting
strictly increases the expected payoff at t = 0 if recipient 1’s valuations for different products are
sufficiently close to each other (Proposition 1), which contradicts truthfulness.
Step 3: We show that for caseNI-C, the only truthful mechanisms are such that g1 ≥ g2 = ... =
gN or g1 = ... = gN−1 ≥ gN . Given that there exists k = 1, ..., N − 1 such that g1 = ... = gk = 1
and gk+1 = ... = gN = 0 (i.e., Step 2), there is nothing to prove for N ≤ 3. Consider N = 4.
Suppose g1 = g2 = 1 and g3 = g4 = 0. Without loss of generality, assume that recipient 1 believes
that recipient 2’s true ranking is γ2 = (1, 2, 3, 4) with probability 1−θ, where θ < 13 . Let η1, η2 > 0
be two small numbers. We now show that recipient 1 has an incentive to misreport her ranking as
γ ′1 = (2, 4, 1, 3) if her true ranking is γ1 = (3, 4, 1, 2), true valuation is v1 = (η1, 0, 1, 2η1),
and she believes that with probability 1 − η2, two of the four products have an inventory level of
one while the other two products have zero inventory. There are six possibilities (with conditional
probability 16 each):
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Inventory levels µ Score of recipient 1 Score of recipient 1 Score of recipient 2
(truth-reporting) (misreporting) (when γ2 = (1, 2, 3, 4))
(1,1,0,0) 0 1 2
(1,0,1,0) 1 2 1
(1,0,0,1) 1 1 1
(0,1,1,0) 1 1 1
(0,1,0,1) 1 0 1
(0,0,1,1) 2 1 0
Suppose recipient 2’s ranking is γ2 = (1, 2, 3, 4). Then misreporting affects recipient 1’s proba-
bility of being selected only when µ = (1, 0, 1, 0) or µ = (0, 1, 0, 1). In particular, if recipient
1 truthfully reports her ranking, then she is selected with probability 12 under both cases. If recip-
ient 1 misreports her ranking as γ ′1 = (2, 4, 1, 3), then she is selected with probability one when
µ = (1, 0, 1, 0), and with probability zero when µ = (0, 1, 0, 1). Suppose recipient 2’s ranking
γ2 6= (1, 2, 3, 4). Then similarly, misreporting can only increase recipient 1’s probability of be-
ing selected unless µ = (0, 1, 0, 1) or µ = (0, 0, 1, 1). Therefore, by misreporting, recipient 1’s






× (1 + η1 − 2η1)− (1− η2)θ ×
1
6
× (2η1 + 1 + 2η1)− η2 × 2,
which is strictly positive for sufficiently small η1, η2 since θ < 13 . That is, in this case, misreporting
strictly increases the expected payoff at t = 0, which contradicts truthfulness.
For the general case where N > 4, the proof follows from a similar construction: Assume that
recipient 1 believes that recipient 2’s true ranking is γ2 = (1, ..., N) with probability 1−θ. Suppose
g1 = g2 = 1 and gN−1 = gN = 0. Then, we can show that recipient 1 has an incentive to misreport
her ranking as γ ′1 = (2, N, 3, ..., N − 2, 1, N − 1) if her true ranking is γ1 = (N − 1, N, 3, ..., N −
2, 1, 2), true valuation is v1 = (η1, 0, (N − 3)η1, ..., 2η1, 1, (N − 2)η1), and she believes that with
probability 1− η2, two of the N products have an inventory level of one while other products have
zero inventory. Therefore, any mechanism with g1 = g2 = 1 and gN−1 = gN = 0 is not truthful,
which completes the proof. 
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Proof of Proposition 5. The “only if” part of the proposition follows directly from Step 1 of
the proof for the “only if” part of Proposition 4. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove the “if” part, i.e.,
for case NI-NC, if g1 ≥ ... ≥ gN , then the score function si =
∑N
j=1 gjµρi,j , i = 1, 2 is truthful.
Recall that for case NI-NC, recipients’ beliefs on inventory levels and competitor’s rankings are
both symmetric in products. Then, for each recipient, the expected amount of each product she
receives is solely determined by her reported ranking of that product (not the specific index of that
product). For each recipient i, let z0i,j denote the expected amount of her reported rank-j product she
receives at t = 0, where i = 1, 2; j = 1, ..., N . Then, it is sufficient to show that if g1 ≥ ... ≥ gN ,
then z0i,j > z
0
i,k for 1 ≤ j < k ≤ N (if this is true, then misreporting leads to a strictly smaller
expected payoff at t = 0).
Without loss of generality, assume that recipient i’s reported ranking is γi = (1, ..., N). Fixing
the inventory levels of all other products that are not j or k, consider two symmetric cases with equal
probability: (i) µj = a, µk = b; and (ii) µj = b, µk = a, where 0 ≤ b ≤ a ≤ K. Let pa, pb > 0 be
the probabilities that recipient i will be selected in cases (i) and (ii), respectively. The probabilities
are strictly positive because recipient −i can have any possible ranking γ−i ∈ Γ. Further, we have
pa ≥ pb because recipient i has a higher score in case (i) than in case (ii) (i.e., if recipient i is
selected in case (ii), then she must also be selected in case (i)). Therefore, with probability pb > 0,
recipient i is selected in both cases (i) and (ii); with probability pa − pb ≥ 0, recipient i is selected
in case (i) but not in case (ii); and with probability 1− pa ≥ 0, recipient i is selected in neither case
(i) or (ii).
To prove z0i,j > z
0
i,k, it is sufficient to show that the inequality holds strictly conditional on that
recipient i is selected in both cases (i) and (ii). Since the probability for cases (i) and (ii) is equal and
recipient i will only receive product k when she has emptied all product j in inventory, clearly we
have z0i,j ≥ z0i,k. Further, the inequality is strict because ψi(µ) > 0,∀µ ∈ M , implying a positive
probability that recipient i needs some product j but not all of products j and k to fill her container.

Proof of Theorem 2. The proof of Theorem 2 directly follows from Propositions 4 and 5. In
particular, Propositions 4 and 5 together imply that the set of truthful additive linear score functions
for case NI-NC is at least as large as that for case NI-C. Therefore, the optimal truthful additive
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linear score functions for case NI-NC performs no worse than that for case NI-C, i.e., πNI-NC ≥
πNI-C . 
Proof of Proposition 6. First, from the proof for the “if” part of Proposition 4, we know that
for the case NI , if g1 ≥ g2 = ... = gN , or g1 = ... = gN−1 ≥ gN , then si =
∑N
j=1 gjµρi,j , i = 1, 2
is truthful regardless of recipients’ belief on each other’s rankings. Then, for any given recipients’
beliefs φi,−i, i = 1, 2, the set of truthful mechanisms is at least as large as that for case NI-C.
Therefore, πNI-C ≤ πNI(φ1,2, φ2,1). Second, from Step 1 of the proof for the “only if” part
of Proposition 4, we know that g1 ≥ ... ≥ gN is a necessary condition to ensure truthfulness
regardless of recipients’ belief on each other’s rankings. Then, for any given recipients’ beliefs
φi,−i, i = 1, 2, the set of truthful mechanisms is at most as large as that for caseNI-NC. Therefore,
πNI-NC ≥ πNI(φ1,2, φ2,1). 
Proof of Proposition 7. We prove this proposition in the following two steps.
Step 1: We show that to ensure truthfulness,
∑N
j=1 h(ṽi,j) must be a constant C. Suppose this






i,j). Without loss of
generality, assume that the associated rankings of vi and v′i are the same. Let η be a small number.
We now show that recipient i has an incentive to misreport her valuation as v′i if her true valuation
is vi and she believes that with probability 1− η, the inventory levels of all products are equal, i.e.,
µ1 = ... = µN .




j=1 h(ṽi,j))µ1, in which
case reporting v′i leads to a strictly higher score and hence a strictly larger probability of being
selected than reporting vi. Let q > 0 denote the difference between the probabilities for recipient
i to be selected by reporting v′i and vi, respectively. Then, by misreporting, recipient i’s expected
payoff at t = 0 is at least (1 − η)qvi,ρi,1µ1 − ηvi,ρi,1K more than that of truth-reporting. Clearly,
this difference is strictly positive for sufficiently small η. Hence, recipient i has an incentive to
misreport, which contradicts truthfulness.
Step 2: We show that to ensure truthfulness, we must have
∑N
j=1 h(ṽi,j) = C = 0, implying
h(ṽi,j) = 0, ∀ṽi,j . Suppose this is not the case. Assume that C = 1. Consider the following two
cases:
Case 1: N = 2. In this case, by reporting vi with associated ranking γi = (1, 2), recipient i
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gets g1 + h(ṽi,1) points for each unit of product 1 in inventory, and g2 + h(ṽi,2) points for each unit
of product 2 in inventory. Since
∑2
j=1(gj + h(ṽi,j)) = g1 + g2 + 1 is a constant, the decision of
reporting different valuations is equivalent to allocating a total of g1 + g2 + 1 fixed points between
the two products (with g1 and g2 going to two different products), and the recipient who allocates
more points to product 1 is selected if µ1 > µ2, the other recipient is selected if µ1 < µ2, and a
random recipient is selected if µ1 = µ2. Then, under symmetric beliefs on inventory levels, the
probability for each recipient to be selected is always 12 . We now show that any recipient i with true
valuations 1 > ṽi,1 > ṽi,2 > 0 has an incentive to misreport her valuations as ṽ′i,1 = 1, ṽ
′
i,2 = 0.
This is true because allocating more points to product 1 increases recipient i’s probability of being
selected when µ1 > µ2 (while decreasing the probability of being selected by the same extent when
µ1 < µ2), which increases recipient i’s expected payoff at t = 0. Hence, recipient i has an incentive
to misreport.
Case 2: N > 2. In this case, we first show that h(ṽi,j) must be a linear function of ṽi,j . Since∑N
j=1 h(ṽi,j) = 1 for any valuation vector, for any s, x ∈ [0, 1] such that 1 − s(1 + x) ≥ 0, we
must have h(s) + h(sx) + h(1 − s(1 + x)) = 1. Since h is monotonically nondecreasing, it must
be differentiable almost everywhere. Then, we have sh′(sx) − sh′(1 − s(1 + x)) = 0. Let s > 0
and x = 0, then h′(0) = h′(1 − s). Hence, the derivative of h must be a constant in [0, 1]. Since
h(0) = 0 and
∑N
j=1 h(ṽi,j) = 1, we must have h(ṽi,j) = ṽi,j .
Note that due to symmetry in recipients, there must exist a valuation vector vi ∈ V such that
by reporting vi, the probability for recipient i to be selected is no larger than 12 . Without loss of
generality, assume γi(vi) = (1, ..., N). Let η be a small number. We now show that recipient i
with true valuation vi has an incentive to misreport her valuation as v′i,1 = 1, v
′
i,j = (N − j)η, j =
2, ..., N if she believes that one of the N products have zero inventory while all other products have
an inventory level of one with a large probability (for simplicity, we proceed by assuming that this





j=1 h(ṽi,j) are constants independent of vi, to compare the score
of the two recipients, it is sufficient to compare the amount of points each recipient loses due to
the associated product not being available. Consider the following two possibilities: If µ1 = 0 and
µj = 1, ∀j ≥ 2 (with probability 1N ), then misreporting leads to a loss of g1 +1−o(η) points (since
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h(ṽi,j) = ṽi,j) and hence recipient i will only be selected with probability o(η). If µj = 0 for some
j ≥ 2 and µk = 1, ∀k 6= j (with probability 1N for each j), then misreporting leads to a loss of
gj + o(η) points and hence recipient i will be selected with probability at least jN − o(η) (i.e., when
recipient −i’s ranking of product j is higher than or equal to j). Therefore, the overall probability








)− o(η) = (N + 2)(N − 1)
2N2
− o(η),
which is strictly larger than 12 when η is sufficiently small. Further, misreporting decreases recipient
i’s probability of being selected only when µ1 = 0, µj = 1, ∀j ≥ 2, in which case the value of
recipient i’s best bundle at t = 0 is strictly lower than when µj = 0 for some j ≥ 2, µk = 1,∀k 6= j.
Hence, misreporting leads to a strictly higher expected payoff at t = 0, which is a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof of Theorem 3 directly follows from Propositions 5 and 7.
Propositions 5 and 7 together imply that the set of truthful additive linear score functions for case




In practice, there are typically multiple recipients in the system waiting to be served. For example,
in the case of MedShare, there are usually 5-10 recipients for whom funding has been secured for
a container shipment. In this section, we consider an extension where T recipients are served in T
respective periods.
We ask all of the T recipients to report their preference rankings of different products at the
beginning of t = 0, and the decision is to select a recipient among the remaining T − t recipients
at each period t = 0, ..., T − 2. We note that when the time horizon is not too large (e.g., in the
case of MedShare, a period is about one week, and the horizon length is about five weeks when five
recipients are considered), it is reasonable to assume that recipient needs for critical products do not
change within the horizon.
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Recall that in the main text, we have primarily analyzed additive linear score functions. Such
a scoring approach can be easily applied to the multi-recipient setting: At each period t, based
on the reported rankings of recipients and the MSRO inventory levels µtj , j = 1, ..., N , each of the




ρi,j , i = 1, ..., T−t, and the recipient
with the highest score is selected. If there is a tie among k ≤ T − t recipients (i.e., their scores are
the same and are the highest among the T − t recipients), then each of the k recipients is selected
with probability 1k .
Based on the above setup, we show that in the multi-recipient setting, i) the conclusion that
there is nonnegative value of eliminating inventory and competitor information continues to hold;
ii) when both inventory and competitor information is eliminated, any additive linear score function
with g1 ≥ ... ≥ gN remains truthful; and iii) there is no value added from further eliciting recipient
valuations. We refer the formal characterization and proof of all these results to our Technical
Appendix (available upon request).
Finally, we find that for case NI-C, an additive linear score function with g1 = 1, g2 = ... =
gN = 0 remains truthful under the following modification: At t = 0, after all T recipients report
their rankings, we randomly sort the recipients from 1 to T . Then, for recipient 1, we simply set
her score as the inventory level of her rank-1 product; for each recipient i = 2, ..., T , we define
her score as the inventory level of her most preferred product among those that have not been used
to define the scores of recipients 1, ..., i − 1. This way, the score of each recipient is equal to the
inventory level of a single product, and the scores of different recipients are defined as the inventory
levels of different products.
C.2.2 Asymmetric Score Functions
Recall that in the main text, we studied score functions that are symmetric in recipients, i.e., both
recipients share the same score function si = g(γi,µ), i = 1, 2. In this section, we present an
extension to consider asymmetric (i.e., recipient-specific) score functions.
In particular, we now consider a general score function si = gi(γi,µ), i = 1, 2, and extend our
characterization of truthful mechanisms for case I (i.e., Proposition 3) to this general setting. More
specifically, we show that for case I , a score function si = gi(γi,µ), i = 1, 2 is truthful if and only
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if the associated mechanism p(γ1,γ2,µ) defined in Equation 7 is a constant for any γ1,γ2 ∈ Γ.
Clearly, if symmetry in recipients is required, i.e., g1(γi,µ) = g2(γi,µ),∀γi ∈ Γ, then
p(γ1,γ2,µ) has to be
1
2 ,∀γ1,γ2 ∈ Γ. Hence, the above result generalizes Proposition 3 in the
following two ways: i) from an additive linear score function to a general score function, and ii)
from a symmetric mechanism (i.e., two recipients sharing the same score function) to an asymmetric
mechanism.
For case NI , similar to before, we consider additive linear score functions, except that we now
allow a base score s0,i that can be different for different recipients: si = s0,i +
∑N
j=1 gjµρi,j , i =
1, 2, where g1 ≥ ... ≥ gN . We show that under such a score function, i) the conclusion that there is
nonnegative value of eliminating inventory and competitor information continues to hold; ii) when
both inventory and competitor information is eliminated, any additive linear score function with
g1 ≥ ... ≥ gN remains truthful; and iii) under additional conditions, there is no value added from
eliciting recipient valuations. We refer the formal characterization and proof of all these results to
our Technical Appendix.
C.2.3 Bounded Perturbation on Recipients’ Beliefs
In the main text, we assumed that recipient beliefs on inventory levels and each other’s rankings
are both symmetric over products in case NI-NC. In this section, we show that our result is in
a way robust against bounded perturbations on recipient beliefs (i.e., when recipients believe that
some product is slightly more likely to have a higher inventory than other products, or that the other
recipient is slightly more likely to prefer some product than other products). More specifically,
we show that under bounded perturbations on recipients’ beliefs, any recipient whose valuations of
different products are sufficient different does not have an incentive to misreport under our proposed
mechanisms.
While we refer the formal characterization and proof of the above result to our Technical Ap-
pendix, the key intuition of this result is that when a recipient have asymmetric beliefs on inventory
and competitor preference, then she may have an incentive to improve the ranking of some product
(e.g., a product that is likely to have a higher inventory level than other products) if there is another
product of higher ranking but similar valuation. In contrast, if all products of higher rankings have
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significantly higher valuations than this product, then misreporting will reduce the expected payoff.
C.2.4 Bayesian Update of Recipients’ Belief on MSRO Inventory
Recall that for case NI , we assumed that the MSRO inventory information is private to the MSRO
and that recipients have a prior belief on the MSRO inventory levels. Since MSROs with different
inventory levels may prefer different mechanisms, theoretically recipients may be able to update
their belief and infer the inventory information based on the announced mechanism.
We prove that the above is not a problem under an additive linear score function mechanism
that we consider. More specifically, we show that under any set of announced gj’s, recipients’
posterior belief on the MSRO inventory remains symmetric in products. The key intuition is that
under an additive linear score function, each recipient gets gj points for each unit of her rank-j
product (i.e., product ρi,j) instead of product j, hence recipients are not able to infer the inventory
levels of different products when they have a symmetric prior on both the MSRO inventory levels
and the other recipient’s rankings. We refer the formal characterization and proof of this result to
our Technical Appendix.
C.2.5 An Alternative Definition of Truthfulness
In the main text, we defined truthfulness based on a lexicographical dominance, which capture the
observation that recipients are typically impatient for critical products can compete for the shipping
opportunity. An alternative way to define truthfulness is to consider a discounted payoff model and
assume that recipients will truthfully report their ranking or valuation when truth-reporting results
in a total discounted payoff at least as large as that of reporting any other ranking or valuation.
We prove that under this alternative definition of truthfulness, i) the conclusion that for case
I , the only truthful (symmetric and acyclic) mechanism is random selection among recipients con-
tinues to hold; and ii) when recipients have symmetric beliefs on the MSRO inventory levels, the
other recipient’s ranking, as well as the arrival quantities of different products, an additive lin-
ear score function with monotone coefficients (with coefficients of non-top-ranked products being
zero) remains truthful. We refer the formal characterization and proof of this result to our Technical
Appendix.
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C.2.6 Heuristics for Relaxing the “Best Bundle” Assumption
A key feature of MedShare’s existing resource allocation model is that each recipient is allowed to
pick their own products to fill a container. This practice is intuitive and expected to significantly
reduce the mismatch between supply and demand compared with traditional “push” models imple-
mented in this context where products are sent to recipients without explicitly considering recipient
needs.
The objective of our paper is to improve upon the above industry best practice by helping
MSROs select the ideal recipient to serve at each shipping opportunity based on recipient needs and
the MSRO inventory levels; once a recipient is selected, following a similar structure as the existing
practice, we assumed that the recipient receives the “best bundle” (based on reported preferences)
from the MSRO inventory. While this practice is appealing from implementation perspectives, one
way that can potentially further improve the MSRO’s value provision capability is to relax the best
bundle assumption and optimally determine what to fill in each container in addition to the recipient
selection decision.
In the following, we first discuss how the best bundle assumption can be adapted to capture
reservations of some critical products for future recipients through exogenous quantity limits. Then,
we present a heuristic approach to relax the best bundle assumption so that what the selected recip-
ient will receive also depends on the needs of other recipients in the system. Finally, we discuss the
challenges faced by the general problem from both implementation and computation perspectives.
First, in the case of MedShare, we observe that each recipient usually receives one or at most
two pieces of each critical biomedical equipment (even if MedShare has a few more in inventory),
so as to reserve the rest for future recipients. In this case, the best bundle of each recipient is defined
as the set of items that maximizes the container value among the truncated MSRO inventory, where
the inventory is truncated by quantity limits the MSROs imposes. This is how we constructed the
calibrated numerical study in §7 and how the best bundle assumption is implemented in practice.
Next, we present a simple and intuitive heuristic that further relaxes the best bundle assumption.
In particular, we stick with our proposed recipient selection approach; once a recipient i is selected,
we determine the container mix for recipient i as follows: Let γ−i,j the the average ranking of all
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remaining recipients waiting in the system for product j; then, instead of sending the best bundle to
recipient i, we skip product j (i.e., reserve it for future recipients) if µj = 1 and γi,j − γ−i,j ≥ ∆γ,
where ∆γ is a policy parameter. Clearly, when ∆γ ≥ N , this approach reduces to the best bundle
assumption. Otherwise, what this approach does is to reserve the products that are significantly
higher ranked by other recipients (i.e., when the gap between the rankings is greater than or equal
to ∆γ).
Under the same setup we considered in §7, we numerically test the performance of the above
approach under different ∆γ values and report the total value provision to recipients below. From
these results, we observe that the proposed heuristic to relax the best bundle assumption has some
value added over the best bundle approach (a performance improvement from 6.7% to 7.5% when
∆γ = 1 and 2).
∆γ 0 1 2 3 N = 20
Improvement over 7.1% 7.5% 7.5% 7.3% 6.7%
random priority
While we stick to the proposed recipient selection mechanism and relax the best bundle assump-
tion for the selected recipient in the heuristic presented above, we note the most general problem
is to simultaneous optimize which recipient to serve and what products to send to the selected
recipient. However, the general problem is challenging from both implementation and analytical
tractability perspectives. First, if what each recipient receives is determined by the ranking profile
of all recipients, it becomes unclear how a scoring approach for recipient selection will continue
to work. More specifically, if one is interested in sticking to a scoring approach, then intuitively,
the score of each recipient should depend on not only her own ranking but also the rankings of
other recipients, which makes this approach more complicated and less intuitive (note that in other
settings such as organ allocation, the score of each patient does not depend on the characteristics of
other patients). Second, from a pure computation perspective, the general problem is challenging
as even the centralized version of the problem (i.e., assume recipient valuations are known to the
MSRO) is intractable due to the high dimensionality of both state and action spaces. Hence, finding
competitive yet simple and implementable solutions that simultaneously determine which recipient
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to serve at each shipping opportunity and which products to allocate to the chosen recipient is an
interesting problem that we leave for future research.
C.3 Description of Date Set and Calibrated Numerical Study
The data set from MedShare contains the information about 39 containers shipped between July
2015 and April 2016. During this period, MedShare shipped out a total of more than one hundred
different kinds of biomedical equipment. For each shipped product, the data set contains detailed
information about recipient name, transportation mode, container capacity, and donor value (i.e.,
market value of the allocated product), among others. The data set also contains two timestamps
that are critical for us to estimate the inventory levels and arrival rates of each product: “Created”
and “ConfirmedDate”. The “Created” timestamp represents the time when the product became
available in MedShare’s inventory, while the “ConfirmedDate” timestamp represents time when the
product was secured for shipment to a specific recipient (for products that are still in MedShare’s
inventory, the “ConfirmedDate” timestamp is empty). Below, we describe how we construct the
calibrated numerical study based on this data set.
Inventory Levels. We divide the interval from July 2015 to April 2016 into 39 periods based on
the shipment date of the 39 containers. Since we have the “Created” and “ConfirmedDate” times-
tamps for all products that are shipped from July 2015 to April 2016 and the “Created” timestamps
for all products that were still in MedShare’s inventory at the end of April 2016, we are able to
compute inventory levels at each period from July 2015 to April 2016. In particular, we first deter-
mine the initial inventory levels at the beginning of July 2015 using the “Created” timestamps for
all products that had arrived and were not shipped out before July 2015. Then, we determine the
inventory levels at each period by incorporating the inflow through the “Created” timestamps, and
outflow through the “ConfirmedDate” timestamps.
Arrival Rates. To determine the arrival distribution of each product, we first determine the
arrival quantity of each product during each period using the “Created” timestamps. Based on this
arrival data, we assume that the arrival of each product follows a Poisson process, and estimate the
arrival rate of each product by calculating the mean of the arrival quantities during all 39 periods.
Valuations. Finally, we describe how we construct recipients’ valuations. A natural measure
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for the valuation of each product is the donor value, i.e., the donor’s estimate of the market value
of a donated product. However, an examination of the shipment data reveals that recipients do
not necessarily pick the highest market value products, which suggests that recipient needs may
sometimes favor ordering lower market value products. Therefore, we next describe a recipient-
choice based adjustment to donor values to account for recipient-specific, needs-based valuations of
different product categories.
First, we analyze the inventory level of each product before each recipient’s order. If a product is
available in inventory (i.e., it has a positive inventory level) and is picked by a recipient, we say that
this product is critical to this recipient. If a product is available in inventory but is not picked by this
recipient, we say that this product is noncritical to this recipient. For products that are not available
(i.e., have a zero inventory level) before a recipient orders, we assume that there is a probability q
for each of these products to be critical, and we estimate q as the fraction of critical products among
the products with positive inventory levels, which is estimated to be around 0.4 in our numerical
study.1 Finally, after all products are designated as either critical or noncritical for a given recipient,
we set the recipient-specific valuations in the following way such that the valuation of a noncritical
product is no higher than that of a critical product. In particular, we first set the valuation of a critical
product for this recipient as the donor value of this product. For a noncritical product, if its donor
value is lower than or equal to the smallest donor value of all critical products, we set the valuation
as its donor value; otherwise, we set the valuation as the smallest donor value of critical products.
An illustrative example is as follows:
Suppose MedShare has a total of five product categories in the system, and the donor values
for products 1-5 are 30, 25, 40, 20, and 35, respectively. Suppose the inventory levels are positive
for all products when recipient A orders, and recipient A has picked products 1-3 but did not pick
products 4 and 5. Then, we say products 1-3 are critical while products 4 and 5 are noncritical to
recipient A. Therefore, we simply set recipient A’s valuations for products 1-3 as their donor values.
For product 4, since its donor value is 20 < min(30, 25, 40) = 25, we set recipient A’s valuation
1Through extensive numerical analyses, we find that the value improvement of the proposed mechanisms
over random priority decreases in q. As we reported in the main text, when q is estimated as the fraction of
critical products among the products with positive inventory levels, mechanism NI-NC improves the total
value provision by 6.7%. In the worst-case when q = 1, our numerical analysis indicates that this value
provision improvement would be 4.8%.
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for product 4 as its donor value 20. Finally, for product 5, since its donor value is 35 > 25, we set
the valuation for product 5 as 25. Hence, recipient A’s valuations for products 1-5 are set as 30, 25,
40, 20, and 25, respectively.
The above procedure provides a set of recipient-specific valuations that are closely related to
the donor values and are consistent with recipients’ past picking behavior (if a recipient values a
noncritical product more than a critical product, she would have picked a noncritical product instead
of a critical one, which contradicts the definition of critical and noncritical products). While there
could be multiple ways of constructing recipient valuations and our proposed approach is not unique,
we note that it provides a reasonable set of recipient-specific valuations that are consistent with
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